Smith v. Chase

Decision Date12 April 1880
PartiesGEORGE W. SMITH v. SANFORD C. CHASE.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

ON EXCEPTIONS.

REPLEVIN of one truck wagon, " to wit, one peddle cart." Writ dated June 14, 1878. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion. The case was submitted to the presiding judge who held as a matter of law, that the property was a truck wagon, and exempt from attachment by the statute. To this ruling, the defendant alleged and filed exceptions.

James Wright, for the plaintiff, cited Webster's and Worcester's unabridged dictionaries; R S., c. 81, § 59; 48 Me. 410; 53 Me. 401; 49 Me. 34; 56 Me. 34; 56 Me. 538.

Folsom & Merrill, for the defendant, cited: 6 Dane Ab. c. 196, art. 5; stat. 1821, c. 95, § 1; stat. 1838, c. 307; stat. 1847, c. 32; stat. 1859, c. 74; stat. 1867, c. 102, § 4; R. S., c. 81, § 59; c. 1, § 4, cl. 1.

BARROWS J.

The vehicle here replevied, is claimed by the plaintiff under a mortgage, from Frank E. Swanton, dated May 29, 1878, in which it is described as " a one horse peddle cart." Defendant justifies the taking of the same, May 25, 1878, (four days before the plaintiff's title accrued) as the property of sad Swanton, by virtue of a writ of attachment, in his hands as sheriff of the county.

The justification must prevail, unless the vehicle was exempt from attachment under the 9th clause of § 59, c. 81, R. S., which places upon the list of exempted articles, " one plow, one cart or truck wagon, one harrow, one yoke with bows, ring and staples, two chains, one ox sled, and one mowing machine."

There was no question of fact as to the description of the vehicle. " It was a light one horse peddler's wagon, with four wheels, the body hung upon three elliptic steel springs, with drawers behind, and doors at sides, with railing around the top, and dasher in front." Was it " a cart, or truck wagon," within the meaning of the provision above referred to? The plaintiff claims that it comes directly within the definition of a truck wagon, which he says is a wagon used for the transportation and exchange or barter of commodities, deriving truck, from the French verb troquer, " to exchange, to barter, to truck." Defendant derives it from the Greek … " a wheel," from which come the English truck and trucks, signifying " a low carriage for carrying goods, stone," & c. Both fortify their positions by Webster's dictionary, an acknowledged authority; but this does not bring us perceptibly nearer a solution of the question. What did the legislature intend to exempt as " a cart or truck wagon?" The fundamental rule in the construction of statutes, is that they are to be construed according to the intention of the legislature. Dane's abridgment, vol. 6, c. 196, art. 5, § 2. Another is, that " all the statutes on one subject are to be viewed as one; " Ibid. c. 196, art. 5, § 16; Merrill v. Crossman, 68 Me. 412. Such a construction must prevail as will form a consistent and harmonious whole, instead of an incongruous, arbitrary and exceptional conglomeration. The context, and the course of legislation, as matter of history often throw light upon the meaning and application of terms used in the statutes.

Clause 9 had its origin in laws of 1838, c. 307, entitled " an act, exempting farming tools and other articles from attachment," & c., by which one plough of the value of $10, one cart of the value of $25, one harrow of the value of $5, and all necessary hand farming tools, of the value of $10, together with one cooking stove of the value of $35 were exempted. In 1839, by c. 413, there was a limited exemption of bulls, steers or oxen, to go with the " " cart." These exemptions were continued in the revision of 1841, and in 1847, c. 11, were supplemented by the exemption of...

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14 cases
  • Hunter v. Totman
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • April 24, 1951
    ...and use 'in the regular course of business'? In the construction of a statute the fundamental rule is the legislative intent. Smith v. Chase, 71 Me. 164; Peirce v. City of Bangor, 105 Me. 413, 74 A. 1039; State v. Koliche, 144 Me. ----, 61 A.2d 115, but a statute in derogation of the common......
  • State v. Spaulding
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • February 11, 1998
    ...as will form a consistent and harmonious whole, instead of an incongruous, arbitrary and exceptional conglomeration.") (quoting Smith v. Chase, 71 Me. 164 (1880)). ¶13 Applicability of section 456 is logically limited to the alteration of an existing public record. Tampering pursuant to sec......
  • Steele v. Smalley.
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • October 2, 1945
    ...on the intent of the legislature. Inhabitants of Guilford v. Inhabitants of Monson, 134 Me. 261, 265, 185 A. 517 (quoting from Smith v. Chase, 71 Me. 164, 165). It is fundamental, likewise, that a particular phrase or a particular section should not be considered apart from its context. The......
  • Depositors Trust Co. of Augusta v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • August 2, 1966
    ...80 A.2d 401, we are aware that the legislative intent is the fundamental rule in the construction or interpretation of statutes. Smith v. Chase, 71 Me. 164; Pierce v. City of Bangor, 105 Me. 413, 74 A. 1039; State v. Koliche, 143 Me. 281, 61 A.2d And as further stated in Hunter, supra, in a......
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