Sherman v. Sawyer

• Decision Date: 26 December 1980
• Docket Number: No. 6492,6492
• Citation: 621 P.2d 346,63 Haw. 55
• Parties: M. Frank SHERMAN and Mildred M. Sherman; Paul S. Collier and Dee Anna L. Collier, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Stephen SAWYER and Harriet Sawyer, aka Harriet Bouslog; David Thompson and Mitsui Thompson; Paul Pinsky and Sara Pinsky; Bernard Berkov and Beth Berkov, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 346

621 P.2d 346

63 Haw. 55

M. Frank SHERMAN and Mildred M. Sherman; Paul S. Collier and Dee Anna L. Collier, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Stephen SAWYER and Harriet Sawyer, aka Harriet Bouslog David Thompson and Mitsui Thompson; Paul Pinsky and Sara Pinsky; Bernard Berkov and Beth Berkov, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 6492.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Dec. 26, 1980.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Generally, each circuit court, pursuant to HRS § 603-21.5, is vested with subject matter jurisdiction over civil causes of action unless precluded by statute or constitution. Circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction.

2. HRS § 633-27 confers to the small claims division of the district court exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving security deposits in residential landlord-tenant relationships.

3. This court is bound by the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the statute unless the literal construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute.

4. Conferring exclusive jurisdiction to one court means that all other courts are deprived of jurisdiction to hear and determine pending actions.

5. Under Rule 82, H.R.C.P., the Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be used to extend the jurisdiction of the circuit court.

Stephen P. Pingree, Honolulu, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Mark Bernstein, Honolulu (Harriet Bouslog, Honolulu, on brief, Bouslog & Symonds, Honolulu, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., OGATA, MENOR and LUM, JJ., and CHUN, Circuit Judge, in place of NAKAMURA, J., disqualified.

OGATA, Justice.

Plaintiffs-appellants, M. Frank and Mildred Sherman, and Paul and Dee Anna Collier (hereinafter appellants) appeal an order by the circuit court granting defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss. Defendants-appellees (hereinafter appellees) are Stephen and Harriet Sawyer, David and Mitsui Thompson, Paul and Sara Pinsky, and Bernard and Beth Berkov.

Appellants lived in an apartment complex known as the Dynasty Apartments located at 2442 Tusitala Street, Honolulu. Appellees are the owners of this complex. When appellants assumed tenancy in January 1976, and November 1975, respectively, each posted a $50.00 security deposit with Gordon Crabtree & Associates, Inc., who had earlier purchased the apartment complex from appellees. In February 1976, Crabtree defaulted on the agreement of sale and appellees repossessed the property. Appellees then sought an accounting of the security deposits contained within the trust funds established by Crabtree.

In May 1976, appellants moved out of the apartment complex, after proper notice was given to the resident manager. However, the security deposits of the appellants were not returned within the time period set forth in HRS § 521-44(c). As of July 1, 1976, appellants' security deposits still had not been returned. After having an attorney make inquiries on their behalf, appellees tendered a return of appellants' security deposit. This tender offer was rejected by appellants.

Subsequently, appellants filed a four count complaint in the First Circuit Court alleging: 1) a wrongful withholding of appellants' security deposit; 2) a breach of contract on the lease for failure to return the security deposit; 3) failure to notify appellants of the change in management pursuant to HRS § 521-43; and 4) an independent tort action for infliction of emotional distress. ¹

The trial court granted appellees' motion to dismiss finding that it lacked jurisdiction over all the causes of actions. We need not address any other issues herein except that of the jurisdiction of the circuit court to hear and determine this action. We affirm the lower court's ruling with respect to counts 1 and 2 of the complaint, but reverse as to the ruling on counts 3 and 4.

I.

The legislature is vested with legislative power by the Hawaii State Constitution, art. III, sec. 1. Legislative power is defined as the power to enact laws and to declare what the law shall be. Bissen v. Fujii, 51 Haw. 636, 638, 466 P.2d 429, 431 (1970). Under this grant of authority, the legislature has the power to establish the subject matter jurisdiction of our state court system. The legislature has utilized such power by enacting HRS §§ 603-21.5 and 633-27.

The circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction. State v. Villados, 55 Haw. 394, 397, 520 P.2d 427, 430 (1974). We defined jurisdiction as "the power and authority on the part of the court to hear and judicially determine and dispose of the cause pending before it." Id. at 396, 520 P.2d at 430. HRS § 603-21.5 gives the circuit court subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions and proceedings. ^{2 2} Thus, the circuit court has jurisdiction over all civil causes of action unless precluded by the State Constitution or by statute.

