Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright

• Decision Date: 18 May 1887
• Citation: 33 F. 121
• Parties: SINGER MANUF'G CO. v. WRIGHT, Compt. Gen. [1]
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

33 F. 121

SINGER MANUF'G CO. v. WRIGHT, Compt. Gen. ^[1]

United States Circuit Court, N.D. Georgia.

May 18, 1887

George Hillyer and Henry Hillyer, for complainant.

All taxation must be uniform upon the same class of subjects. Const. Ga. art. 7, Sec. 2. Complainant alone of the retail dealers in the state falling under the description 'companies,' is taxed under the statute. Classification of subjects must be in respect of the business taxed, and not of the persons engaged therein. Davis v Macon, 64 Ga. 128; Johnston v. Macon, 62 Ga 645; Cutliff v. Albany, 60 Ga. 597; Smith v Goldsmith, 63 Ga. 736; Burr v. Atlanta, 64 Ga 225. And such tax must extend to all engaged in the particular business taxed. Cooley, Tax'n, 169, 170, 214, 215; Gould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 683; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418. See, also, Welton v. State, 91 U.S. 275; Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 367, 6 S.Ct. 1064.

Corporations are 'persons,' within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, and a tax law of a state which in its operation discriminates against them is a denial as to them of the equal protection of the laws. Santa Clara Co. v. Railroad Co., 13 Amer. & Eng.R.Cas. 182, 18 F. 385; San Mateo v. Railroad, 8 Amer. & Eng.R.Cas. 1; Santa Clara Co. v. Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 396, 6 S.Ct. 1132; Bureau Co. v. Railroad Co., 44 Ill. 229; Railway Co. v. Boone Co., Id. 240; Law v. People, 87 Ill. 385; City of East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 46 Ill. 392; Marsh v. Clark Co., 42 Wis. 502; Railroad Co. v. Taylor Co., 52 Wis. 37, 8 N.W. 833.

The state cannot discriminate in favor of individuals. A tax must extend to all of a class, or it will be invalid as to any. Wynne v. Wright, 1 Dev. & B. 19; Wiggins v. Chicago, 68 Ill. 372; Wiley v. Palmer, 14 Ala. 627; Cowles v. Brittain, 2 Hawks, 204; State v. City Council, 10 Rich.Law, 240; State v. Pinckney, 10 Rich.Law, 474; Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash.C.C. 380; Plymouth v. Pettijohn, 4 Dev. 591; Ward v. Morris, 4 Har. & McH. 340; State v. North, 27 Mo. 464; Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 434, 4 P. 800. See, also, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303; Railway v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512; 6 S.Ct. 110; Lexington v. McQuillan, 9 Dana, 513; Doyle v. Insurance Co., 94 U.S. 535; Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410. The case at bar is essentially different from Fire Ass'n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 7 S.Ct. 108.

Clifford Anderson, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

NEWMAN J.

Complainant, a corporation created by the laws of New Jersey, files its bill against defendant, and says that it has been for a number of years engaged in selling sewing-machines in this way: Machines are shipped from its factory at Elizabeth, New Jersey, to agents in different parts of the world, including the state of Georgia, and are sold by such agents through subagents to persons desiring to use them for sewing. It does no wholesale business in Georgia, but deals directly with and sells to consumers exclusively. It deals exclusively in Singer sewing-machines, needles, findings, and attachments connected therewith. It is further alleged in the bill, and an amendment thereto, that there are a large number of individuals and firms engaged in the sale of sewing-machines manufactured by other companies, at retail in Georgia, not as agents of the companies whose machines they sell, but engaged in such business in their own right, and on their own account. They send out agents, as complainant does, and some of them do a large business. These dealers compete directly with complainant. Complainant pays its regular taxes on all its property. Complainant has in the state of Georgia $25,000 worth of property, comprising sewing-machines, horses, wagons, outfits, etc., and has outstanding some 2,000 executory contracts. It has been engaged in business in Georgia some 15 years. Complainant further says that at its session in 1886 the legislature of the state of Georgia passed a general tax act for said state for the years 1887 and 1888; that paragraph 17 of section 2 of said act is as follows:

