Sliney v. Previte
Decision Date | 09 December 2015 |
Docket Number | SJC–11844. |
Citation | 41 N.E.3d 732,473 Mass. 283 |
Parties | Rosanne SLINEY v. Domenic A. PREVITE, Jr., & others. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Carmen L. Durso (Mark F. Itzkowitz, Boston, with him) for the plaintiff.
Sylvia Katsenes for the defendant.
Marci A. Hamilton, of Pennsylvania, & Erin K. Olson, for National Center for Victims of Crime & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
Present: GANTS, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, DUFFLY, LENK, & HINES, JJ.
BOTSFORD
, J.
Until June, 2014, civil actions alleging sexual abuse of a minor, which may be brought pursuant to G.L. c. 260, § 4C
(§ 4C ), were governed by a three-year statute of limitations. G.L. c. 260, § 4C, as amended through St. 2011, c. 178, § 19. Section 4C was amended effective June 26, 2014, to extend the limitations period from three years to thirty-five years; the amending act contained a retroactivity provision, and an emergency preamble. St. 2014, c. 145, §§ 5, 8. The plaintiff, Rosanne Sliney, filed an action in 2012 alleging that her uncle, the defendant Domenic A. Previte, Jr., had sexually abused her between 1968 and 1977, when she was a child. Judgment entered in the Superior Court in June, 2012, dismissing the complaint on statute of limitations grounds. We consider here two questions: whether, in the circumstances presented, § 4C
's extended statute of limitations applies to the plaintiff's case, and, if so, whether the retroactive application is constitutional. We answer both questions yes and, as a consequence, vacate the Superior Court judgment.2
Background. 1. Factual background. In the Superior Court, this case was decided on Previte's motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(c)
, 365 Mass. 754 (1974). We recite here the facts alleged in Sliney's complaint and for purposes of this appeal we assume the facts to be true. Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 529–530, 766 N.E.2d 482 (2002) ( ). From the time she was five years old in 1968 until she was fourteen years old in 1977, Sliney was sexually abused many times by Previte, her uncle. She required psychiatric treatment to deal with issues related to the abuse, and was hospitalized on numerous occasions for the same reason, beginning when she was approximately twenty-four years old.
Sliney began to recall some of the abuse by Previte beginning in 1988, and confided in her relatives. Thereafter, Previte wrote a letter of apology to Sliney and asked for her forgiveness. Sliney
was under family pressure to forgive Previte, and in March of 1991, Sliney was coerced into signing a document that purportedly released Previte from all claims in exchange for a payment of $26,500; Sliney's mental state was such at the time that she did not understand the nature of this document. Thereafter, she continued to require mental health hospitalizations. At some point in 2011, Sliney began to recall new, different memories that Previte, in addition to committing acts of sexual abuse himself, had forced her to engage in sexual acts with other men who were unknown to her.3
On January 30, 2012, Sliney filed this action in the Superior Court. The complaint named Previte and Michael Moe Nos. 1–104 as defendants and alleged the facts just summarized. Previte answered the complaint and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings that sought dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that (1) the statute of limitations had already run before Sliney filed her complaint, and (2) the release executed by Sliney in 1991 foreclosed her from raising her claims against Previte. In response, Sliney argued in part that the abuse she suffered as a result of being forced by Previte to engage in sexual activities with other men was distinct from the acts of sexual abuse committed directly by Previte and she reasonably could not have discovered that abuse until 2011—i.e., within the limitations period of three years. She also contended that the release she signed was invalid. In June, 2012, a judge in the Superior Court allowed Previte's motion and entered judgment dismissing the complaint against him on the basis that the action was filed after the three-year statute of limitations that had been prescribed by § 4C
had expired.5 The motion judge concluded that Sliney knew of the sexual abuse by Previte as of 1988, and the fact that she remembered additional incidents did not extend the limitations period beyond the three-year period ending in 1991. The motion judge did not address the validity of the release. Sliney filed a timely appeal in the Appeals Court, which, on December 31, 2013, affirmed the Superior Court judgment on statute of limitations grounds in a decision issued pursuant to its rule 1:28.
In January, 2014, Sliney filed a petition for rehearing in the Appeals Court and thereafter an application for further appellate review in this court. See Mass. R.A.P. 27
, as amended, 410 Mass. 1602 (1991); Mass. R.A.P. 27.1, as amended, 441 Mass. 1601 (2004). On June 26, 2014, while the petition and application were still pending in the respective courts, the Legislature enacted St. 2014, c. 145(act), enlarging the limitations period in § 4C for civil actions alleging sexual abuse of a minor from three years to thirty-five years. Section 8 of the act contains a retroactivity provision. St. 2014, c. 145, § 8. After the act's passage, Sliney filed a variety of motions in the Appeals Court, seeking relief based on the provisions of the act.6 These motions were denied.7 In August, 2014, Sliney filed in this court a second application for further appellate review. We allowed both of Sliney's applications.
2. Statutory Background. As originally enacted in 1993, § 4C
provided that “[a]ctions for assault and battery alleging the defendant sexually abused a minor shall be commenced within three years of the acts alleged to have caused an injury or condition” or three years from when the victim reasonably discovered the injury was caused by the acts, although the time for a child to commence an action under the statute was tolled until the child turned eighteen. G.L. c. 260, § 4C, inserted by St. 1993, c. 307. The act substantially enlarged the limitations period, and also replaced the phrase “actions for assault and battery,” with “actions of tort.”8 St. 2014, c. 145, § 4. As amended by the act, the first paragraph of § 4C provides:
Discussion. 1. Application of the act. Whether a statute applies to events occurring prior to the date on which the statute takes effect is in the first instance a question of legislative intent. Smith v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 462 Mass. 370, 372, 968 N.E.2d 884 (2012)
. If “the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent.” Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 444, 895 N.E.2d 446 (2008). Where there is no express legislative directive, this court generally applies the rule of interpretation that statutes operate prospectively. See Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Nunez, 460 Mass. 511, 516, 952 N.E.2d 923 (2011) (Nunez ), and cases cited. Nevertheless, a statute will be applied retroactively if “it appears by necessary implication from the words, context or objects of [the amendments] that the Legislature intended [them] to be retroactive in operation” and the retroactive intention is “unequivocally clear” (quotations omitted). Smith, supra at 376–377, 968 N.E.2d 884. See Nunez, supra. Here, we deal with a statute that regulates practice and procedure and affects remedies, but far more to the point, the Legislature has made its intention about retroactive operation both clear and unequivocal: § 8 of the act expressly states that the act's expansion of the limitation periods in § 4C
is to apply “regardless of when any such action or claim [relating to sexual abuse of a child] shall have accrued or been filed and regardless of whether it may have lapsed or otherwise be barred by time ” (emphasis added).
Previte does not dispute that the Legislature intended the act's new limitations period to apply retroactively, but argues that the act does not apply to this case for two reasons. First, he contends that even where a statutory amendment is procedural in nature—as is the case with an alteration of a statutory limitations period, see generally Boston v. Keene Corp., 406 Mass. 301, 312, 547 N.E.2d 328 (1989)
(Keene Corp. )—the amendment applies only if the case has not yet gone beyond the procedural stage...
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