Siller v. Board of Sup'rs of City and County of San Francisco

• Decision Date: 02 October 1962
• Docket Number: INC,MASON-PIN
• Citation: 25 Cal.Rptr. 73,58 Cal.2d 479,375 P.2d 41
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 375 P.2d 41 Edward L. SILLER et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants and Respondents;, et al., Real Parties in Interest, and Respondents. S. F. 21109.

Page 73

25 Cal.Rptr. 73

58 Cal.2d 479, 375 P.2d 41

Edward L. SILLER et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants and Respondents MASON-PINE, INC., et al., Real Parties in Interest, and Respondents.

S. F. 21109.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Oct. 2, 1962.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 31, 1962.

Lawrence W. Jordan, Jr., Bernard P. McCullough and Rogers, Clark & Jordan, San Francisco, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Dion R. Holm, Thomas M. O'Connor, City Attys., and Bernard J. Ward, Deputy City Atty., for defendants and respondents.

Jacobs, Sills & Coblentz and Donald M. Cahen, San Francisco, for real parties in interest and respondents.

SCHAUER, Justice.

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment denying their petition for a peremptory writ of mandate to compel the Board of Supervisors and the Planning Commission of the City and County of San Francisco to set aside an order granting a building variance to Mason-Pine, Inc., the principal real party in interest, hereinafter sometimes called Mason-Pine.

As ground for reversal, plaintiffs contend that the record upon which the planning commission acted shows as a matter of law that the provisions of the planning code allowing variances have not been met; i. e., that in granting the subject variance the commission abused its discretion and exceeded its authority. Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to test the proper exercise of discretion vested in a local board; and where, as here, the challenge rests on claimed insufficiency of the evidence, the court's power of review is conditioned on determining 'that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record' before the board. (Code Civ.Proc. § 1094.5, subd. (c); Atchison etc. Ry. Co. v. Kings Co. Water Dist. (1956) 47 Cal.2d 140, 143(1), 302 P.2d 1; Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals (1943) 23 Cal.2d 303, 315(5), 144 P.2d 4.) Upon such review the 'court does not have the right to judge the intrinsic value of the evidence or to weigh it.' (Damiani v. Albert (1957) 48 Cal.2d 15, 17(1), 306 P.2d 780; Thompson v. City of Long Beach (1953) 41 Cal.2d 235, 240(3), 259 P.2d 649.)

For the reasons hereinafter stated we have concluded that the trial court was correct in its determination that upon the entire record before the commission the granting of the variance is not shown to be unsupported by substantial evidence, that no abuse of discretion appears, and that the judgment should be affirmed.

Plaintiffs allege in their petition for the writ that they own real property located within 300 feet of property owned by the principal real party in interest on the corner of Mason and Pine Streets in San Francisco; that in February 1960 Mason-Pine filed with the planning commission an application for a variance from certain off-street parking provisions of the city planning code with respect to apartments proposed to be constructed in San Francisco; that following hearings the commission granted the variance; that plaintiffs appealed to the board of supervisors, which heard the matter and affirmed the order of the commission. Plaintiffs further allege that Mason-Pine presented to the commission no evidence of special circumstances and unnecessary hardship, as required by the provisions of the planning code, and that therefore the order granting the variance was unauthorized and invalid.

The trial court reviewed the record of the proceedings before the commission, heard brief testimony from one witness as to statements made by himself at the hearing before the board of supervisors, and following argument by the parties denied plaintiffs' petition and discharged the alternative writ theretofore issued. This appeal by plaintiffs followed.

On March 31, 1960, when Mason-Pine was granted the variance by the commission, article 4.5 of the San Francisco Planning Code (Ch. II, pt. II, San Francisco Municipal Code), in effect since 1955, set forth certain off-street parking requirements. Section 111 provided that 'The interpretation and application of the provisions of this Article shall be made in the light of a good faith attempt on the part of the Board of Supervisors to take a step toward relieving traffic congestion and to enhance the public safety, convenience and welfare by requiring ample parking facilities in connection with dwelling units hereafter constructed.' (Italics added.)

Section 112 set forth certain definitions: 'For the purpose of this Article * * * (b) Dwelling Unit. The words 'dwelling unit' mean a room or suite of rooms that is designed for, or is occupied by, one family doing its own cooking therein and having only one kitchen * * * (d) Off-Street Parking Space. The words 'off-street parking space' mean an off-street area within the building housing the dwelling unit, or on the lot where the building is located, not less than one hundred sixty (160) square feet in area, net, exclusive of access or maneuvering area, or ramps, columns, or the like, to be used exclusively as a temporary storage space for one private motor vehicle. Each required parking space shall be of usable shape, independently accessible and properly maintained.'

Section 113 provided that 'The number of off-street parking spaces required for dwelling units hereafter constructed in * * * San Francisco shall be one off-street parking space for each dwelling unit.'

Section 114 authorized variances, as follows: 'The City Planning Commission may, upon application, grant variances from any of the provisions of Section 113 of this Article, after public notice and hearings, if it is of the opinion that special circumstances exist in the particular case, and that unnecessary hardship would result from the strict interpretation and enforcement of such provisions * * * ' (Italics added.)

The variance granted by the commission to defendant authorized 174 parking spaces for a building to contain 190 dwelling units (rather than the one-for-one ratio set forth in section 113, quoted hereinabove), none of which parking spaces was either as large as 160 square feet in area or required to be independently accessible. There was evidence that Mason-Pine had purchased the subject site with full knowledge of the Planning Code provisions.

From the building plans submitted by Mason-Pine and from the evidence presented at the hearings before the planning commission, it appears that the proposed building as finally approved by the commission is to contain 19 stories with 190 dwelling units, of which 114 are to be one-bedroom units and the remaining 76 are to be 'efficiency units' (one room with adjoining kitchenette and bath). The building is to be located on the corner of Mason and Pine Streets, within five blocks of San Francisco's central financial district and of the Union Square shopping area, and assertedly is designed for use by moderate-income tenants desiring to live within walking distance of their places of work. There was evidence that only 25% to 50% of such moderate-income tenants (i. e., the tenants of only 48 to 95 of the 190 units in the buildings, which nevertheless was to contain 174 parking spaces) would own automobiles; that within the area surrounding and serving the subject site there were three garages with storage parking stalls available; and that the operator of 'the parking lot on the subject site' had never been able to rent more than ten of his forty available parking stalls on a monthly basis despite repeated efforts so to do.

Mason-Pine asserted also that if denied a variance it would be compelled to decrease the number of proposed dwelling units in order to comply with the one-for-one 160 square feet parking space requirement; that such a change in design would necessarily result in larger units with correspondingly higher rents which would include the cost of vacant garage...