'Upon every sewing-machine company selling or dealing in sewing-machines in this state, and upon all wholesale dealers in sewing-machines, selling sewing-machines manufactured by companies that have not paid the tax herein required, two hundred dollars for each fiscal year or fractional part thereof, to be paid to the comptroller general at the time of commencement of business, and, in addition to the above amount, said companies or wholesale dealers shall furnish the comptroller general a list of all agents authorized to sell machines, and shall pay to said comptroller general the sum of ten dollars for each of their agents in each county, for each year or fractional part thereof, and upon the payment of such sum the comptroller general shall issue to each of said agents a certificate of authority to transact business in this state, and all sewing-machines belonging to such companies, dealers, or their agents, in possession of such companies, dealers, or their agents, or others, shall be liable to seizure and sale for the payment of such license fees and tax. This tax shall be for the whole state, and such companies, their agents, and wholesale dealers shall not be liable for any county tax or license fees by the counties for selling sewing-machines therein, and said agents shall be required to register their names with the ordinary, and exhibit their license from the comptroller general at the time of registering, and thereafter keep the same posted on their wagons or vehicles, or at their places of business. When a company or wholesale dealer transfers an agent from one county to another, said company or dealer shall notify the comptroller general in advance of such transfer. In cases where wholesale dealers sell sewing-machines manufactured by different companies, such dealers shall pay the license fees and tax above provided for, separately, for each company whose manufacture of machines may be sold by such dealers, unless each of said companies has itself paid such license fees and tax. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this section shall be liable to indictment for misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, and not less than one hundred dollars, in the discretion of the court trying the same. If said fine is not paid within the time prescribed by the court, such person so fined shall be imprisoned as prescribed in section 4310 of the Code.'

Complainant further says that the comptroller general does not intend to enforce this act against individuals and firms engaged in selling sewing-machines on their own account; but that he does intend to enforce it against complainant, and is already proceeding to do so. It employs about 40 agents, for each of whom the comptroller general demands $10 under said act. The answer denies generally the allegations in the bill; but the proof submitted shows them to be substantially true.

Complainant's position then is, as stated in its bill, and elaborated in argument, that the paragraph of the tax act above quoted, is violative of, and in conflict with, the constitution of the United States, and of the state of Georgia, as follows:

First, that it conflicts with paragraph 3, Sec. 8, art. 1, of the constitution of the United States, and also with paragraph 1, Sec. 2, art. 4. These clauses provide that congress shall have power to 'regulate commerce * * * among the several states,' and that 'the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. ' Complainant's counsel do not insist earnestly upon these points however, and, indeed, could not well do so. The language of the act is certainly broad enough to cover all sewing-machine companies, whether the company be of this state or of another state. It is 'upon every sewing-machine company selling or dealing in sewing-machines by itself or its agents in this state,' etc. The words 'by itself' are evidently intended to cover companies operating and having their home office or residence in Georgia. The fact, and probably such is the fact, that no sewing-machines are manufactured in this state, cannot change this matter if the language of the tax act embraces such companies as are now, or may hereafter during the operation of the law be, engaged in such manufacture in the state. This it clearly does. I am satisfied, therefore, that the first position of complainant is not well taken.

The second point made, or position assumed, is that this paragraph of the tax act of 1886 is violative of and in conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. The language of the amendment which is invoked here is: 'No state shall * * * deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. ' It is alleged and argued in brief that a burdensome tax is put by this law upon complainant that is not put upon others engaged in the same business. It was for some time doubted by the court whether the word 'person,' as used in the fourteenth amendment, included corporations. Indeed, it has been settled by some courts that it does not. But it is now considered settled, I presume, by the language used by Chief Justice WAITE, speaking for the supreme court, in the case of Santa Clara Co. v. Railroad, 118 U.S. 396, 6 S.Ct. 1132, that corporations are so included and entitled, as fully as natural persons, to its protection. As to the fourteenth amendment, and private corporations, see, however, Fire Ass'n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 7 Sup.Ct.Rep.

108. The question, then, here is, does this amendment to the federal constitution apply to cases of alleged unjust and...