Smith v. City of St. Charles, 37899

Decision Date17 May 1977
Docket NumberNo. 37899,37899
Citation552 S.W.2d 60
PartiesGlen SMITH et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF ST. CHARLES, Defendant-Respondent. . Louis District
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Carter & Becker, P. C., Charles F. Dufour, John J. Allen, Clayton, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Rollings, Gerhardt & Hazelwood, Keith W. Hazelwood, St. Charles, for defendant-respondent.

REINHARD, Judge.

Plaintiffs filed a class action praying for an invalidation of annexation and a declaration that the same was unreasonable, unnecessary, and void as a matter of law. The real estate was annexed by the City of St. Charles pursuant to the provisions of § 71.014, RSMo.1969. 1 The trial court rendered judgment adverse to the plaintiffs and they brought this appeal.

The property involved is a part of land which is known as the Commons of St. Charles. The United States Congress passed an act on January 27, 1831, whereby the inhabitants of the City of St. Charles were granted all the right, title and interest of the United States in and to the adjoining areas known as the Commons of St. Charles. On November 11, 1844, the inhabitants of the City executed a 999 year lease in favor of John Frederick Schmiemeyer, and has assigns, on the land which forms the subject of this litigation.

Through a series of transfers, this leasehold interest was held by various individuals and eventually the interest in the land was sold to Joseph G. Shatro and Kathryn Shatro. The Shatros transferred the property to appellants by a series of warranty deeds in 1963, 1964, and 1966. The warranty deed to the appellant Cork contained no reservations or limitations; however, the warranty deeds to appellants Smith and Westhues contained clauses stating: "SUBJECT to conditions, restrictions and easements of record." The Shatros paid rent on this property to the City of St. Charles prior to the time they transferred their interest, and they continued to pay rent on the Commons property they retained. There was no evidence presented that the City had made a conveyance of this property other than the lease.

Chapter 5 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of St. Charles provides a procedure wherein a tenant can obtain a fee simple title. It provides that a tenant must surrender his leasehold interest to the City; petition the City for a deed in fee simple; pay the City the value of the property (the value to be determined as stated in the lease); and pay all of the expenses of the transfer and all arrearages of rent on such property. If the City attorney determines that the petitioner has acquired the interest he claims, still holds the same, and has complied with the above provisions, the City shall deliver to him a deed in fee simple.

The appellants never petitioned the City to obtain a fee simple interest.

The inhabitants of the City of St. Charles, in their corporate capacity, acting through the City Council, petitioned the City Council under § 71.014, supra, for the annexation of the tract of land to which they claimed the fee interest. On November 5, 1974, the voters of the City approved the annexation. The City did not obtain the consent of any of the appellants.

The appellants contend that the court erred when it concluded that: 1) the fee simple title of the property lies with the City of St. Charles; 2) because the City held fee simple ownership the property could be annexed under the provisions of § 71.014; and 3) there were no facts showing that such annexation was unreasonable under the provisions of § 71.014.

In 1803 France ceded title to this property to the United States (Louisiana Purchase). In 1831 the United States transferred fee simple title to the City of St. Charles. Woodson v. Skinner, 22 Mo. 13 (Sup.Ct.1855); Bird v. Montgomery, 6 Mo. 510 (Sup.Ct.1840); Chouteau v. Eckhart, 7 Mo. 16 (Sup.Ct.1841), affirmed, 2 How. 344, 43 U.S. 344, 11 L.Ed. 293 (1844). 2 The evidence shows that the City of St. Charles executed a 999 year lease on November 11, 1844, and that by a series of transfers the leasehold interest was acquired by the appellants.

While appellants admit that the leasehold interest was not converted to a fee simple interest under the procedures provided by the ordinances of the City of St. Charles, they claim that equity requires they be declared the owners in fee. They base this claim on the fact that they purchased the property by a warranty deed which they claim conveyed to them a fee interest; they have paid no rent; and they pay taxes on the property. (The lease provided for the payment of taxes by the tenants and for an annual rental in addition thereto.)