In State ex rel. McClung v. Fukushima, 53 Haw. 295, 492 P.2d 128 (1972), this Court held that the circuit court had jurisdiction over a defamation action, even in the absence of express statutory provisions conferring jurisdiction over that cause of action to the circuit court. The Court reasoned that the circuit court had jurisdiction based on the broad statutory language in HRS § 603-21.5.

It follows from McClung that the circuit court properly has jurisdiction to hear actions in tort and to determine statutory violations in the instant case. We are of the opinion that actions in torts and statutory violations are causes of action over which the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction based on HRS § 603-21.5. Thus, the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear and dispose of these causes of action.

II.

The question which we now consider is whether the circuit court has been conferred jurisdiction over causes of action involving security deposits in landlord-tenant relationships.

In 1972, the legislature prescribed that disputes involving security deposits were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the small claims division of the district court. HRS § 633-27 states in relevant part:

(a) All district courts, except as otherwise provided, shall exercise jurisdiction conferred by this chapter, and while sitting in the exercise of that jurisdiction, shall be known and referred to as the small claims division of the district court, provided that the jurisdiction of the court when sitting as a small claims division of the district court shall be confined to:

(2) Cases involving disagreements between landlord and tenant about the security deposit in a residential landlord-tenant relationship;

.... In cases arising under paragraph (2) the jurisdiction of the small claims division of the district court shall be exclusive. (Emphasis added.)

It is well settled that this court is bound by the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the statute unless the literal construction would produce an absurd and unjust result, and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute. State v. Palama, 62 Haw. 159, 612 P.2d 1168 (1980); Chun v. Employees Retirement Sys., 61 Haw. 596, 607 P.2d 415 (1980); State v. Sylva, 61 Haw. 385, 605 P.2d 496 (1980); In Re Spencer, 60 Haw. 497, 591 P.2d 611 (1979); In Re Grayco Land Escrow, 57 Haw. 436, 559 P.2d 264, cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910, 97 S.Ct. 2976, 53 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1977); In Re Palk, 56 Haw. 492, 542 P.2d 361 (1975); Univ. of Hawaii v. Leahi Foundation, 56 Haw. 404, 537 P.2d 1190 (1975); State v. Park, 55 Haw. 610, 525 P.2d 586 (1974). HRS § 633-27 must be given effect according to its plain and obvious meaning.

The phrase exclusive jurisdiction as used in statutes has been interpreted in its general and common usage as follows:

Nor can there be any doubt as to the meaning the legislature intended to give to the word exclusive. In its usual and generally accepted sense, as given by lexicographers, and in the ordinary speech of the people, it means, possessed to the exclusion of others; appertaining to the subject alone, individual, sole; to confer exclusive jurisdiction on one court deprives all other courts of such jurisdiction, whether theretofore exclusive or concurrent, conferred by statute.... possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation and enjoyment to any other; nor including, admitting or pertaining to any other; opposed to inclusive: .... The word "exclusive" is of Latin derivation "ex" meaning "out" and "claudere" meaning "to shut." "Exclusive" precludes any idea of co-existence and its usual, ordinary and generally accepted meaning is "sole," "undivided" and "possessed to the exclusion of others." (Citations omitted.)

Quoting Harris-Walsh v. Borough of Dickson City, 420 Pa. 259, 270-71, 216 A.2d 329, 334 (1966); Commonwealth v. Supt. of House of Corrections, 64 Pa.Super. 613, 623 (1916); see Keller v. Commonwealth, 594 S.W.2d 589 (Ky.1980); Powell v. Walden, 473 S.W.2d 147 (Ky.App.1971); Black's Law Dictionary, p. 507 (5th ed. 1979).

The statute provides that the district courts small claims division has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving security deposits. Therefore, a tenant or landlord must raise disputes involving security deposits in the small claims division of the district court. ³ To do otherwise would completely ignore the obvious meaning and intent of the statute.

Our position is supported by the legislative history of HRS § 633-27. The House Judiciary Committee Report explains the underlying policy of the statute and that report states:

The purpose of this bill is to entrust residential landlord-tenant disputes about security deposits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the small claims division of our district courts and thereby expedite and lower the costs of settling such disputes. (Emphasis ours.)

It is the intent of your Committee that the effect of this bill as amended is to provide quick, impartial, and inexpensive settlement of a principal area of dispute between residential landlords and...