Shufeldt v. Shufeldt

• Decision Date: 25 June 1924
• Docket Number: 18430.
• Citation: 227 P. 6,130 Wash. 253
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: SHUFELDT v. SHUFELDT et al.

227 P. 6

130 Wash. 253

SHUFELDT v. SHUFELDT et al.

No. 18430.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

June 25, 1924

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Preston, Judge.

Action by Henry H. Shufeldt against William B. E. Shufeldt, Henry W Hughes, William Hughes, Richard Hughes, and others, in which the three last-named defendants filed a cross-bill. From the judgment rendered, the first-named defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Mackintosh J., dissenting.

Butler, Lamb, Foster & Pope, of Chicago, Ill., and Shorett, McLaren & Shorett and Edward R. Taylor, all of Seattle, for appellant.

Poe Falkner & Emory, of Seattle, for respondents.

HOLCOMB J.

Henry Shufeldt, a resident of Wisconsin, on November 28, 1900, made a will disposing of a considerable estate and containing many provisions, all with the exception of the one involved in this litigation looking to the benefit of only his wife children, grandchildren, sisters, and two widows of deceased brothers. The will first provides for a number of specific legacies, then gives to the testator's wife a life estate in the residue, and, coming to the property concerned in this appeal, bequeathes the Hotel Butler property, situated in Seattle, in trust to his son, William B. E. Shufeldt, appellant, and his son-in-law, Edwin Hughes, for certain purposes which may be thus summarized: That during the lifetime of his wife, Emeline M. Shufeldt, the trustees were to pay to her the net income from the Butler Hotel and after her decease the trustees were to pay one-half of the net income to the testator's daughter, Emeline Shufeldt Hughes, wife of the trustee Edwin Hughes, during her lifetime; that upon her death, if she left surviving her any issue, this one-half net income should be used for the benefit of such issue during its minority and upon such issue attaining majority the title to one-half of the property was to be conveyed by the trustees in fee to such issue, but if the daughter, Emeline S. Hughes, died leaving no issue surviving her, 'then the said trustees or their successors shall convey said undivided one-half of said lots and blocks as follows: To Edwin Hughes, husband of my daughter Emeline S. Hughes one-half thereof, being the undivided one-fourth of said lots and blocks to him, his heirs and assigns forever; and the other half thereof, being also an undivided one-fourth of said lots and blocks, to the eldest male child then surviving of my son, William B. E. Shufeldt.' This child is the plaintiff in this action. The will then provides that 'after the decease of my said wife' the trustees shall convey the other half of the Butler Hotel property to the grandson (the plaintiff) in fee forever. The will further authorizes and empowers the trustees to 'sell the said lots and blocks and to convey the same in fee simple, saving, caring for and investing the proceeds of such sale for the use herein stated.' After various other provisions the will, in paragraph F, provides:

'All the remainder of my property in which my wife, Emeline M. Shufeldt, is herein given a life estate, I will and bequeath subject to such prior life estate, to my son, William B. E. Shufeldt, to him and his heirs forever, in case he survives both me and my said wife; but if he do not survive my said wife and me, then, subject to said life estate, I will and bequeath all such remainder of my property to the children and their issue of my said son that may then survive; and if no child or children or issue of my said son then survive, I will and bequeath said property to the children of my daughter, Mary Shufeldt Hartshorne, to them and their heirs, per stirpes, forever.'

The will continues with other provisions which are unnecessary to be noted here. This action was brought for the purpose of securing the partition of the Butler Hotel property.

It is admitted that the grandson, the plaintiff, has a title in fee simple to an undivided three-fourths of the property. The only controversy is as to the remaining undivided one-fourth and arises in this manner: The testator died on November 13, 1906. His daughter, Emeline Shufeldt Hughes, died without issue March 21, 1909; her husband, the trustee and the testator's son-in-law, Edwin Hughes, died September 6, 1909, and the testator's widow, Emeline M. Shufeldt, died in March, 1922. The only heirs left by the son-in-law, Edwin Hughes, are three brothers, who are the cross-complainants and respondents in this action. These three brothers are and have always been residents and subjects of Great Britain. It is their contention that they are entitled to the undivided one-fourth interest in the Butler Hotel property which was to go to their brother, Edwin Hughes. The defendant and appellant, William B. E. Shufeldt, son of the testator, claims an undivided one-fourth interest in the Butler Hotel property by reason of paragraph F, whereby he was bequeathed all the remainder of the property in which his mother had been given a life estate; in other words, he is claiming as a residuary devisee. The case is here for the interpretation of the portion of the will which we have noted, and the question is whether under it Edwin Hughes took a 'vested' or a 'contingent' remainder.

