Smith v. COM'R OF GA. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY

• Decision Date: 10 November 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 86-90-VAL (WDO).
• Citation: 673 F. Supp. 446
• Parties: James O. SMITH, III, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF the GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

673 F. Supp. 446

James O. SMITH, III, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF the GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 86-90-VAL (WDO).

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Valdosta Division.

November 10, 1987.

Randall A. Schmidt, Valdosta, Ga., John L. Cromarties, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.

Neal Childers, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant.

OWENS, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff, James O. Smith, III, has brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant, the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Public Safety (hereinafter "Commissioner"). In his complaint, plaintiff asserts that the Commissioner has deprived him of his property, specifically, his State of Georgia driver's license, without the due process guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Jurisdiction in this matter is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1979) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1980). The parties have agreed to have this case decided by the court, and, therefore, have waived any right to a trial by jury that they might have otherwise had in this action. See Summary of Telephonic conference dated July 22, 1987. The parties have also submitted all evidence that they wish to be considered, and this case is now ready to be decided. The facts of this controversy are relatively undisputed.

Factual Background

Mr. Smith is a thirty-nine (39) year old male citizen of the United States who resides in Lowndes County, Georgia. See Exhibit A, ¶¶ 1-2, which is attached to the proposed consolidated pre-trial order. In May of 1982, Mr. Smith was issued a Georgia driver's license in accordance with O.C. G.A. § 40-5-36 (1985). Exhibit A, at ¶ 7. Prior to the expiration of that license, on May 18, 1985, Mr. Smith was involved in an accident in his automobile. Id. at ¶ 8. At the time of this accident, Mr. Smith was a member of the Georgia National Guard. Id. at ¶ 9.

Following this accident, on May 21, 1985, Sergeant Allen Catoe of the Valdosta Police Department sent a letter to the Georgia Department of Public Safety (GDPS). In that letter Sergeant Catoe informed the GDPS of certain alleged driving incidents involving Mr. Smith. Sergeant Catoe expressed concern over Mr. Smith's driving ability and sought to have the GDPS revoke his license. See Exhibit II. After receiving this information, the GDPS sent Mr. Smith a notice of revocation. See Exhibit III.

Upon receiving this notice, Mr. Smith timely requested a hearing before the GDPS, and the revocation was stayed pending the resolution of this hearing. See Exhibit A, ¶ 12. A hearing was held on June 25, 1985, before Sergeant M.W. Clements, who is a member of the uniform division of the GDPS specially trained to handle such hearings. At that hearing, Mr. Smith was not permitted to subpoena witnesses to appear at the hearing, nor was he permitted to examine or otherwise discover the evidence against him. Id. at ¶¶ 15-16, 22. It was only after the filing of the instant lawsuit that Mr. Smith was finally able to discover the evidence against him and the source of that information.

At the conclusion of the GDPS hearing, the hearing officer, relying on the undisclosed "confidential" information contained in Officer Catoe's letter, revoked Mr. Smith's driver's license. He further advised Mr. Smith that should he get a physician to file a complete medical report, GDPS Form 287, the GDPS Medical Review Board would review his case. Id. at ¶ 19; and Exhibit VI. Mr. Smith did not get a physician to complete this form. He did, however, subsequent to the institution of this action, submit a sworn affidavit to the Board in lieu of a completed GDPS Form 287. See Exhibit VIII; and Exhibit A, ¶¶ 21, 25. Because the proper medical reports were not submitted to the Medical Advisory Board, a review of the GDPS hearing officer's decision was not made, and that decision was, thereby, affirmed. Mr. Smith did not seek to have this decision reviewed by any state court forum. On October 4, 1985, the GDPS informed Mr. Smith that his license had been revoked as a result of the hearing officer's decision in his case. See Exhibit VII.

