Smith v. McGriff

• Decision Date: 12 November 1976
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 76-53-N.
• Citation: 434 F. Supp. 673
• Parties: Maxine Vincent SMITH, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. G. L. McGRIFF, Individually and in his official capacity as Chief of the Driver License Division, his agents, servants, assigns, and successors in office, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

434 F. Supp. 673

Maxine Vincent SMITH, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. G. L. McGRIFF, Individually and in his official capacity as Chief of the Driver License Division, his agents, servants, assigns, and successors in office, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 76-53-N.

United States District Court, M. D. Alabama, N. D.

November 12, 1976.

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John L. Carroll, Joseph J. Levin, Jr., Pamela S. Horowitz, and Morris S. Dees, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiffs.

William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and Kent B. Brunson, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Ala., Montgomery, Ala., for defendants.

Before RIVES, Circuit Judge, JOHNSON, Chief District Judge, and VARNER, District Judge.

JOHNSON, Chief District Judge:

The plaintiffs in this cause, Maxine Vincent Smith and the Alcoholism Council of Montgomery, Elmore and Autauga Counties, attack the constitutionality of Title 36, Section 68 of the Code of Alabama 1940 (Recomp.1958)¹ and certain practices of the Alabama Department of Public Safety, insofar as they require or permit pre-hearing suspensions of licenses of alcoholics or of persons believed by the Department to be alcoholics. The plaintiffs also maintain that the statute involved is unduly vague and that the statute and defendants' policies violate both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and plaintiffs' First Amendment rights of association. They assert that the defendant medical facilities release and have released medical records contrary to the prohibitions under 42 U.S.C. § 4582.

The plaintiffs represent the class of all persons whose Alabama driver licenses are or may be suspended without a hearing or on arbitrary grounds. They also represent two subclasses. Subclass—1 consists of alcoholics whose driver's licenses are or may be suspended because of their alcoholism. The members of subclass — 2 are alcoholics and alcohol abusers who have undergone treatment in defendant medical facilities and whose medical records have been or may be released contrary to law.

Defendant McGriff is Chief of the Driver License Division ("the Division"). As such, he supervises Division employees and notifies drivers of license suspensions. Defendant Dothard is Director of the Department of Public Safety ("the Department"). His powers include enforcement of the driver licensing laws, and he has the ultimate responsibility for, inter alia, the suspension of driver's licenses. Defendants Watts and Byrd are State Troopers assigned to the Division. The defendant Medical Advisory Board (MAB) is an anonymous panel of physicians established by the Division to advise it on the issuance, suspension and revocation of driver's licenses. The defendant medical facilities (including the named facility Greil Memorial Hospital), institutions designed to help persons with alcohol-related problems, are hospitals which have treated members of subclass—2 and released those licensees' medical records to the Division.

This action arises under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 42 U.S.C. § 4582. Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

A three-judge panel was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281, and the case is now submitted upon depositions and other documentary evidence.

Plaintiff Smith is a forty-three year old alcoholic. In July, 1975, she was involved in an automobile accident which was duly investigated by a police officer but for which no traffic citation was issued. Six weeks later, the Department of Public Safety, Driver's License Division, notified Ms. Smith that, since she had no car insurance, her license would be suspended under Alabama's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law² and that she could request a pre-suspension hearing. She did request such hearing, which was held October 9, 1975.

During this time span the Division had received information leading it to believe that Ms. Smith had a drinking problem. The Division thereupon wrote to Ms. Smith, stating that an "interview-investigation" was being conducted into her driving status and that such interview would be held October 1, 1975.

Corporal Byrd conducted the October 1 interview-investigation. Ms. Smith readily told him that she was an alcoholic; she answered all questions concerning her drinking. She was not informed that her license could be suspended based on the information she was then giving. At the end of the interview, Corporal Byrd warned her not to tell anyone else that she was an alcoholic because her driver's license could be taken away.

Two months later, Sergeant Watts went unannounced to the plaintiff's home, in order to continue the Division's investigation into Ms. Smith's driving status. He and Ms. Smith talked for about thirty minutes regarding her alcoholism. According to Sergeant Watts, Ms. Smith answered his questions very openly and, in his opinion, very honestly. There is conflicting testimony as to whether or not Sergeant Watts informed the plaintiff that the interview could lead to immediate suspension of her license. After talking with Ms. Smith, defendant Watts interviewed other people who knew the plaintiff.

The following day, December 4, 1975, the Division sent plaintiff Smith a notice that her license would be suspended for one year, effective December 7, 1975. Under "Reason for Action," the word "Alcoholic" was checked. On the back of the form was a statement regarding one's right to a presuspension hearing. However, when Ms. Smith called the Division to find out how she could prevent the suspension, she was told that all she could do was to send in medical forms which the Division would evaluate in determining whether or not to reinstate her license. Ms. Smith (and possibly her doctor) filled out the forms and mailed them back to the Division. She heard no more about her license until February 9, 1976, when she was told by letter that the Division had decided to hold her license under suspension.

The class as defined by the plaintiffs does not meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Driver's License Division suspends licenses without a hearing for very different traffic convictions or violations. Not all of these suspensions raise the same legal issues, nor do they all necessarily require the same due process procedures.

This Court certifies the class of all persons who are alcoholics, or who are believed by the Department of Public Safety to be alcoholics or alcohol abusers, whose driver's licenses are or may be suspended without a pre-suspension hearing. This class action is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2) and satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a).

We also find that both subclasses defined by the plaintiffs meet the requirements of Rule 23 and may be certified. See Francis v. Davidson, 340 F.Supp. 351 (D.Md.1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 907, 93 S.Ct. 223, 34 L.Ed.2d 168.

The state's power to revoke or suspend driver's licenses is limited by the due process restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); Jennings v. Mahoney, 404 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 180, 30 L.Ed.2d 146 (1971); Salkay v. Williams, 445 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1971). Due process in this area requires that, absent an emergency situation, the licensee be given notice of the charges and a hearing before such suspension takes effect.

While "many controversies have raged about . . . the Due Process Clause," it is fundamental that except in emergency situations (and this is not one) due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must afford "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case" before the termination becomes effective.

Bell v. Burson, supra, 402 U.S. at 542, 91 S.Ct. at 1591 emphasis in original. See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). Mr. Justice White discussed the development of the law of procedural due process in his concurring opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 187, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1660, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974):

In recent years, however, in a limited number of cases, the Court has held that a hearing must be furnished at the first stage of taking, even where a later hearing was provided. This has been true in the revocation of a state-granted license, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971) . . .

Bell v. Burson, supra, requires that a licensee be given notice and hearing before suspension except in emergency situations. Bell itself did not explain what circumstances would constitute an emergency except to cite as examples Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 67 S.Ct. 1552, 91 L.Ed. 2030 (1947), and Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 70 S.Ct. 870, 94 L.Ed. 1088 (1950), but in Fuentes the Court explained that the situations would have to be "truly unusual" ones, "extraordinary" ones, such as those in which earlier courts have allowed pre-hearing seizures.³ 407 U.S. at 90-91, 92 S.Ct. 1983. The court went on to formulate the elements necessary, in those cases, for seizure without hearing:

First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance.

407 U.S. at 91, 92 S.Ct. at 2000.

The due process attack on the statute and defendants' policies raises two basic questions:

1. Under what circumstances may the Department justify summary suspension under the "emergency situation" doctrine?

2. Is the

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