Simmons v. Simmons
| Decision Date | 30 May 1995 |
| Citation | 900 S.W.2d 682 |
| Parties | Glenda SIMMONS (Jones), Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George William SIMMONS, Defendant, Isaac Thomas Simmons and Wife, Sylvia Simmons, Intervening Petitioners/Respondents/Appellees. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Denise S. Terry, Morristown, Nicholas D. Hare, Nashville, for plaintiff-appellant.
Stephenson Todd, Todd & Dossett, P.C., Kingsport, for intervening petitioners/appellees.
Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Dianne Stamey Dycus, Sr. Counsel, Nashville, for Atty. Gen.
This is a grandparents' visitation case. It presents a dispute between the natural mother and adoptive father of a child presently five years old and the parents of the child's natural father. The Court of Appeals, finding that there had been no change in circumstances, refused to terminate the court authorized visitation privileges of the parents of the natural father, upon the application of the mother and adoptive father. Because the principles of parental rights discussed in Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn.1993), are also applicable to this case, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The natural father abandoned the child's mother, the appellant, prior to the child's birth on February 28, 1990. Soon after the child's birth, the trial court awarded the mother a divorce and custody of the child. The father's right to visitation was conditioned upon his having one of his parents, the respondents in this case, transport the child between the mother and the father. Subsequently, upon respondents' petition, they were granted visitation privileges pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-6-301 (1991), and, in the same proceeding, upon the appellant's petition, the court terminated the natural father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment.
On September 18, 1992, the mother married Loyall F. Jones, who, in a separate proceeding, adopted the child. The final order of adoption was entered on February 23, 1993.
The appellant responded to the respondents' motion that she be held in contempt for refusing to allow visitation as provided in the court order, with a petition that the respondents' visitation privileges be terminated. On a record in which evidence regarding the relationship between the respondents and the child is in substantial conflict, the trial court found that the appellant failed to carry the burden of proving that continued visitation is not in the best interest of the child. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion.
Resolution of the issue presented begins with a review of the decision in Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn.1993), in which the Court held:
Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution protects the privacy interest of these parents in their child-rearing decisions, so long as their decisions do not substantially endanger the welfare of their children. Absent some harm to the child, we find that the state lacks a sufficiently compelling justification for interfering with this fundamental right. When applied to married parents who have maintained continuous custody of their children and have acted as fit parents, we conclude that court interference pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-6-301 constitutes an unconstitutional invasion of privacy rights under the Tennessee Constitution.
Neither party has referred the Court to a case in which the precise issue presented here has been decided. All decisions relied upon by the respondents, except Preston v. Mercieri, 133 N.H. 36, 573 A.2d 128 (1990), involve the construction of state statutes without any constitutional analysis, and provide little guidance. See In the matter of CGF, 168 Wis.2d 62, 483 N.W.2d 803 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953, 113 S.Ct. 408, 121 L.Ed.2d 333 (1992); Puleo v. Forgue, 610 A.2d 124 (R.I.1992); In re Groleau, 585 N.E.2d 726 (Ind.App. 3 Dist.1992); In Interest of R.C.E., 535 So.2d 673 (Fla.App.1988); Santaniello v. Santaniello, 18 Kan.App.2d 112, 850 P.2d 269 (1992).
The respondents urge the Court to adopt the rationale of Preston v. Mercieri, in which the constitutional issue was discussed. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire recognized that under the common law, "parental authority was generally deemed supreme with regard to the upbringing of offspring, and courts refused to interfere with child rearing decisions that excluded grandparents and prohibited meaningful contact with grandchildren." Preston v. Mercieri, 573 A.2d at 130. That court further acknowledged that, "the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized a private realm of family life which the state cannot enter," and that the Supreme Court "has sustained the parenting right, like the right to marry and establish a home, as a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 131. The New Hampshire court concluded, "Thus, parents enjoy a constitutionally protected right to raise their children as they see fit, unfettered by undue state intrusion." Id. (emphasis added). However, that court imposed narrow limits upon the constitutional right recognized and held: "parental rights are not absolute, but are subordinate to the State's parens patriae power, and must yield to the welfare of the child." Id.
In that case, in which the natural father had died while divorce proceedings were pending, the New Hampshire court found that visitation privileges which had been granted to the grandparents were not automatically terminated by the mother's remarriage and the stepfather's adoption of the child. There was no claim that the child was in substantial danger of harm. The statute did not authorize a grant of visitation privileges to the grandparents upon those facts, and the court stated that the refusal to terminate the grandparents' privileges was not based upon their rights or the kinship between the child and them, but upon the child's best interest.
After an extensive review of prior decisions of this Court and cases from other jurisdictions, the Court in Hawk v. Hawk expressly rejected the proposition that the courts may engage in best interest analysis without first determining the threshold issue--substantial danger of harm to the child. The Court stated:
In light of [the constitutional right of privacy acknowledged in Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.1992) ], we believe that when no substantial harm threatens a child's welfare, the state lacks a sufficiently compelling justification for the infringement on the fundamental right of parents to raise their children as they see fit. Thus, we find the statute to be unconstitutional under Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution, as applied to this married couple, whose fitness as parents is unchallenged.
The respondents contend that the constitutional principle stated in Hawk is not applicable to the instant case. They insist that the decision in Hawk does not preclude a best interest of the child analysis because the divorce of the child's natural parents justifies the state's interference with parenting decisions by the mother and adoptive father. They insist that the constitutional protection is limited to married, natural parents who have maintained continuous...
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