Although appellants may have acted as if they were owners in fee, it is a fundamental property law that a grantee takes only such interest in land as the grantor had when the conveyance was executed. While appellants allege that the warranty deeds conveyed to them a fee simple interest, the undisputed fact remains that the City of St. Charles retained the fee simple title. Appellants' grantor had only a leasehold interest, and that is all the appellants could take.

The appellants contend that the court erred when it concluded that fee simple ownership of the subject property by the City of St. Charles allowed annexation of such property pursuant to the provisions of § 71.014. Plaintiffs contend that the defendant should have proceeded under § 71.015 which requires the filing of an action against the inhabitants of the area to be annexed. Under this section, as opposed to § 71.014, the annexing authority must show that the annexation is reasonable and necessary to its development and that normal municipal services can be provided within a reasonable time after the effective date of the annexation. Under § 71.014 the landowners offer their property for annexation and the annexing authority could then accept the landowners' petition and submit it to the voters of the municipality for approval and thereby avoid the expense and aggravation of filing a declaratory judgment action.

The primary purpose of the statutory construction is to determine the intent of the legislature by the language used in the statute. State ex rel. Dravo Corporation v. Spradling, 515 S.W.2d 512 (Mo.1974); State ex rel. Schwab v. Riley, 417...

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4 cases
  • Comfort v. Higgins
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • December 18, 1978
    ...to MHI. As the grantee, MHI could take only such interest in the property as SWCA, the grantor, could convey. Smith v. City of St. Charles, 552 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Mo.App.1977); Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of Kansas City v. Dunn, 416 S.W.2d 948 (Mo.1967); Reasor v. Marshall, 359 M......
  • City of Flat River v. Counts, 40854
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • December 4, 1979
    ...fragmentation. While irregular boundaries will not alone serve to destroy an annexation, City of O'Fallon; Smith v. City of St. Charles, 552 S.W.2d 60 (Mo.App.1977), the distortion of the boundary here weighs heavily against reasonableness. City of Mexico v. Hodges, 482 S.W.2d at Finally, w......
  • Reed v. Little River Drainage Dist.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • July 10, 1979
    ...fee. The effect of that deed was to convey to defendant the interest in the land that they had, a life estate. Smith v. City of St. Charles, 552 S.W.2d 60, 62(1) (Mo.App.1977). All of the life tenants except Charles Andrew Juden have died. A life estate held by more than one life tenant is ......
  • City of St. Charles v. Schone
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • June 13, 1978
    ...in support of their first point and we have been unable to find any case so holding. As we previously stated in Smith v. City of St. Charles, 552 S.W.2d 60, 63(4) (Mo.App. 1977): "While irregular boundaries are a factor in determining the reasonableness of an annexation, it alone is not det......
3 books & journal articles
  • Section 8 Alternative Voluntary Annexation in Municipalities Within Certain Counties
    • United States
    • The Missouri Bar Urban Development Subdivisions, and Annexations (2011 Ed.) Chapter 4 Annexation Law and Procedures
    • Invalid date
    ...complete alternative to other authorized annexation methods. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 66‑87 (Nov. 10, 1987). See Smith v. City of St. Charles, 552 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. App. E.D. 1977).Section 71.014 eliminates requirements for a public hearing and precludes written objections. Territory to be annexed i......
  • Section 15.6 Statutes
    • United States
    • The Missouri Bar Local Government Deskbook Chapter 15 Annexation and Municipal Boundary Adjustments
    • Invalid date
    ...complete alternative method to undertake voluntary annexation. See Op. Att’y Gen. No 66-87 (Nov. 10, 1987); Smith v. City of St. Charles, 552 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. App. E.D. 1977). Owner annexations for municipalities in all other counties are controlled under § 71.012. Section 71.015 does not aff......
  • Section 15.13 Special Circumstances
    • United States
    • The Missouri Bar Local Government Deskbook Chapter 15 Annexation and Municipal Boundary Adjustments
    • Invalid date
    ...(§15.13) Special Circumstances In Smith v. City of St. Charles, 552 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. App. E.D. 1977), the City had leased land for 99 years but retained fee simple ownership. The court ruled that it could proceed to annex without filing an action against inhabitants or obtaining the tenants’ ......

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