Sinclair v. Sinclair
| Decision Date | 15 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. S–15–0067.,S–15–0067. |
| Citation | 357 P.3d 1100,2015 WY 120 |
| Parties | Rhonda Marie SINCLAIR, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Kevin Dean SINCLAIR, Appellee (Defendant). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Lisa K. Finkey, Gillette, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee: Rex O. Arney, Law Office of Rex O. Arney, Sheridan, Wyoming.
Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, DAVIS, FOX, and KAUTZ, JJ.
[¶ 1] Rhonda Marie Sinclair (Wife) appeals from a divorce decree, claiming the district court erred when it declined to require Kevin Dean Sinclair (Husband) to pay interest on the amount it ordered him to pay to equalize the division of marital property. We conclude the district court properly exercised its discretion when it suspended payment of interest as long as Husband makes annual payments of at least $15,000 toward the property allocation. We, therefore, affirm.
[¶ 2] Wife presents the issue for our determination as follows:
Whether the district court erred when it ordered that the statutory interest on the final judgment could be suspended if [Husband] made minimum payments towards satisfaction of the final judgment.
Husband contends the district court properly exercised its discretion when it ordered that statutory interest on the amount owed be suspended as long as he makes the minimum annual payments.
[¶ 3] Husband and Wife were married in September 1993 in South Dakota. They had no children. In September 2013, Wife filed for divorce in Campbell County, Wyoming, where they were living at the time. Husband answered the complaint, and asked the district court to dismiss Wife's complaint and grant him a divorce.
[¶ 4] At trial, the primary issue in dispute concerned the division of the marital property. The focus of the dispute was property located in South Dakota, which the parties had acquired from Husband's mother during the parties' marriage. The property is held in trust by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Husband's name. This property cannot be sold to the general public, but instead can be transferred only to Husband's family or another tribal member. The parties receive rental income from the property of about $14,000 per year.
[¶ 5] After hearing all of the testimony and considering all of the marital property including the South Dakota land, the district court allocated the tribal trust property to the Husband, and then concluded Husband should pay Wife $141,360 to accomplish an equitable property division. While leaving Husband the option to make higher payments, the court imposed a minimum payment of $15,000 per year. The district court then stated that as long as Husband paid the $15,000 per year, it would suspend the statutory post judgment interest of ten percent. The court stated:
[¶ 6] Consistent with the district court's ruling from the bench, the divorce decree provided:
To create an equitable division of the parties' property and debts, [Husband] shall pay to [Wife] the sum of One Hundred Forty One Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Dollars ($141,360.00) for which [Wife] shall have Judgment against [Husband]. Statutory interest on the judgment shall be suspended as long as [Husband] pays [Wife], at the minimum, Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) each year, beginning December 1, 2015, and each year thereafter until the entire judgment is paid [in] full. In the event [Husband] fails to make a payment timely, statutory interest shall be reinstated from the date of entry of the Decree.
Wife appealed from the decree.
[¶ 7] Wife's sole challenge is to the district court's order suspending payment of interest on the amount it ordered Husband to pay to accomplish an equitable division of property.
“We will not disturb a property division in a divorce case, except on clear grounds, as the trial court is usually in a better position than the appellate court to judge the parties' needs and the merits of their positions.” Metz v. Metz, 2003 WY 3, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d 383, 385 (Wyo.2003), citing Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 712 (Wyo.1980) ; Warren v. Warren, 361 P.2d 525, 526 (Wyo.1961). If our review requires an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court's decision, “we afford to the prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any consideration of evidence presented by the unsuccessful party.” Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo.1998) (citations omitted). When interpretation of statutory language is required to resolve an issue, our standard of review is de novo. Egan v. Egan, 2010 WY 164, ¶ 7, 244 P.3d 1045, 1048 (Wyo.2010) ; Dorr v. Smith, Keller & Assoc., 2010 WY 120, ¶ 11, 238 P.3d 549, 552 (Wyo.2010).
Bagley v. Bagley, 2013 WY 126, ¶ 7, 311 P.3d 141, 143 (Wyo.2013).
[¶ 8] Wife asserts the district court did not have the discretion to suspend payment of interest on the amount it ordered Husband to pay in order to equitably divide the parties' property. She cites Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1–16–102 (LexisNexis 2015), which provides as follows:
[¶ 9] Wife also cites Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1247–48 (Wyo.1976), in which a Wyoming district court attempted to both enforce and modify a New Jersey judgment for unpaid alimony and child support. The Wyoming court permitted the husband to pay the wife $100 per month without interest until the total amount due was paid in full. Addressing on appeal the issue of interest, this Court said:
Upon entry of a judgment for money by any court in Wyoming the applicable law, § 1–308.1, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum. Supp., specifically directs that it shall ‘bear interest at 10% per year from the date of rendition until paid.’ Such allowance of interest is not in the discretion of the court entering judgment, it is a grant from the legislature of the state and we do not think that any court may refuse to give it effect. [fn. omitted] The district court directed that the total judgment of $11,176.20 entered by it be paid in 117 installments of $100 per month, commencing September 1, 1975, the last such payment to be in the amount of $76.20. Such language must be construed as carrying the inference that compliance with that order would satisfy all obligations of the judgment debtor and he would then be entitled to satisfaction of the judgment. So construed, we think the judgment was beyond the jurisdiction and power of the court.
Id. at 1249. Based upon § 1–16–102 and Salmeri, Wife contends the district court had no authority to suspend payment of interest on the amount it ordered Husband to pay.
[¶ 10] Husband responds that the legislature has given district courts broad discretion to fashion a just and equitable disposition of marital property and, as part of that process, the district court can determine whether payment of interest should be ordered. Husband cites Odegard v. Odegard, 2003 WY 67, 69 P.3d 917 (Wyo.2003), in which this Court upheld a divorce decree that imposed interest at a rate of 7% per year, rather than the 10% required by § 1–16–102. Although we did not specifically address the husband's claim that the interest imposed violated § 1–16–102 because he did not object to the decree or otherwise raise the issue in district court, we said the interest rate imposed was not at a level to shock the conscience of the court and affirmed. Id., ¶ 28, 69 P.3d at 925. Husband also cites Zaloudek v. Zaloudek, 2010 WY 169, ¶ 8, 245 P.3d 336, 339–340 (Wyo.2010), in which the Court suggested that a district court could override the interest requirement of § 1–16–102 by setting a payment due date other than the date the decree or judgment is rendered. Because the payment date set in this case is different from the date the decree was rendered, Husband argues, the district court properly exercised its discretion by suspending payment of interest as long as he makes the payments on time.
[¶ 11] There is no question § 1–16–102 requires that all decrees and judgments for the payment of money bear interest at the rate of 10% per year from the date of rendition until paid. The statute uses the word “shall,” a word we have repeatedly said is mandatory. JKS v. AHF (In re: ARF), 2013 WY 97, ¶ 23, 307 P.3d 852, 857 (Wyo.2013) ; Verheydt v. Verheydt, 2013 WY 25, ¶ 32, 295 P.3d 1245, 1253 (Wyo.2013). As Wife points out, this Court in Salmeri reversed a district court order permitting one party in a divorce action to make a monthly payment on a judgment for unpaid alimony and child support without imposing interest. Citing § 1–16–102, the Court concluded the district court did not have the jurisdiction or power to decline to impose interest.
[¶ 12] Husband asserts Salmeri is distinguishable. He contends that unlike this proceeding, which was an original action for divorce, Salmeri involved judgments entered in New Jersey (one dissolving the marriage,...
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