Smith v. Avatar Properties, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-1434,97-1434
• Parties: 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1642 Danny SMITH, Appellant, v. AVATAR PROPERTIES, INC., et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1103

714 So.2d 1103

23 Fla. L. Weekly D1642

Danny SMITH, Appellant, v. AVATAR PROPERTIES, INC., et al., Appellees.

No. 97-1434.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fifth District.

July 10, 1998.

Richard J. Manno of Morgan, Colling & Gilbert, P.A., Orlando, and Bill McCabe of Shepherd, McCabe & Cooley, Longwood, for Appellant.

Richard A. DuRose, John R. Hamilton and John S. Lord, Jr., of Foley & Lardner, Orlando, for Appellees.

PETERSON, Judge.

Danny Smith appeals an order summarily dismissing his claim of employment discrimination based on a "handicap" ¹ under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), sections 760.01-11, Florida Statutes (1994), in favor of his former employer, Avatar Properties, Inc., and Kissimmee Construction Co. (collectively, Avatar).

Smith is a forty-nine year old man, who worked for Avatar for approximately 11 years, as a dump truck driver, as a heavy equipment operator, as a pug mill operator, and as a pipe layer. His employment record was unmarred. During the course of his employment, he suffered two heart attacks, one in 1984 and one in 1991, both of which required open heart surgery. He was able to return to light duty work after these heart attacks and was eventually given full medical release to return to heavier duties.

Suffering with angina pains in May 1994, he consulted his physician who advised him not to work. Following further medical examination, Smith was diagnosed with coronary artery disease and chronic obstructive lung disease.

On September 27, 1994, during that period of time in which his treating physician was of the opinion that Smith should not return to work, he applied for but was denied social security disability (SSD) benefits. On October 11, 1994, Smith's physician told him that he could return to light duty work.

When Smith attempted to return to light duty work, Avatar told him that no such work was available. Contrarily, he believed, that at that time, Avatar needed a fuel truck driver, a parts runner, and meter readers, all of which are light duty jobs. He claims that he was further informed by a co-worker that Avatar's supervisor just did not want to give him a job. Smith suspected that a past bad personal experience with the supervisor resulted in a personal grudge. He again approached the supervisor about light duty work, and was offered a desk job in Barefoot Bay. He did not accept the offer, however, because Barefoot Bay was 60-80 miles away from his home. Smith then asked another supervisor about light duty work and was assured that he would check into it, but Smith never heard anything further about his inquiry. Two weeks later, he again inquired about light duty work, but the original supervisor informed him that he was being terminated based on his inability to work.

Shortly after his termination, Smith moved to Oklahoma, and although he has applied for numerous jobs, he has not been successful in acquiring employment; he believes it is because of the status of his health. Once again he made a claim for SSD benefits, citing his disabling heart condition as the reason for his inability to work. He also sought damages from Avatar for employment discrimination based on disability under FCRA, alleging an ability to work with accommodation.

In his SSD claim, Smith alleged that, "I became unable to work because of my disabling condition on June 1, 1994," and that, "I am still disabled." A disability report filed the same month, July 1995, stated that his disabling condition is "heart and lung trouble", and that his condition kept him from working. The Social Security Administration denied his claim, concluding that his condition did not keep him from performing less demanding work. He applied for reconsideration stating that, "I am unable to work," but he was again denied relief.

Smith then requested a hearing before an administrative law judge who found in November, 1996, that Smith should receive SSD benefits:

The claimant is a 48-year old man who alleges disability since June 1, 1994, due to coronary heart disease. He has no education, is illiterate, and has relevant work experience as a heavy equipment operator and as a gas station attendant. There is no evidence he has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability.

The claimant has medically-determined impairments which impose significant limitations on his ability to engage in work or work-like activities. These impairments include coronary heart disease.... [The] evidence [of his impairments] is accorded significant weight and there is no substantial evidence to the contrary. There is no evidence the claimant's impairments are remediable by reasonable therapy that has not been attempted yet nor evidence that claimant has not been compliant properly with prescribed therapy.

Consideration was given to the findings of fact of the state medical consultants. The testimony of the impartial medical expert and the medical documentation from the treating and examining sources obtained subsequent to the issuance of the initial and reconsideration determinations outweighs those prior findings of fact. The entire medical record provides substantial evidence to support a conclusion the claimant's impairments are severe and meet a listing.

* * * * * *

FINDINGS

1. The claimant meets the disability insured status requirements of the Social Security Act.

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date.

3. The claimant has medically determinable impairments which impose significant limitations on his ability to engage in work or work-like activities.

4. The claimant's impairments meet the criteria of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Regulations No. 4. Therefore, the claimant is disabled.

5. The prior determination and decision should be reopened and/or revised based on the record in this case.

DECISION

The claimant was disabled on June 1, 1994, and is entitled to a period of disability commencing on that date and to disability insurance benefits under section 216(I) and 223, respectively, of Title II of the Social Security Act.

In April, 1997, Avatar obtained a summary judgment against Smith on his claim of employment discrimination under FCRA, based on his representations in his SSD applications that he was unable to work. Citing to numerous cases invoking the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the trial court entered a final summary judgment against Smith. This appeal ensued.

Smith argues that the trial court erred in barring his claim for disability discrimination under the doctrine of judicial estoppel because issues of material fact remain in the FCRA proceeding. He contends that Avatar discriminated against him in violation of his rights under FCRA by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for his disability and by terminating him because of his disability.

To present a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on disability under FCRA, a plaintiff must show 1) that he or she is a person with a disability; 2) that he or she is "qualified" for the position apart from his or her disability; and 3) that he or she was denied the position solely because of his or her disability. See Brand v. Florida Power Corp., 633 So.2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). FCRA should be construed in conformity with the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), and its predecessor the Rehabilitation Act. Greene v. Seminole Elec. Co-op., Inc., 701 So.2d 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Brand at 509 (if Florida statute is modeled after federal law on same subject, Florida statute will take on same construction as is placed on its federal prototype, insofar as such interpretation is harmonious with spirit and policy of Florida legislation). The ADA provides that a "qualified individual" is an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). If a qualified individual with a disability could perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation, then the employer is required to provide the accommodation unless doing so would be an undue hardship for the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Reasonable accommodation may include, but is not limited to such ameliorations as: additional unpaid leave, job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, or even reassignment to a vacant position. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(9)(B).

The legislature, in enacting FCRA, and Congress in its enactment of the ADA, were silent regarding the relationship of these laws with existing disability legislation under the Social Security Act. In the absence of any guidance, the courts have split over whether the application for or receipt of Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits should stop discharged employees from asserting protection under the ADA. ² Two cases from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and two cases from the U.S. District Courts of Florida, have addressed the subject. See Taylor v. Food World, Inc., 133 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir.1998); Talavera v. School Board of Palm Beach Co., 129 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir.1997); Thomas v. Fort Myers Housing Authority, 955 F.Supp. 1463 (M.D.Fla.1997), overruled by Talavera v. School Board of Palm Beach Co., 129 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir.1997); Dockery v. North Shore Medical Center, 909 F.Supp. 1550 (S.D.Fla.1995). However, only the Thomas case has been cited by the parties, and that case has been overruled.

Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that is used to prevent litigants from taking totally inconsistent positions in separate judicial, including quasi-judicial, proceedings. The doctrine is "designed to prevent parties from making a mockery of justice by inconsistent pleadings." American Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Federal Dep. Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d 1528, 1536 (11th Cir.1983). Stated differently, the doctrine is intended...