Smith v. Hamilton
| Decision Date | 07 March 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 9939,9939 |
| Citation | 237 S.W.2d 774 |
| Parties | SMITH v. HAMILTON. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Smith & Lear, San Angelo, for appellant.
W. A. Johnson and Sedberry & Williams, all of San Angelo, for appellee.
Appellee filed this suit against appellant and alleged that, during the fall of 1948, he and appellant entered into a verbal contract whereby appellee agreed to work for appellant as a farm hand during the year 1949. The terms of the contract as alleged by appellee were that he was to be paid $3 per day for each day he worked as such farm hand; that, in addition thereto, he was to receive the cotton produced on fifty acres of land; that appellant was to furnish him a house to live in, and one cow to milk, with roughness for the cow, but appellee to furnish such other feed as he might feed said cow.
Appellee alleged that he moved on appellant's farm and continued to work under the terms of the contract until on or about June 20, 1949, at which time he was discharged without good cause. He further alleged that appellant designated the fifty acres from which appellee was to receive the cotton; that the same had been planted, and that on June 20 the cotton was up and growing.
The suit was for the value of the cotton from the fifty acres of land, and for $450 as wages for one hundred and fifty days that appellee alleged he would have worked if he had not been discharged, he having been paid his wages up to June 20. The petition contains an alternative plea in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of appellee's services.
Appellant answered by special exceptions; a general denial; that appellee abandoned the contract; that appellee was indebted to him in the sum of $500; and a pleading relative to the reasonable cost of producing the cotton on the fifty acres of land. There is no pleading by appellant (and no proof was offered by him) that appellee could have diminished his damages by making other contracts or securing other employment. However, appellee alleged that after he was discharged he was compelled to go elsewhere and seek work, and that during the balance of the year he earned $948.
During the trial the parties made the following stipulation:
"Total cotton ginned from the 50
acres, thirteen bales, bringing $1,773.95
Cotton seed ................................ 178.11
---------
$1,952.06
"Reasonable expense on
cost of raisin crop and
all of expenses were
borne by W. H. Smith
"Ginning .................... $102.10
Picking .................... 585.84
Breaking twice ............. 150.00
Bedding once and planting
twice .................... 150.00
Cotton seed for planting ... 50.00
Chopping ................... 48.00
Plowing cotton 3 times ..... 150.00
Cash advanced and cow
feed to C. E. Hamilton ... 144.50
-----------
$1,380.44."
It was also stipulated between the parties as follows:
'It is agreed by and between the parties by their counsel that the facts shown on plaintiff's Exhibit 2 (Exhibit 2, above quoted) are to be found by the court and no issue submitted to the jury thereon, the court making such findings as are material to the judgment to be entered in the case.
'It is agreed by all parties that C. E. Hamilton under any conditions is only a laborer and that Henry Smith was the employer and that he was the employee.'
Only three issues were submitted, and the jury found: (1) that appellant was to cultivate the fifty acres of cotton and appellee was to have all of the cotton from the fifty acres as part of his wages for 1949; (2) that it was not the contract that appellee was to have only one-half of the cotton from the fifty acres; and (3) that appellee was discharged on or about June 20, 1949, without good cause. No requests for the submission of additional issues were made by either party.
The trial court rendered judgment for appellee for $766.12. The judgment does not furnish an accurate guide for determining how this amount was arrived at, but recites: 'And the court finds that upon said verdict and the facts admitted by the parties and found by the court herein in the trial of said cause that the plaintiff is entitled to recover of and from the defendant his judgment herein for the sum of * * * ($766.12).'
Appellant's first five points complain: that the trial court erred in allowing any recovery for work appellee would have done for appellant after June 20, 1949, at $3 per day; no issue was requested, and none submitted, on this element of appellee's cause of action; since the same was an ultimate issue the court erred in rendering a judgment thereon; that the burden was on appellee to obtain a jury finding on the issue, and that there is no evidence to support a finding of $450 for wages appellee would have earned. Appellee's brief answers these points by saying the trial court did not so err.
Appellee, in his brief, says: 'There was no direct testimony from any witness as to the number of days plaintiff would have worked for defendant in 1949, after June 20th.' And '* * * no testimony as to how many days the plaintiff did in fact actually work for other people after June 20, 1949.' But says the finding of the trial court is supported by circumstantial evidence.
From the record and the briefs before us it is clear that the trial court arrived at the sum of $766.12 by taking the value of the cotton and the seed as fixed by the stipulation of the parties, $1,952.06, and added the sum of $450 (one hundred and fifty days' work at $3 per day), which made a total of $2,402.06. From this amount he took the cost of picking, $585.84, the ginning, $102.10, and $948 earned by appellee by working after his discharge at places other than on appellant's farm.
It was the duty of the trial court to apply the correct measure of damages to the facts. 13 Tex.Jur.Sec. 170, p. 314. And appellee was entitled to recover the benefits of which he was deprived by reason of his wrongful discharge. It appears to be a well established rule that, 'Where the employee is discharged without cause, or is prevented by the employer from completing the performance, he is entitled to recover for the part performed, and the damages he has sustained by reason of the breach of contract, by the employer.' McFaull v. Collins, Tex.Civ.App., 208 S.W.2d 142, 143, Er. Ref. This rule means no more and no less than that the discharged employee is entitled to compensation for the loss he has sustained. When we come to find the loss sustained by appellee, we must apply the correct measure of damage, and, in answering this question, it must be here...
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