Smith v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 15 June 2017
• Docket Number: 2015-SC-000301-MR
• Citation: 520 S.W.3d 340
• Parties: Darnell SMITH, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

520 S.W.3d 340

Darnell SMITH, Appellant

v.COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee

2015-SC-000301-MR

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

JUNE 15, 2017

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Bruce P. Hackett, Chief Appellate Defender, Joshua Michael Reho, Assistant Public Advocate.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Andy Beshear, Attorney General of Kentucky, Matthew Robert Krygiel, Assistant Attorney General.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE WRIGHT

Darnell Smith was convicted of a number of offenses related to three separate robberies and sentenced to a total of 25 years in prison. In this matter-of-right appeal, he raises four claims of error: (1) that admitting his recorded statements to a detective violated his Miranda rights; (2) that barring him from introducing evidence of his refusal to sign a Miranda -waiver form prevented him from fully informing the jury of the circumstances surrounding his statements and thus infringed his right to present a complete defense; (3) that admitting evidence of a sweatshirt with no apparent connection to any of the charged offenses was reversible error; and (4) that denying his motion to sever the charged offenses for separate trials was reversible error. This Court affirms.

I. BACKGROUND

Smith's convictions arose from three separate robberies committed in downtown Louisville in January 2014.

The first occurred on the evening of January 18. Wesley Kingsolving was waiting at a bus stop when two men asked him whether they should walk or take the bus to the Phoenix Hill Tavern (which happened to be very close to Kingsolving's apartment). He recommended the bus and volunteered to show them which stop to get off at because he lived across the street from the bar. So they all rode the bus and got off at the same stop. Kingsolving pointed out the bar before turning and heading home. But the two men did not go to the bar; they robbed Kingsolving instead. The robbers physically assaulted Kingsolving and forced him to let them into his apartment—there they stole a backpack, money, an Xbox, a laptop, condoms, and a cell phone. The lead assailant—the taller of the two men, whom Kingsolving would later identify through a police photo lineup and at trial as Smith—also threatened to shoot him with a "clip." After the robbers left, Kingsolving asked a neighbor to call 911. Surveillance cameras on the bus captured images of the men.

Thirty minutes later, the second robbery happened about one-and-a-half miles away, outside the Jewish Hospital campus downtown. There, two men approached a Jewish Hospital nurse, Joshua Worthington, who was outside on a smoke break. One of the men asked him for a cigarette, and Worthington declined. The man walked away but immediately returned and asked instead for a drag from the cigarette Worthington was then smoking. Worthington again declined. The man punched him in the face, stole his cellphone, and ran away. Worthington never positively identified who struck him, but described his assailant as a black male who had "acne scars on his face" and was wearing a dark coat or jacket. (Smith has distinctive facial scars.) Surveillance cameras outside the hospital recorded the assault and captured images of the two assailants—their appearance matched that of the two suspects recorded on the bus surveillance before the Kingsolving robbery.

The third robbery occurred almost one week later, on January 24. That evening, Rodney Pino arrived in the parking lot of his apartment with his son and noticed two men standing in the lot. As he parked his car, one of the men approached and asked for a cigarette. Pino said, "Yes." But as he was exiting his vehicle, the man grabbed him. Pino tried to fight him off. During the struggle, according to Pino, the man implied that he had a gun and threatened, "You don't want it." Eventually, after Pino's son threw something at him, the attacker ordered his companion into Pino's car's driver seat. The attacker jumped into the passenger's seat, and they fled with the vehicle.

Patrol officers soon encountered the stolen vehicle on the road—the ensuing chase ended when the vehicle crashed. Smith exited from the passenger side of the crashed vehicle and briefly attempted to flee on foot before submitting to police. Law enforcement never apprehended the driver (and Smith never identified him, claiming that he hadn't known the man well and was unsure even of his name). Pino arrived at the scene a short time later and identified the handcuffed Smith as his attacker; he would identify Smith as his attacker at trial as well. When police arrested him, Smith was wearing a dark jacket that appeared to be the same jacket that he was wearing in the bus and hospital surveillance footage from the earlier robberies.

Smith was charged with three counts of first-degree robbery, first-degree burglary, first-degree fleeing or evading police, two counts of third-degree terroristic threatening, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO).¹ (For all, he was charged with either principally committing or else being complicit in the commission of each offense. See KRS 502.020.) Before trial, he moved to sever the charges and have separate trials held for each of the three robberies; the trial court denied the motion.

After a three-day trial, the jury found Smith guilty of the three first-degree robbery counts, first-degree burglary, second-degree fleeing or evading police, both counts of third-degree terroristic threatening, and being a second-degree PFO. The trial court sentenced him to a total of 25 years' imprisonment as recommended by the jury.

Smith now appeals to this Court as a matter of right. See Ky. Const. § 110 (2)(b). We will develop additional facts as needed in the discussion below.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The trial court did not err in declining to suppress Smith's statements to Detective Ditch.

Smith's first claim of error involves statements he gave to Detective Matt Ditch about the Worthington robbery while he was in jail on other charges.

Smith claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements, which he argues Detective Ditch procured in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. See Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) ("The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda [v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ] is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.").²

We review suppression decisions under a mixed standard of review, employing a two-step process. First, we examine the trial court's factual findings for clear error. Welch v. Commonwealth , 149 S.W.3d 407, 409 (Ky. 2004). We treat those findings as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Bauder v. Commonwealth , 299 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Ky. 2009). We then review the application of the law to those facts de novo , giving no deference to the lower court's legal conclusions. Id.

Smith's claim rests on an alleged violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment as laid out by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda. Broadly speaking, to protect the Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself, Miranda laid out a set of constitutionally mandated guidelines that state authorities must follow to obtain self-incriminating statements that may be used against the defendant at trial. See Dickerson v. United States , 530 U.S. 428, 434-35, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). The Miranda requirements are geared toward mitigating against the inherently coercive nature of isolated and pressured interactions with police—namely, custodial interrogations. Id. Those protections are not implicated unless and until the suspect is both "in custody" and subject to interrogation³ by the state. Rhode Island v. Inn is , 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). To introduce statements obtained through in-custody interrogation without a lawyer present, the state has the burden of showing that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights and chose to speak to police voluntarily. Miranda , 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see also North Carolina v. Butler ; 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).

If a suspect clearly asserts his right to remain silent and to have counsel, a bright-line rule prohibits any further questioning without counsel being present. Edwards , 451 U.S. at 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880. The Edwards rule in effect renders any post-invocation waivers presumptively invalid—post-invocation waivers are not considered voluntary if obtained through police persistence. Id. The rule bars "police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda right ... by presuming his postassertion statements to be involuntary." Monte j o v. Louisiana , 556 U.S. 778, 787, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009).

But that bright-line presumption is overcome if the suspect himself "initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."

Edwards , 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880. "Edwards does not foreclose finding a waiver of Fifth Amendment protections after counsel has been requested, provided the accused has initiated the conversations or discussions with the authorities." Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990). "Only the suspect may reinitiate dialogue with the authorities; the authorities cannot continue to cajole or otherwise induce the suspect to continue to speak without first affording the suspect an attorney." Bradley v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Ky. 2010).

Edwards does not, however, protect a Miranda invocation in perpetuity. Instead, it is subject to an expiration date of sorts, recognizing that the coercive pressures engendered by a custodial setting subside as time passes after a break in custody. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 107-08, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010). Indeed, the Supreme Court crafted a bright-line rule dictating when the Edwards presumption...