Siemers v. United Ben. Life Ins. Co.

• Citation: 246 Minn. 459,75 N.W.2d 605
• Decision Date: 02 March 1956
• Docket Number: No. 36698,36698
• Parties: Henrietta H. SIEMERS, Respondent, v. UNITED BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Page 605

75 N.W.2d 605

246 Minn. 459

Henrietta H. SIEMERS, Respondent, v. UNITED BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.

No. 36698.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 2, 1956.

Syllabus by the Court.

Where an appeal involves the sufficiency of the evidence to justify a verdict, the Supreme Court will take that view of the evidence most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict is rendered. The verdict will be sustained if it is possible to do so on any reasonable theory of the evidence.

Held, under the facts in the instant case, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury.

Fortier & Wetzel, Little Falls, for appellant.

Gordon Rosenmeier and John E. Simonett, Little Falls, for respondent.

FRANK T. GALLAGHER, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the district court entered December 7, 1954, in favor of plaintiff, Henrietta H. Siemers, and against defendant, United Benefit Life Insurance Company. This action was commenced by plaintiff as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy purchased by her deceased husband, William Siemers, and is for the face amount of the policy with interest and costs.

On June 22, 1943, defendant insurance company issued a life insurance policy on the life of William Siemers in the sum of $2,500. The policy was renewable in five years. On June 22, 1948, William Siemers renewed the policy. The premiums were payable every six months with a 31-day grace period. The premium due on June 22, 1950, was not received by the insurance company until August 4, 1950, several days after the 31-day grace period had expired. As a result of this delay the insurance company held the premium check in suspension and sent an application for reinstatement to William Siemers, who filled out the application and sent it back to the defendant insurance company. On August 15, 1950, payment of the premium was accepted and the policy reinstated.

On the application submitted by the insurance company to William Siemers appears the statement: 'To the best of my knowledge I am in sound health and since the issuance of this policy I have had no illnesses or injuries, and I have received no medical treatment, except as follows.' Immediately under this sentence appear five column headings with blank space under each column heading. These column headings are spaced across the page from left to right; the first reads, 'Nature of illness, injury or medical treatment (If none, please write 'none').' The next column heading is entitled 'Date'; the next 'Duration'; the next 'Is recovery complete?'; and the final column is entitled 'Names and addresses of all doctors consulted.' Underneath these column headings and in large letters William Siemers wrote the word 'None.' The only other information solicited on the application is the present occupation of the applicant, his weight, and present mailing address.

About a year and a half after the delayed premium had been accepted by the defendant insurance company, William Siemers died. Thereafter the company tendered to the plaintiff beneficiary the amount of premiums paid from the date of reinstatement of policy in the sum of $110.60, which payment she refused.

The case was tried before a jury, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $2,744.16, representing the face amount of the policy plus interest. Thereafter the defendant insurance company moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in the alternative for a new trial. This motion was denied and judgment was entered.

On appeal the defendant seeks a reversal of this judgment and assigns as error, among other things, that the evidence shows the verdict is contrary to law and that as a matter of law plaintiff is entitled to a verdict of only $110.60. The only issue is therefore, as stated by the defendant, whether the evidence shows as a matter of law that the insured, William Siemers, made statements in his application for reinstatement of his policy which were willfully false or intentionally misleading.

At the outset we are confronted with several well-settled principles of law. Where an appeal involves the sufficiency of the evidence to justify a verdict, the Supreme Court will take that view of the evidence most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict is rendered. The verdict will be sustained if it is possible to do so on any reasonable theory of the evidence. Vorlicky v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 34, 287 N.W. 109; see, also, 1 Dunnell, Dig., 3d Ed., § 415. Where the verdict has the approval of the trial court, the appellate court will interfere only if it is manifest that an injustice under the law has been done. Schleuder v. Soltow, 239 Minn. 453, 59 N.W.2d 320.

In the case at bar the application in effect required Siemers to state three things to the best of his knowledge: (1) That he was in sound health; (2) that he had no illness or injury since the issuance of the policy; (3) that he had received no medical treatment since the issuance of the policy.

M.S.A. § 61.24 reads:

'In any claim upon a policy issued in this state without previous medical examination, or without the knowledge or consent of the insured, or, in case of a minor, without the consent of his parent, guardian, or other person having his legal custody, the statements made in the application as to the age, physicial condition, and family history of the insured shall be valid and binding upon the company, unless wilfully false or intentionally misleading. Every policy which contains a reference to the application, either as a part of the policy or as having any bearing thereon, shall have a copy of such application attached thereto or set out therein.'

In Schmidt v. Prudential Ins. Co., 190 Minn. 239, 251 N.W. 683, the court in discussing the above statute said that it announced a less harsh rule and prevents the avoidance of nonmedical examination policies on the grounds of material misrepresentations when made as to age, physical condition, or family history unless such misrepresentations are wilfully false or intentionally misleading. Thus, in the case at bar it appears to be implicit in the verdict of the jury that it either found the statements made by Siemers were true or that they were not wilfully false or intentionally misleading. Under the above cited cases we must therefore sustain the verdict if possible under either theory.

The evidence in regard to either of these findings is conflicting. However, we believe the verdict may be sustained on the theory that Mr. Siemers, even if ...