Slavinskaya v. Ray

• Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 35471 (U)
• Docket Number: Index No. 714996/2018,Motion Cal. No. 17,Motion Seq. No. 1
• Decision Date: 28 September 2020
• Parties: ANASTASIA SLAVINSKAYA and TAMARA SLAVINSKAYA, Plaintiffs, v. SWAPON K. RAY and PUMAS CAB CORP., Defendants.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New York)

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2020 NY Slip Op 35471(U)

ANASTASIA SLAVINSKAYA and TAMARA SLAVINSKAYA, Plaintiffs, v. SWAPON K. RAY and PUMAS CAB CORP., Defendants.

Index No. 714996/2018, Motion Cal. No. 17, Motion Seq. No. 1

Supreme Court, Queens County

September 28, 2020

Unpublished Opinion

Motion Date: 7/30/20

Present: HONORABLE MAURICE E. MUIR Justice

Maurice E. Muir Judge

The following electronically filed documents read on this motion by Swapon K. Ray ("Mr. Ray") and Pumas Cab Corp. ("Pumas Cab") (collectively, the "defendants") for an order (a) striking the Note of Issue and Certificate of Readiness; (b) compelling plaintiffs to submit to Examination Before Trial ("EBT"); (c) precluding plaintiffs from testifying at trial should they fail to appear for the scheduled EBT(s); or in the alternative (d) dismissing plaintiffs' complaint should they fail to appear for EBTs; and (e) compelling plaintiffs to submit to Physical Exams after appearing for EBTs pursuant to CPLR § 3121(a).

Papers Numbered

Notice of Motion-Affirmation-Exhibits-Service.................................. EF 12- 19

Affirmation in Opposition-Exhibits.................................................. EF 20 - 21

Upon the foregoing papers, it is ordered that this motion is determined as follows:

BACKGROUND

This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries, which the plaintiffs allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle collision. On March 8, 2018, while Anastasia Slavinskaya ("Anastasia") and Tamara Slavinskaya ("Tamara") (collectively, the "plaintiffs") were passengers in a vehicle driven by Mr. Ray and owned by Pumas Cab Corp., wherein they allegedly sustained injuries ("subject accident"). As a result, on October 2, 2018, the plaintiffs commenced the instant action against the defendants. On November 9, 2018, issue was joined. On March 27, 2019, the parties appeared for a preliminary conference at which time the plaintiffs were ordered to appear for an examination before trial ("EBT") on or before June 4, 2019; and physical examination were to be conducted 45 days after their EBTs. Furthermore, pursuant to the preliminary conference order ("PCO"), the plaintiffs were further directed to file their note of issue on or before March 6, 2020. At the compliance conference, on October 21, 2019, the court ordered that ". . . all parties not yet deposed shall appear for deposition(s) on 11/14/2019 at time 10:00 o'clock . .." Furthermore, pursuant to the compliance conference order ("COC"), the court ordered that "[a]ll physical examinations shall be completed within 30 days of the designation of examining physician(s)."

On or about March 9, 2020, the plaintiffs filed their Note of Issue and Certificate of Readiness for Trial ("NOI"), wherein it stated "[d]iscovery now know[n] to be necessary completed." However, the defendants argue the plaintiffs' physical examinations have not been completed and that "[a]t present, neither Plaintiff has been deposed. Completion of Plaintiffs' EBTs are necessary to mounting a proper defense to this action, which will allow Defendant to ascertain the alleged damages of Plaintiffs claim, and the extent of Plaintiff s' injuries." As a result, the defendants filed the instant motion seeking the following relief: (a) striking the NOI; (b) compelling plaintiffs to submit to an EBT; (c) precluding plaintiffs from testifying at trial should they fail to appear for the scheduled EBTs; or in the alternative (d) dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint should they fail to appear for EBTs; and (e) compelling plaintiffs to submit to physical examination, pursuant to CPLR § 3121(a). Counsel for the plaintiffs opposes the defendants' application in its entirety and argues that "[c]ontrary to the defendants' allegations . . . there is no lack of cooperation to appear for depositions and subsequent medical examination necessary in this matter. Plaintiffs will appear, on a mutually agreeable day, to conduct depositions of all parties." Moreover, counsel asserts that "[p]laintiffs Certificate of Readiness is not deficient or inaccurate and does not contain erroneous allegations. ... The plaintiffs' Note of Issue, including the Affirmation, says that the parties were not yet deposed and the plaintiffs intend to complete all depositions and discovery in this matter after placing this matter on a trial calendar as directed by this Court."

APPLICABLE LAW

CPLR § 3101(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." The terms "material and necessary" in this statute "must 'be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity'" (Matter of Kapon v. Koch, 23 N.Y.3d 32, 38 [2014], quoting Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 406 [1968]; see also Brito v. Gomez, 33 N.Y.3d 1126 [2019]). At the same time, a party is "not entitled to unlimited, uncontrolled unfettered disclosure" (Geffner v. Merry Med. Ctr., 83 A.D.3d 998, 998 [2d Dept 2011]; see Quinones v. 9 E. 69th St., ILC, 132 A.D.3d 750, 750 [2d Dept. 2015]). "It is incumbent on the party seeking disclosure to demonstrate that the method of discovery sought will result in the disclosure of relevant evidence or is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information bearing on the claims" (Crazytown Furniture v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 150 A.D.2d 420, 421 [2d Dept. 1989]; see Quinones v. 9 E. 69th St., ILC, 132 A.D.3d at 750, supra).

Furthermore pursuant to CPLR § 3126, "[i]f any party . . . refuses to obey an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information which the courts finds ought to have been disclosed pursuant to this article, the court may make such orders with regard to the failure or refusal as are just, among them ... an order striking out pleading or part thereof, or dismissing the action or any part thereof. . . ." (see Fish & Richardson, P.C v. Schindler, 75 A.D.3d 219, 220 [1^st Dept 2010]). In Friedman, Harfenist, Langer & Kraut v. Rosenthal, 79 A.D.3d 798 [2d Dept 2010], the court ruled that "[t]he nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 rest within the discretion of the Supreme Court (see Raville v. Elnomany, 76 A.D.3d 520 [2d Dept 2010]; Negro v. St. Charles Hospital & Rehabilitation Ctr., 44 A.D.3d 727 [2d Dept 2007]; 1523 Real Estate, Inc. v. East Atl. Props. LLC, 41 A.D.3d 567, 568 [2d Dept 2007]). "[W]hen a party fails to comply with a court order and frustrates the disclosure scheme set forth in the CPLR, it is well within the Trial Judge's discretion [to dismiss a pleading]" (Kihl v. Pfeffer, 94 N.Y.2d 118, 122 [1999]). "While actions should be resolved on the merits when possible, a court may strike [a pleading] upon a clear showing that a party's failure to comply with disclosure order was the result of willful and contumacious conduct." (Almonte v. Pichardo, 105 A.D.3d 687 [2d Dept 2012]; Harris v. City of New York, 117 A.D.3d 790 [2d Dept 2014]; Arpino v. F.J.F. & Sons Elec. Co., Inc., 102 A.D.3d 201 [2d Dept 2012]; Zakhidov v. Boulevard Tenants Corp., 96 A.D.3d 737 [2d Dept 2012]; see also Brannigan v. Door, 44 A.D.3d 959 [2d...