Shore Line Realty Co. v. R.I. Dep't of Bus. Regulation

• Decision Date: 29 June 2011
• Docket Number: W.M. No. 2010-367
• Parties: SHORE LINE REALTY CO., INC. v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION and WAKAMO PARK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

SHORE LINE REALTY CO., INC.

v.RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION and WAKAMO PARK HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

W.M. No. 2010-367

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND WASHINGTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

FILED: JUNE 29, 2011

DECISION

LANPHEAR, J. This matter is before the Court on the appeal of Shore Line Realty Co., Inc. Shore Line seeks to vacate a Declaratory Ruling of the Department of Business Regulation ("DBR"). The department regulates year-round mobile home parks, pursuant to chapter 31-44 of the Rhode Island General Laws. The Declaratory Ruling of DBR found that the department was also empowered to regulate seasonally operated mobile and manufactured home parks pursuant to the same statute.

I.FACTS AND TRAVEL

Shore Line owns and operates Wakamo Park in South Kingstown, which rent spaces upon which residents install mobile homes and removable cottages. Leases run only from April 15 to October 15 of each year, that is, the homes are not permanentlyaffixed to the sites. The residents of the park have organized the Wakamo Park Homeowners Association. Several members of the association, residents of the park, wrote to DBR in 2008 and 2009 expressing their concern regarding the Department's failure to actively improve the property.

On May 7, 2009 the association filed a Petition for Declaratory Ruling with DBR seeking an order "declaring Wakamo Park to be subject to the requirements of 31-44-1 et seq and 31-44.1-1 et seq", and subject to the jurisdiction of DBR. Shore Line was not served with the petition. On July 2, 2009 the director of DBR appointed a hearing officer and scheduled a hearing for July 23. DB's order and notice of the July 2 notice was sent to Shore Line at an incorrect address. At the July 23 hearing, the hearing officer expressed concern about the owner's failure to attend, and entered an order allowing all interested parties to brief the issue and ordering the record will "be kept open through September 15, 2009." (DBR order of July 24, 2009). Shortly thereafter, the residents noticed that an incorrect address was being used for the owner, and the July 24 order was mailed to the correct address.

On August 18, 2009, an attorney for Shore Line appeared in the DBR case. Shore Line immediately moved to dismiss and to continue the matter as it had received no advance notice of the hearing, the petition failed to join an indispensable party and failed to state a claim.¹ In a letter dated August 31, the hearing officer extended the deadline for briefs for another 30 days, and allowed either party to request an additional hearing. The owner submitted an answer and a memorandum in October, but did not request a hearing.

The Decision of DBR was issued on May 18, 2010, concluding that the statute is interpreted to allow the department to regulate seasonal mobile and manufacture home sites. Shore Line timely filed this appeal.

II.THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act provides for declaratory rulings by administrative agencies:

§ 42-35-8. Declaratory rulings by agencies. - Each agency shall provide by rule for the filing and prompt disposition of petitions for declaratory rulings as to the applicability of any statutory provision or of any rule or order of the agency. Rulings disposing of petitions have the same status as agency orders in contested cases.

Pursuant to this statute, the departments establish administrative rules or regulations setting forth the procedures for obtaining declaratory rulings. No party cited those department regulations extensively nor did anyone append them to the record herein.

III.THE STANDARD FOR REVIEW

An appeal from an administrative agency is described in another statute, which sets forth the statutory standard for review:

§ 42-35-15. Judicial review of contested cases. - (a) Any person, including any small business, who has exhausted all administrative remedies available to him or her within theagency, and who is aggrieved by a final order in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter. ...

(b) Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a complaint in the superior court ...

(c) ...

(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error or law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

IV.ANALYSIS

A.Statutory Interpretation

Shore Line first suggests that the Department misconstrued the statute to provide for regulation of seasonal communities.

