Skinner v. Angliker

• Decision Date: 26 July 1988
• Docket Number: No. 5519,5519
• Citation: 15 Conn.App. 297,544 A.2d 246
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: John M. SKINNER v. Colin ANGLIKER, Director of Whiting Forensic Institute, et al.

Page 246

544 A.2d 246

15 Conn.App. 297

John M. SKINNER v. Colin ANGLIKER, Director of Whiting Forensic Institute, et al.

No. 5519.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 10, 1987.

Decided July 26, 1988.

William J. McCullough, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., and Richard J. Lynch, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants (defendants).

Albert S. Bill, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Igor I. Sikorsky, Jr., Rocky Hill, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before DALY, NORCOTT and FOTI, JJ.

DALY, Judge.

The plaintiff instituted this action against the defendants ¹ for wrongful discharge from employment. The defendants have appealed from the judgment rendered on the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, claiming that the trial court erred (1) in denying the defendants' motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity, (2) in denying the defendants' motion to strike the case from the jury docket, (3) in refusing to charge as requested, and (4) in refusing to charge the jury as requested concerning punitive damages. We find error in part.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On March 7, 1983, the plaintiff was employed by the department of mental health as a forensic treatment specialist at the Whiting Forensic Institute. During the course of his employment, the plaintiff witnessed numerous incidents of both verbal and physical abuse of patients by some of the staff members. The plaintiff introduced evidence that the nursing staff was aware of the patient abuse and failed to take action or make inquiries to stop it. Moreover, the plaintiff made several complaints to his immediate supervisors during the summer and fall of 1983 regarding the patient abuse. The plaintiff was discharged on October 21, 1983, a few days after notifying officials ranked higher than his immediate supervisors of his complaints. His employment status was listed as leave of absence without pay and in December he secured employment at another institution.

In January, 1984, the plaintiff filed his complaint alleging that he was discharged and disciplined by the defendants because he exercised his first amendment rights and that this action was in violation of General Statutes § 31-51q. ² The defendants on February 28, 1984, filed a motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In the motion, the defendants argued that the case should be dismissed because General Statutes § 31-51q does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, the plaintiff claimed the case for the jury docket, and the defendants subsequently filed a motion to strike claiming that there was no right to a jury trial under General Statutes § 31-51q. This motion was also denied and the jury trial commenced on July 22, 1986. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff awarding him $9000 for present and future loss of earnings, $1 for emotional distress and $26,752.50 for punitive damages. The trial court, after hearing the plaintiff's motion for counsel fees and costs, awarded $3000 in counsel's fees.

The first claim of error put forth by the defendants is that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The defendants argue that this action cannot be maintained without the state's consent and that General Statutes § 31-51q does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity. We disagree.

It is a well established principle in our state that the defense of sovereign immunity is inappropriate where the legislature, by appropriate legislation consents to being sued. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 621, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Textron, Inc. v. Wood, 167 Conn. 334, 339, 355 A.2d 307 (1974). "The state's sovereign right not to be sued may be waived by the legislature, provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed 'by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication.' Baker v. Ives, [162 Conn. 295, 298, 294 A.2d 290 (1972) ]." Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228, 464 A.2d 45 (1983).

The case before us is one of the first impression. The controlling issue on appeal is whether the legislature intended General Statutes § 31-15q to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity. In determining the legislative intent of a particular statute, a reviewing court must look at the exact language used and the legislative history which indicates the purpose underlying the enactment of the statute. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Sullivan, 150 Conn. 578, 581, 192 A.2d 545 (1963); State v. Rado, 14 Conn.App. 322, 329, 541 A.2d 124 (1988). Our job is not to determine the intent of the legislature by what it meant to say, but to determine the intent by what was actually said. B. Holden & J. Daly, Connecticut Evidence § 50. "If the words of the statute are clear, the duty of a reviewing court is to apply the legislature's directive source 'where the wording is plain, courts will not speculate as to any supposed intention because the question before a court then is not what the legislature actually intended but what intention it expressed by the words that it used.' Robinson v. Unemployment Security Board of Review, 181 Conn. 1, 6, 434 A.2d 293 (1980)." P.X. Restaurant, Inc. v. Windsor, 189 Conn. 153, 159, 454 A.2d 1258 (1983).

In this case, it is abundantly clear that General Statutes § 31-51q does waive the sovereign immunity by its expressed term. The legislature, in clear and unambiguous language, put the state in the same status of an employer in the first sentence of the law by stating; "Any employer, including the state and any instrumentality or political subdivision thereof...." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the defense of sovereign immunity is not a defense to an alleged violation of constitutional rights. Horak v. State, 171 Conn. 257, 261, 368 A.2d 155 (1976). In this case, the plaintiff argued that his employment was terminated by his attempt to exercise his first amendment rights. As our Supreme Court ruled in Sentner v. Board of Trustees, 184 Conn. 339, 343, 439 A.2d 1033 (1981): "In a constitutional democracy sovereign immunity must relax its bar when suits against the government complain of constitutional acts." See also Wiley v. Lloyd, 4 Conn.App. 447, 450, 495 A.2d 1082 (1985).

The defendants next claim that the trial court erred in denying their motion to strike ³ the case from the jury docket. Specifically, the defendants argue that the plaintiff does not have a right to a jury trial in an action brought against the state pursuant to General Statutes § 31-51q.

The constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 19, states that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." ⁴ This particular provision of our constitution has been consistently construed by Connecticut courts to mean that if there was a right to a trial by jury at the time of the adoption of the provision, then that right remains intact. See, e.g., Swanson v. Boschen, 143 Conn. 159, 165, 120 A.2d 546 (1956) ("The test is whether the issue raised in the action is substantially of the same nature or is such an issue as prior to 1818 would have been triable to a jury"); State v. Mention, 12 Conn.App. 258, 263, 530 A.2d 645 (1987); State v. Weisser, 9 Conn.App. 255, 257, 518 A.2d 655 (1986), cert. denied, 202 Conn. 803, 519 A.2d 1207 (1987).

General Statutes § 52-215 ⁵ expands the right to a jury trial. The plaintiff argues that this section is applicable to the present case because it allows such trials in "civil actions involving such an issue of fact as, prior to January 1, 1880, would not present a question properly cognizable in equity." A subsequent provision of General Statutes § 52-215 makes it clear, however, that special statutory proceedings, under enactments of the legislature subsequent to January 1, 1880, are to be tried by the court.

In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Spring Brook Farm Dairy, 135 Conn. 294, 297, 64 A.2d 39 (1949), our Supreme Court stated: "Under this provision [of the Constitution] no party has a constitutional right to a trial by jury of any action not so triable in 1818, when the constitution was adopted.... [T]his is true of actions established by statute since the constitution was adopted, unless perhaps, the new remedy constitutes 'a modification of existing remedies, so vital as to unduly limit and violate the right of trial by jury.' " In Windham Community Memorial Hospital v. Windham, 32 Conn.Sup. 271, 272-73, 350 A.2d 785 (1975), the plaintiff brought suit under a statute enacted well after 1880 and the defendant claimed a right to a jury trial. The court, upon finding that the cause of action was strictly statutory and that there was no...