Appellant claims that Hughes' interest was not a direct bequest or devise of any property and that no title vested or was intended to vest in Hughes, as he was not living at the time the trustees were directed to make the conveyances and that he, not having lived until after the death of the holder of the life estate--that is, the testator's widow--the one-fourth interest in question falls into the residue.

Hughes' heirs contend that the title to the undivided one-fourth interest vested in Edwin Hughes at the time of the death of the testator or of Mrs. Hughes and would thus descend to his heirs, the cross-complainants and respondents.

It is probably true that no more intricate, technical, and perplexing questions have arisen in the interpretation of wills than those which have had their origin in the effort to determine the nature of remainders, as to whether they are contingent or vested. Chancellor Kent, referring to Blackstone's discussion of this subject, praised it for its 'perspicuity, simplicity, comprehension, compactness, exactness, accuracy and admirable precision,' and added, 'I have read the chapter frequently, but never without a mixture of delight and despair.' After reading the authorities pertinent to this case, we have received the same delight and suffered the same despair. As was said by the Supreme Court of California in In re Blake's Estate, 157 Cal. 448, 108 P. 287:

'Counsel on both sides in support of their respective positions have brought to their aid much of the abstruse learning which has been devoted to the subject of remainders. There is no subject in the law to which more refinement of learning has been applied, nor one where, particularly in ascertaining whether a remainder is a contingent or vested one, more nice, technical, and shadowy rules of construction have been formulated. Counsel for appellants more particularly invoke the aid of these rules, upon the theory that the language of the will is so uncertain as to the nature of the remainder devised, as to make them applicable to the proper determination of the intent of the testator in that respect. As to these rules, however, it may be said that there are none of them which may be taken as an unvarying standard by which the meaning or intent of all testamentary devises in remainder may be construed. They have not been harmoniously applied in jurisdictions where they obtain, and whether they are applicable at all must depend upon the particular provisions of each will which is under consideration. They are simply subordinate rules of construction which are applied only in the absence of all other indications in the will to the contrary, and in support of an intention on the part of the testator to create a vested remainder.'

It goes without saying that in this, as in every other case of construing a will, the supreme purpose is to ascertain the actual intent of the testator, and that should be ascertained, whenever possible, from the language of the will itself, unaided by extrinsic facts. Certain technical rules exist for the gathering of the intent of the testator from the will itself. Concurring with modern authority sustaining this rule as the proper solution of these complications, this court has committed itself to the doctrine by having announced in Webster v. Thorndyke, 11 Wash. 390, 39 P. 677, that, if the intent of the testator can be gathered from the will, 'it is the duty of the court to see that such intention is given effect.' Martin v. Moore, 49 Wash. 288, 94 P. 1087; Peck v. Peck, 76 Wash. 548, 137 P. 137; Denton v. Schneider, 80 Wash. 506, 142 P. 9; In re Moran's Estate, 95 Wash. 428, 163 P. 922; In re Peters' Estate, 101 Wash. 572, 172 P. 870; In re Wilson's Estate, 111 Wash. 491, 191 P. 615. In fact, by statute the duty is imposed on the court to accomplish the true intent of the testator. Section 45, c. 156, Laws 1917.

'The question in all the cases has been whether the testator intended it as a condition precedent that the legatees should survive the time appointed by him for the payment of their legacies, and the answer to this question has been sought for out of the whole contents and not in particular expressions.' Leeming v. Sherratt, 2 Hare, 14; 3 Bro. C. C. 473.

The intention is to be gathered from the words used as covered by recognized rules and in cases of doubt and ambiguity from the situation and surrounding circumstances. In re Wilson's Estate, supra; Giddings v. Gillingham, 108 Me. 512 81 A. 951; Martin v. Cook, 129 Md. 195, 98 A. 489; Allison v. Allison's Ex'rs, 101...