Due Process Requirements

Mr. Smith asserts that the statutory procedure utilized by Georgia to suspend or revoke the licenses of drivers who are alleged to be medically unfit to drive does not meet the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Mr. Smith further contends that as a result of those procedures, he was unconstitutionally deprived of his license, even though he remains fit to drive. From the outset, the court finds that the interest of the holder of a driver's license in keeping that license is one that is protected by due process. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). This is true regardless of whether the state denominates the issuance of their licenses as a "privilege" or a "right." Id. at 539, 91 S.Ct. at 1589. Once a driver's license has been issued, the license itself often becomes essential to the holder's livelihood, and, therefore, the suspension of that license potentially infringes upon these important interests. Id. The protection of the Fourteenth Amendment is, thus, implicated. Id.

In protecting these interests, the Supreme Court in Bell has held that when a state seeks to terminate an interest such as a driver's license, it must afford "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case" before the termination becomes effective. Id. at 542, 91 S.Ct. at 1591. Absent an "emergency situation," a pre-revocation hearing is required. Id. Defendant has not asserted that such an emergency situation existed in this case, and, given the fact that the Commissioner voluntarily stayed its revocation decision pending the decision by the GDPS hearing officer, the court finds that such a position would be untenable. Tolbert v. McGriff, 434 F.Supp. 682, 685 n. 8 (M.D.Ala.1976).¹

In order for the revocation of Mr. Smith's license to have been proper then, the Commissioner was required to give him notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the effective date of the termination of his license.

A. The effective date of the termination.

On May 24, 1985, Mr. Smith was sent notice that his license was to be revoked as of June 10, 1985. This revocation, however, was stayed pending the resolution of Mr. Smith's administrative remedies. The court, therefore, finds that the effective date of the termination occurred sometime after the hearing was provided to Mr. Smith by the GDPS. The issue before the court, thus, becomes whether the notice and hearing provided Mr. Smith were adequate under the Fourteenth Amendment.

B. Notice

Notice requires that the licensee be told the precise nature of the pending or threatened action. Smith v. McGriff, 434 F.Supp. 673, 679 (M.D.Ala.1976). It also requires that adequate time be provided the licensee between the giving of notice and the hearing so that the licensee may have sufficient time to confront the evidence against him. Id. Exhibits III and IV constitute the notice given Mr. Smith prior to his hearing with the GDPS officer. A review of these documents leads the court to conclude that the notice given, while adequate with regard to the time limits it provided, was inadequate in informing Mr. Smith of what rights he would have at the hearing, and it further failed to inform him of the nature of the evidence against him. At minimum, the court believes the following elements must be included in the notice given if it is to pass constitutional muster:

(1) A statement of the time, place, and nature of the hearing;

(2) A statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held;

(3) A reference to the particular section of the statutes and rules involved;

(4) A short and plain statement of the matters asserted. If the Department is unable to state the matters in detail at that time, the notice may be limited to a statement of the issues involved. Thereafter, upon application, a more definite and detailed statement shall be furnished; and

(5) A statement as to the right of any party to subpoena witnesses and documentary evidence through the agency. See O.C.G.A. § 50-13-13 (1986) for similar notice requirements. Absent this type of notice, the court must find that the notice given Mr. Smith did not comply with the requirements of the due process clause.

C. Hearing

While the formality and procedural requisites of a hearing can vary, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971), the hearing itself must be "meaningful," Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965), and "appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). In other words, the process due will vary in each case depending upon what type of interest is being threatened. Bell, 402 U.S. at 540, 91 S.Ct. at 1590. In this instance, the ability to drive on the public roads of this state is clearly an important interest, as is plaintiff's interest in not being unfairly labeled by the state as having certain mental or physical disabilities. Even though Mr. Smith may not be entitled to the same process that he must be afforded, for example, in a felony prosecution, the court is persuaded that the procedural process utilized by the state in this case cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.

At minimum, the due process requirement of a hearing "embraces not only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them." See Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18, 58 S.Ct. 773, 776, 82 L.Ed. 1129 (1937); and Tolbert, 434 F.Supp. at 686. In Bell, the Supreme Court cited to its decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), for the...