Smith v. Lee
| Decision Date | 22 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-1261 |
| Citation | 599 F.Supp.3d 440 |
| Parties | Juanita SMITH, et al. v. JC LEE, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Nelson Welch Cameron, Shreveport, LA, for Juanita Smith, et al.
Nichole Marie Buckle, Carmouche Bokenfohr et al., Shreveport, LA, for JC Lee, City of Shreveport, Cpl. Barker.
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment, filed by the Defendants in the above-captioned matter. [Record Document 44]. The Defendants seek dismissal of all federal and state-law claims brought against them by Plaintiffs Juanita Smith and Floyd Stewart. The Plaintiffs oppose the motion, and the matter is now ripe for review. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The events in this case stem from the Shreveport Police Department's search for Christian Combs ("Combs") to execute a warrant for second degree murder. On October 4, 2018, the police received information that Combs was hiding at either 1906 State Street or 1913 State Street in Shreveport, Louisiana. That day, officers went first to 1906 State Street where it was determined Combs was not hiding. They then proceeded across the street to 1913 State Street, the home of the Plaintiff, Juanita Smith ("Smith"). A group of officers went to the front door to speak to Smith, while other officers established a perimeter around the house. The Defendants, Corporal Derek Barker, Corporal John Lee, and Officer Christopher McConnell, were three of the officers on the scene that day. The remaining officers present at the scene have not been named as Defendants in this case.
When Smith answered the door, the officers informed her that they were looking for Combs and asked whether she knew him. She said she did not. Almost all of the events following that initial discussion are the subject of much debate. The Defendants contend that Smith agreed to step outside to talk to them, while Smith disagrees with that characterization; but, she does not allege that officers forcibly removed her from her home. In any event, Smith ultimately stood in her driveway while speaking with the officers. Defendants represent that officers asked Smith numerous times whether anyone was inside the home and that she said no. Smith acknowledges that she told the officers no one else was inside, but she claims that she misunderstood the question and thought they were asking if Combs was inside.1
Corporal Lee and his police canine, Dice, then proceeded to the front door of Smith's home. Defendants contend that Corporal Lee gave three loud warnings at the front door, telling anyone inside that a police canine was present and to come out and identify themselves. On the third warning, Defendants state that Corporal Lee warned that the dog would enter and would bite. No one spoke up from inside the house. It is undisputed that Corporal Lee and Dice then entered Smith's home, and Corporal Lee gave Dice the command to "find the man." Dice proceeded around a corner into a hallway and came into contact with Plaintiff Floyd Stewart ("Stewart"), an elderly man. Stewart evidently had been sleeping inside a bedroom in the residence. When Stewart heard the noise from outside, he put on his shoes and went to the bedroom door where he countered Dice. Dice bit Stewart. Ultimately, upon realizing Stewart was not Combs, Corporal Lee made Dice release Stewart from his bite. Although it is not relevant to the issues before the Court today, the Defendants concede that Smith, who identified Stewart as a friend, may not have known Stewart had returned to her house and was sleeping inside at the time of the incident.2 Stewart was treated for his injuries. Combs was not located at Smith's residence.
Smith and Stewart brought suit against the City of Shreveport, Corporal Lee, Corporal Barker, and Officer McConnell under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the constitutional violations of unlawful entry, excessive force, and failure to train. Plaintiffs also brought analogous state law claims, in addition to claims of negligence and strict liability for dog bites. Defendants filed the instant motion seeking summary judgment on all claims. While the Defendants concede that there are factual disputes in this case, they nonetheless argue that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were objectively reasonable, even if mistaken. As to the City, they argue that there is no policy or custom upon which to base municipal liability for failure to train. Defendants seek summary judgment on the state law claims, as well, arguing that the claims with federal counterparts, along with Plaintiffs’ claims of negligence, are subject to dismissal for the same reasons the federal claims should be dismissed. As to Plaintiffs’ claim of strict liability for dog bites, Defendants argue there is no legal basis for such a claim. Plaintiffs oppose the summary judgment motion.
Defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity in response to Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims. Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" against any person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not itself create substantive rights; rather, it merely provides remedies of rights guaranteed to citizens by the United States Constitution or other federal laws. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ; City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 2432, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for claims against them in their individual capacity "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Qualified immunity serves to shield government officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably, and it applies regardless of whether the official's error is "a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). A Section 1983 complaint must allege that the constitutional or statutory deprivation was intentional or due to deliberate indifference and not the result of mere negligence. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) ; Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332, 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).
Because qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, ... it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Consequently, qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage in litigation. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S. Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (per curiam). While qualified immunity is technically an affirmative defense, once it has been raised, it is the plaintiff's burden to negate the defense. Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2012).
In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), the Supreme Court held that a court ruling upon the issue of qualified immunity must apply a two-step analysis. First, the court must determine whether "the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Id. Second, if a violation has been established, the court must determine whether the officer's actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question. See id.; Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 411 (5th Cir. 2007). The court may evaluate these steps in whichever order it so chooses.3 "The touchstone of this inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have believed that his conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the information available to him and the clearly established law." Goodson v. Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000). If officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether the plaintiff's rights were violated, the officer's qualified immunity remains intact. See Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 2005) () The question of whether an official's conduct was objectively reasonable is a question of law to be decided by the court. See Evett v. DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 688 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1994) ).
To be clearly established, a legal principle must be found in the holdings of either "controlling authority" or a "robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority,’ " Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–42, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) ), and defined with a "high ‘degree of specificity,’ " District of Columbia v. Wesby, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (per curiam)). It is not that a case must be directly on point, but rather existing precedent must have provided sufficient notice that the acts violate the Constitution. See ...
To continue reading
Request your trial