Smith v. Board of Supervisors
| Decision Date | 18 December 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. A043213,A043213 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Allen E. SMITH et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Louis H. Renne, City Atty., Paula Jesson, Deputy City Atty., San Francisco, for defendants and respondents.
This is an appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction. For the reasons set forth below we shall remand the case to the trial court.
On May 27, 1988, the Board of Supervisors (Board) of the City and County of San Francisco (City) issued a public notice that on June 27, 1988, it would hold a hearing on various reductions in medical and health services provided by the City. The notice stated that it was pursuant to HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE SECTION 1442.51 and that at the end of the hearing, the Board would adopt a finding that the proposed changes would or would not have a detrimental impact on the health care needs of those affected. Attached to the notice were 11 pages providing further details on the nature of the proposed reductions.
These reductions, which totaled $17.2 million, were initiated by the mayor's office in response to a projected budget deficit of $179 million. The mayor had asked city departments to prepare two budget reduction scenarios. The first would take place, assuming Board approval, if Proposition K (increase in the Gann spending limit) were approved. Scenario two would take place if Proposition K were rejected. The Board's notice of May 27, 1988, reflected each of these scenarios.
This budgetary process was in accordance with the City's charter. Under the charter, each department executive receives from every department and office within that department a budget estimate for the upcoming fiscal year. (Art. VI, § 6.200.) These budget estimates are then transmitted to the mayor's office no later than the first day of March of each year. (Id.) The mayor may then hold hearings on these estimates and may decrease or increase them. (§ 6.203.) The mayor is then required, not later than the first day of June of each year, to transmit to the Board the consolidated budget estimates for all departments for the coming year. (§ 6.203.)
The charter further requires that, on or before June 30 of each year, the Board enact an interim appropriation ordinance. (§ 6.205.) However, the charter specifically provides that the "[B]oard of supervisors may decrease or reject any item contained in the proposed budget, and may without reference or amendment to the detail schedule and positions and compensations, decrease any total amount for personal services contained in the proposed budget, but shall not increase any amount or add any new item for personal services or materials, supplies, or contractual services, for any department, unless requested in writing so to do by the mayor...." (Ibid.) Finally, the Board, after public hearing, and not earlier than the 15th day of July, nor later than the first of August of each year, must adopt the proposed budget as "submitted or as amended." (Ibid.)
Under this scheme the mayor submitted to the Board his budget proposals. The clerk of the Board then issued the public notice of those reductions on May 27, 1988. 2 Appellants, two indigent patients of county funded health care facilities, brought an action for injunctive and declaratory relief on June 14, 1988. The action also sought a peremptory writ of mandate. They alleged that the May 27, notice did not comply with the requirements of section 1442.5; that section provides in pertinent part as follows:
"Prior to closing a county facility, eliminating or reducing the level of services provided, or prior to the leasing, selling, or transfer of management, the board shall provide public notice, including notice posted at the entrance to all county health care facilities, of public hearings to be held by the board prior to their decision to proceed. Such notice shall be posted not less than 30 days prior to such public hearings. The notice shall contain a detailed list of the proposed reductions or changes, by facility and service. The notice shall include, but not be limited to, the amount and "The board shall make findings based on evidence and testimony from these hearings that their proposed action will or will not have a detrimental impact on the health care needs of the indigents of the county. Such findings shall be included as part of the official public hearing record.
type of each proposed change, the expected saving, and the number of persons affected.
"Notwithstanding the board's closing of a county facility, the elimination of or reduction in the level of services provided, or the leasing, selling or transfer of management of a county facility subsequent to January 1, 1975, the county shall provide for the fulfillment of its duty to provide care to all indigent people, either directly through county facilities or indirectly through alternative means." (Emphasis added.)
Appellants filed their motion for preliminary injunction on June 15, 1988. In support of their motion they submitted affidavits in which they stated that they could not tell from the notice how they were going to be affected by the proposed reductions. In addition they submitted an affidavit from a public health nurse employed by the City who stated that she was unable to determine from the notice what impact the budget cuts would have in her area of public health. Finally, they submitted an affidavit of E. Richard Brown, an associate professor at the University of California at Los Angeles School of Public Health. In his affidavit Professor Brown stated that, based on his extensive experience, the May 27, notice was excessively vague, and was one of the "vaguest and least informative Beilenson notices" 3 that he had ever seen.
The City issued a second notice on June 21, 1988, which was posted at all county health services on that date and was distributed by mail to other interested parties on June 22. This notice provided much greater detail than the previous notice. 4 On June 24, 1988, the superior court denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The Board proceeded with the June 27 hearing.
Appellants' complaint sought to enjoin the Board's June 27, hearing; to obtain a declaratory judgment that respondents were in violation of section 1442.5 with respect to the hearing set for June 27; and to obtain a writ of mandate requiring respondents to carry out their duties under section 1442.5. Neither this court nor the trial court could issue an injunction or writ of mandamus to prevent what has taken place. "The scope of available preliminary relief is necessarily limited by the scope of the relief likely to be obtained at trial on the merits." (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 442, 261 Cal.Rptr. 574, 777 P.2d 610.) Also, as framed, the issue presented in the declaratory relief action is moot. We may, however, decide a matter of public interest which is likely to recur. Although an injunction can no longer be issued to postpone the June 27, 1988, hearing (see Chase v. Brooks (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 657, 662, 232 Cal.Rptr. 65), we may address important issues which are of great public interest, are likely to recur, and may otherwise evade appellate review. (See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fales (1973) 8 Cal.3d 712, 715-716, 106 Cal.Rptr. 21, 505 P.2d 213.)
We must resolve two questions in determining the controversy. The first is whether section 1442.5 applies to all counties in the state or whether San Francisco as a charter county is exempted from its application due to its unique budgetary process. Second, if we determine section 1442.5 does apply to San Francisco, then we must decide whether the May 27, notice complied with the statute.
The language in dispute in section 1442.5 is found in the first two paragraphs of that section. Appellants contend the language of the section, by itself or through consideration of legislative intent, clearly demonstrates that it is to apply to all counties. Respondents assert, however, that given the unique budgetary process of San Francisco, this section does not apply to it.
In interpreting a statute our primary objective is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature and to effectuate that intent. (San Diego Union v. City Council (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 947, 954, 196 Cal.Rptr. 45.) As our Supreme Court further stated in Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 810, 818-819, 226 Cal.Rptr. 81, 718 P.2d 68, " '[T]he "intention of the...
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