Shoulars v. Astrue

• Decision Date: 13 November 2009
• Docket Number: No. 5:08-CV-520-FL.,5:08-CV-520-FL.
• Citation: 671 F.Supp.2d 801
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: Randolph SHOULARS, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

671 F.Supp.2d 801

Randolph SHOULARS, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 5:08-CV-520-FL.

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division.

November 13, 2009.

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COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Elizabeth F. Lunn, Wolf & Hogan, P.C., Raleigh, NC, for Plaintiff.

Charlotte M. Connery-Aujla, Social Security Administration, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant.

ORDER

LOUISE W. FLANAGAN, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the court on the parties' cross motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (DE # 20, 22). These motions were referred to Magistrate Judge Robert B. Jones, Jr., who filed a memorandum and recommendation ("M & R") on July 14, 2009. The magistrate judge recommended granting plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings, denying defendant's motion, reversing the decision of the Commissioner, and remanding for a calculation of benefits (DE # 25). Defendant filed an objection to the M & R, arguing the magistrate judge's finding that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") improperly applied Rule 202.11 of the Medical-Vocation Guidelines (the "Grids"), instead of Grid Rule 202.09, was incorrect (DE # 26). In this posture, the matter is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons that follow, this court adopts the M & R, rejects defendant's objection to the M & R, grants plaintiffs motion, denies defendant's motion, and remands this matter for a calculation of benefits.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On May 9, 2005, plaintiff filed an application for Supplement Security Income ("SSI") payments, alleging disability since June 1, 2004. (R. at 17, 75-80.) This claim was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (R. at 27-28, 46, 65.) On December 5, 2007, a hearing was held before an ALJ, at which plaintiff was represented by counsel, and a medical expert ("ME") and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. (R. at 453-87.) The ALJ issued a decision denying plaintiffs request for benefits on March 24, 2008. (R. at 14-26.) The Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review on August 21, 2008, rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. at 5-7.) Finally, on October 16, 2008, plaintiff filed the instant action in this court.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court is authorized to review the Commissioner's denial of benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). It must uphold the findings of an ALJ if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir.1996) (superseded by statute on other grounds). "Substantial evidence is ... such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). A denial of benefits is not supported by substantial evidence if the ALJ "has [not] analyzed all evidence and ... sufficiently explained the weight he has given to obviously probative exhibits." Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir.1984.).

To assist it in making such a determination, the court may "designate a magistrate ... to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition" of a variety of motions, including motions for judgment on the pleadings. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)-(B). "The magistrate ... shall file his proposed findings and recommendations ... with the court." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Upon careful review of the record, "the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." Id. The court is obligated to make de novo determinations of those portions of the M & R to which objections have been filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir.1983).

If a claimant does not fall squarely within one of the Grid categories, the Grids are only to be used as a "framework" by the ALJ, rather than to direct any specific result. Before slotting a claimant into a particular Grid Rule, however, the ALJ must first determine whether the claimant is conversant and literate in English. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1564(b)(5), 416.964(b)(5). This finding is critical because it dictates which Grid Rule the ALJ will apply as a basis for deciding whether a claimant is disabled. Where a claimant's medical-vocational profile correlates perfectly with that of a particular Grid Rule, the rule will dictate whether the claimant can be considered disabled. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir.1983). In cases such as this one, where the claimant cannot perform a full range of sedentary work, the Grid Rules "are considered in determining first whether a finding of disabled may be possible based on the strength limitations alone and, if not, the [Grid Rules] ... provide a framework for consideration." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 § 200.00(e)(2).

Here, the determinations that plaintiff was "literate" and had a "limited education" were the deciding factors under the Grids as to whether plaintiff was disabled. Accordingly, this court will focus its review on whether substantial evidence supports these findings and whether the proper Grid Rule was applied under these facts. With these principles in mind, and having benefit of the M & R, the court turns to the arguments at hand.

B. Defendant's Objection

Defendant raises one objection to the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations. In his M & R, the magistrate judge recommended three legal conclusions. First, he agreed with the ALJ's finding that plaintiffs impairment did not meet or equal Listing 12.05C. (M & R 8-11.) Second, the magistrate judge determined the ALJ properly assessed plaintiffs residual functional capacity ("RFC") in finding that plaintiff could perform light work absent the use of alcohol. (M & R 11-13.) Third, the magistrate judge found the ALJ misapplied the Grids in making the determination that plaintiff is not disabled. (M & R 13-16.) He concluded the ALJ erred in not applying Rule 202.09 and directing a finding of disability under that rule.

Defendant objects to the third recommendation, arguing the ALJ properly found plaintiff not disabled "under the framework of Rule 202.11," rather than directing a finding of disabled under Rule 202.09, because "Grid Rule 202.09 does not apply because the plaintiff does not satisfy the regulatory definition of illiteracy." (Def.'s Obj. 5.) Rule 202.09 directs a finding of "disabled," whereas Rule 202.11 directs a finding of "not disabled."

1. The Education Categories

As defendant notes, "[t]he only difference between the two Rules is that [Rule 202.09] requires that the claimant be illiterate." (Def.'s Obj. 3.) Rule 202.09 applies when the individual's education level is "[illiterate or unable to communicate in English." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 § 202.09. Rule 202.11 applies when the individual's education level is "[l]imited or less." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 § 202.11. Both of these education levels are statutorily defined. "Illiteracy means the inability to read or write. We consider someone illiterate if the person cannot read or write a simple message such as instructions or inventory lists even though the person can sign his or her name. Generally, an illiterate person has had little or no formal schooling." 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b)(1). The next highest education level is "marginal education," which is one level below "limited education." "Marginal education means ability in reasoning, arithmetic, and language skills which are needed to do simple, unskilled types of jobs. We generally consider that formal schooling at a 6th grade level or less is a marginal education." 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b)(2). Finally, limited education means

ability in reasoning, arithmetic, and language skills, but not enough to allow a person with these educational qualifications to do most of the more complex job duties needed in semi-skilled or skilled jobs. We generally consider that a 7th grade through the 11th grade level of formal education is a limited education.

20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b)(3).

As the regulations point out, circumstances may dictate that "the numerical grade level that you completed in school may not represent your actual educational abilities." 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b). Only where "there is no other evidence to contradict it, we will use your numerical grade level to determine your educational abilities." Id. Thus, where there is contradictory evidence, it must be considered to determine a claimant's educational abilities.

2. The ALJ's "Limited Education" Finding

The ALJ's specific findings regarding plaintiffs education level and illiteracy are sparse. The ALJ noted that plaintiff testified to completing the sixth grade. (R. at 20.) The ALJ then found that plaintiff "is unable to perform any past relevant work."¹ (R. at 21, Finding 5.) Without any specific factual support, the ALJ concluded that "claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English." (R. at 21, Finding 7.) He also found that plaintiff "can perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks in job [sic] that did not involve reading and writing." (R. at 22, Finding 12.) In making this finding, the ALJ explicitly relied upon the ME's testimony that plaintiff was "functionally illiterate." (R. at 22-23.) The ME testified that "he is it seems to me functionally illiterate, that's what I'm hearing. He can recognize his name but cannot read and write." (R. at 473.) The ALJ did not make any more findings particular to plaintiffs education level or illiteracy.

Plaintiff was seventeen (17) years old when he completed the sixth grade. (R. at 468.) The regulatory definition of illiterate instructs that "[g]enerally, an illiterate...