The Petition for Declaratory Ruling sought an order "declaring Wakamo Park to be subject to the requirements of 31-44-1 et seq." (May 5, 2009 petition, page 3).Chapter 31-44 of the General Laws authorizes DBR to regulate mobile and manufactured homes, issue licenses for the homes, and imposes certain statutory regulations on them.²

Several definitions in the chapter provide significant guidance in determining which homes are subject to regulation:

§ 31-44-1. Definitions. - As used in this chapter:

(1) ...

(8) "Mobile and manufactured home" means a detached residential unit designed:

(i) For a long term occupancy and containing sleeping accommodations, a flush toilet, and a tub or shower bath and kitchen facilities, and having both permanent plumbing and electrical connections for attachment to outside

systems;

(ii) To be transported on its own wheels or on a flatbed or other trailer or detachable wheels; and

(iii) To be placed on pads, piers, or tied down, at the site where it is to be occupied as a residence complete and ready for occupancy, except for minor and incidental unpacking and assembly operations and connection to utilities systems.

(9) "Mobile and manufactured home park" or "park" means a plot of ground upon which four (4) or more mobile and manufactured homes, occupied for residential purposes are located.

The department construed this language of the statute to include seasonal occupants and seasonal units.

In order to interpret a statute, this Court and the department are similarly bound by established Rhode Island law:

When we construe a statute or an ordinance, "our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature." D'Amico, 866 A.2d at 1224 (quoting Webster, 774 A.2d at 75). We must "determin[e] and effectuat[e] that legislative intent and attribut[e] to the enactment the most consistent meaning." In re Almeida, 611 A.2d 1375, 1382 (R.I. 1992). "That intent is discovered from an examination of the language, nature, and object of the statute." Berthiaume v. School Committee of Woonsocket, 121 R.I. 243, 247, 397 A.2d 889, 892 (1979). "It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996). "This is particularly true where the Legislature has not defined or qualified the words used within the statute." D'Amico, 866 A.2d at 1224 (quoting Markham v. Allstate Insurance Co., 116 R.I. 152, 156, 352 A.2d 651, 654 (1976)). In giving words their plain-meaning, however, we note that this "approach is not the equivalent of myopic literalism." In re Brown, 903 A.2d 147, 150 (R.I. 2006). "When we determine the true import of statutory language, it is entirely proper for us to look to 'the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context.'" Id. (quoting In re Estate of Roche, 16 N.J. 579, 109 A.2d 655, 659 (1954)). As we previously have held, it would be "foolish and myopic literalism to focus narrowly on" one statutory section without regard for the broader context. In re Brown, 903 A.2d at 150.

Thus, in interpreting a statute or ordinance, we first accept the principle that "statutes should not be construed to achieve meaningless or absurd results." Berthiaume, 121 R.I. at 247, 397 A.2d at 892. "[W]e [then] consider the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other sections." Sorenson v. Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125, 128 (R.I. 1994); accord Bailey v. American Stores, Inc./Star Market, 610 A.2d 117, 119 (R.I. 1992); Stone v. Goulet, 522 A.2d 216,218 (R.I. 1987). Ryan v. City of Providence, 11 A.3d 68, 70-1(2011)

Accordingly, the Court first considers the plain language of the statute. It is noteworthy that the legislature specifically intended to define a mobile and manufactured home, for purposes of this statute. R.I. Gen. Law § 31-44-1(8) not only defines that home as a detached residential unit, but sets forth several conditions. The unit must be designed for long term occupancy, with sleeping accommodations, plumbing and electrical connections. It must also be designed to be transported on wheels and situated on pads. It is a very comprehensive, explicit list of conditions, clearly enumerated in specific detail.

Shore Line contends that the statute was designed to regulate affordable, year round residences (Plaintiff's Brief, Page 8), but none of these requirements is contained in the plain language of the statute. The statutory definition, in itself is clear and unambiguous and can be literally interpreted. In short, there is no need to read more or less into the statute. The General Assembly attempted to set forth a clear...