Slaten v. Travelers Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 November 1943
• Docket Number: 14648.
• Parties: SLATEN et al. v. TRAVELERS INS. CO. et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

28 S.E.2d 280

197 Ga. 1

SLATEN et al. v. TRAVELERS INS. CO. et al.

No. 14648.

Supreme Court of Georgia

November 9, 1943

Rehearing Denied Dec. 2, 1943.

Certified Question from Court of Appeals.

Syllabus by the Court.

As to those employees who have accepted the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act by the method prescribed in the Code, § 114-201, the bare fact of engaging in work in this State without giving notice of election not to be bound by the act automatically brings the provisions of the act into operation, in so far as injury arising out of the Georgia employment is concerned, regardless of where the accident itself may occur. In such circumstances the provisions of § 114-411 have no application, and the execution of a contract of employment within this State is not necessary to entitle them to receive compensation for injuries sustained outside of the State; but as to employees who have agreed to be bound by the act by the method prescribed in § 114-110, and who have not engaged in any work within this State, it is essential that the contract of employment be executed within this State, in order that such employees may receive compensation for injuries sustained while employed outside of the State.

The Court of Appeals certified to this court the following question:

'It is provided in the Code, § 114-411, as published in the official Code of 1933, and in Park's Annotated Code of 1933, that 'Where an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this State, which would entitle him or his dependents to compensation if it had happened in this State the employee or his dependents shall be entitled to compensation, if the contract of employment was made in this State, and if the employer's place of business is in this State or if the residence of the employee is in this State; provided his contract of employment was not expressly for service exclusively outside of the State.' It appears from an inspection of the authentic original act on file in the office of the Secretary of State, and also from the officially published volume of Georgia Laws of 1920 (Ga.L.1920, pp. 167, 187, sec. 37), from which the foregoing Code section is codified, that after the words 'employer's place of business is in this State,' there is a comma, thus causing this phrase to read as follows: 'employer's place of business is in this State, or if the residence of the employee is in this State.'

'Is it essential to the right of a claimant for compensation to recover compensation for an injury resulting from an accident which happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this State that the contract of employment must have been made within this State, where at the time of the accident the residence of the employee was in this State?'

Philip Etheridge, Woodruff, Ward & Etheridge, and Lokey & Bowden, all of Atlanta, for plaintiffs in error.

Neely, Marshall & Greene and Harry L. Greene, all of Atlanta, for defendants in error.

DUCKWORTH Justice.

The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Code, title 114) was to substitute a method of accident insurance in the place of the common-law rights and liabilities for substantially all employees. It is a humanitarian measure enacted to avoid the evils which actions for torts had entailed. Under the old law the injured employee could recover from the employer damages only by proving that the employer was at fault; and the procedure for obtaining this relief was attended with protracted litigation, thus preventing the employee and his dependents from receiving financial aid immediately following the injury, during which time he often experienced the greatest financial distress. Our act was not made compulsory; but as evidence of the legislative desire that it be voluntarily accepted by all to whom it is applicable, certain inducements are held out to facilitate its acceptance. Therefore the act should be interpreted in the light of this purpose, and, so far as the rules of construction will permit, to promote the accomplishment of its beneficent design. It attempts to provide immediate financial assistance for injured employees, without regard to whether or not the injury resulted from the fault of the employer, the single and only requirement being that the injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. It fixes the maximum that can be recovered by any employee, and thus protects the employers against excessive recoveries of damages. It is obvious that the Legislature was primarily concerned with industries and businesses located in this State, and the employers and employees who are engaged in the types of employment covered by the act. Therefore courts should interpret the act, if its language will permit, so that its benefits will be denied to none of these people. As to employers and employees who otherwise meet the requirements of the act, the bare fact that they engage in work in this State without giving the notice, as required by the act, of their refusal to have the act operative as to them automatically brings the provisions of the act into operation, in so far as injury arising out of the Georgia employment is concerned, regardless of where the accident itself may have occurred. Code, § 114-201. The section just cited is not concerned about where the contract of employment was made, but without regard to that matter provides that where the work is begun in Georgia the employer and employee are presumed to have agreed that the law shall operate as to them, and to pay and accept compensation as therein provided for injuries resulting from accidents arising out of and in the course of the employment. Obviously the Legislature knew that Georgia industries and businesses extend the field of their operations beyond State lines, and, hence, understood the plain meaning of the words, 'arising out of and in the course of the employment,' and therefore intended that compensation cover the entire field of operations, without regard to State lines. Since the parties are authorized by this section to reject the law, their failure to reject it constitutes a voluntary acceptance, and obligates them to settle all accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of the employment on the basis prescribed in the act.

A spirited controversy exists throughout this country as to whether, in the absence of express provisions in the Workmen's Compensation Act, it will be given extraterritorial operation. Some courts have held that such a statute should not be construed to operate beyond State lines, and that it can be so construed only when it contains an express provision to that effect. Other courts hold that where the acceptance of the act is voluntary, as is ours, the parties by voluntarily agreeing to come under its operation thereby make the provisions of the law a part of their contract of employment, and its operation stops at no State lines. For cases on this subject see annotations in 3 A.L.R. 1351; 18 A.L.R. 292; 28 A.L.R. 1345; 35 A.L.R. 1414; 45 A.L.R. 1234; 59 A.L.R. 735; 82 A.L.R. 709; 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Law (2d Ed.) 411, § 47; 1 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Law (Perm.Ed.) 447, § 155. A case adopting the latter view is Grinnell v. Wilkinson, 39 R.I. 447, 98 A. 103, 108, L.R.A.1917B, 767, Ann.Cas.1918B, 618. The opinion cites Kennerson v. Thomas Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 A. 372, L.R.A.1916A, 436, and Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N.Y. 544, 111 N.E. 351, Ann.Cas.1916B, 158, and Rounsaville v. Central R. Co., 87 N.J.L. 371, 94 A. 392, and says: 'We are of the opinion that the reasoning of the cases above cited from New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut is quite applicable to the case at bar; that under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Rhode Island the relation of employer and employé is contractual, and the terms of the act are to be read as a part of every contract of service between those subject to its terms; that on principle and in reason, and in view of the purpose, scope, and character of the act, it should be construed and held to include injuries arising out of the state as well as those arising within it; and that the weight of authority upon acts similar to our own gives full support to our conclusion.' The decision just quoted from was cited with approval in Industrial Commission v. AEtna Life Insurance Co., 64 Colo. 480, 174 P. 589, 3 A.L.R. 1336. In the New Jersey decision, supra [87 N.J.L. 371, 94 A. 393] the court said: 'We are now dealing with the simpler question, whether a New Jersey court will enforce a New Jersey contract, according to the terms of a New Jersey statute. The question hardly calls for an answer. The place where the accident occurs is of no more relevance than is the place of accident to the assured, in an action on a contract of accident insurance, or the place of death of the assured, in an action on a contract of life insurance.' In the Kennerson case, supra [89 Conn. 367, 94 A. 376], the court, in construing the Connecticut Compensation Act, said: 'Its intent was to afford its protection to all Connecticut employers and employés who might voluntarily choose to make its provision for compensation for injury a part of their contracts of employment. It assumed that accident is incident to employment, and purposed to charge its cost, in the case of every injury not caused by the willful and serious misconduct or intoxication of the injured employé, to the industry in which it occurred. It intended that the employé should know what compensation he or his dependents would receive in the event of injury, and that payment should be made speedily by a procedure at once simple and inexpensive. It intended that the employer should know his liability in this...