Smith v. McCullen

• Decision Date: 03 May 1943
• Docket Number: 35341.
• Citation: 13 So.2d 319,195 Miss. 34
• Parties: SMITH et al. v. McCULLEN, State Land Com'r, et al.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

13 So.2d 319

195 Miss. 34

SMITH et al. v. McCULLEN, State Land Com'r, et al.

No. 35341.

Supreme Court of Mississippi

May 3, 1943

J B. Mayfield, of Poplarville, and Geo. H. Ethridge, Asst Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Green & Green, of Jackson, and J. S. Atkinson, of Shreveport La., amici curiae.

Parker & Morse, of Poplarville, and R. L. Genin, of Bay St. Louis, for appellees.

McGEHEE Justice.

The school trustees of Township 3, Range 17, in Pearl River County, and the Attorney General have taken this appeal from a final decree of the chancery court of said county dismissing the bill of complaint filed by such trustees, as well as the answer and cross-bill of the Attorney General wherein he joins in the prayer of the trustees for the relief prayed for, against the other defendants, to wit, the board of supervisors, the county superintendent of education, and certain other persons, including Guy McCullen, State Land Commissioner, who is a mere nominal defendant having no interest in the subject matter of the suit, and by which proceeding it is sought to have the chancery court render a decree approving a certain proposed, but unexecuted, mineral lease in favor of the Sun Oil Company for the exploration and possible production of oil, gas and other minerals on Section 16 of said township and to direct the execution of the same by said trustees, or, in the alternative, by such other person or persons as may be designated by the court on behalf of the inhabitants of the township and for the benefit of the educable children therein, upon the theory that under Chapter 150, Laws of 1942, amending Section 6762, Code of 1930, no one else is now vested with authority to lease a sixteenth section of land for mineral purposes in the territory lying south of the 31 degree of north latitude, embracing Pearl River, Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, George, Stone, and parts of Forrest and Perry counties, and also in substantial portions of Lowndes, Clay, and Monroe Counties in the eastern part of the State, and the counties of Warren, Claiborne, Jefferson, Adams, Wilkinson, and the larger portions of Amite and Franklin Counties in the southwestern part of the State referred to in the record as the "Old Natchez District", and in all of which said three separate territories such lands are likewise held by the State as trustee and reserved for the support of the township schools, it being contended that said Chapter 150, Laws of 1942, has withdrawn from the boards of supervisors in the various counties throughout the State, including the above mentioned areas, which have control over any sixteenth sections of land reserved for such purposes, or lands held in lieu thereof, the authority which they formerly had under said Section 6762, Code of 1930, to make such a lease with the approval of the Governor and the Attorney General, and has apparently undertaken to vest authority in the boards of supervisors of those counties alone that are situated in a particular area of the State which is referred to in the said Act of 1942 as the "Choctaw purchase", to make such a lease with the approval of the county superintendent of education. And it is alleged that Pearl River County is outside of the Choctaw purchase within the meaning of the statute in question; that, therefore, there is now no statutory power and authority vested in any officer or officers to make such a lease, and that the chancery court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction in all matters in equity under Section 159 of the State Constitution should authorize the proper persons to lease said land for oil and gas in order that the trust under which the State holds title to the same as trustee for the benefit of the township schools may be faithfully administered.

The board of supervisors and the county superintendent of education interposed demurrers and also filed answers to the bill of complaint, wherein they assert their lack of authority under Chapter 150, Laws of 1942, supra, to execute a lease on any sixteenth sections of land in their county, admit the fairness of the proposed lease to the Sun Oil Company and that it would be advantageous to the inhabitants of the township for the same to be executed, but deny the authority of the complainants to bring this suit, and challenge the jurisdiction of the chancery court to grant the relief prayed for, the substance of which last mentioned objection, as we understand it, being (1) that the duty of the State as trustee to provide for the leasing of these lands is not such a trust as is contemplated within the equity powers conferred upon said court by Section 159 of the Constitution, nor is the State such a trustee as may be required by its courts to perform its functions through any agency designated by decree in that behalf in the absence of its own consent given by legislative enactment; and (2) that an adequate, full and complete remedy is provided by law for the leasing of said lands for mineral purposes by the board of supervisors with the approval of the Governor and the Attorney General under Section 6762, Code of 1930, supra, on the assumption that the said Act of 1942, amendatory thereof, is unconstitutional, and therefore ineffective to modify or repeal the authority granted to said officials under the code section, supra, for the alleged reason that the amendatory act is a special or local law, in contravention of Section 90, subsection (p) of the State Constitution, in that it denies benefits to the educable children in various counties of the State which by its terms and provisions are vouchsafed to the educable children in other sections thereof, without any reasonable basis for such classification and discrimination.

The court below was of the opinion that in the exercise of its equity powers under Section 159 of the Constitution, it would have jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for in the absence of any legislative authority vested in anyone else in that behalf, but held that said Chapter 150, Laws of 1942, is unconstitutional for the reason hereinbefore mentioned, and that therefore such lease could be made under the statute sought to be amended by said act. The court, therefore, sustained the demurrers to the bill of complaint and cross-bill after hearing proof both as to the fairness of the proposed lease and as to whether from a historical standpoint the use of the words "in the Choctaw purchase", as contained in the act, had the effect of limiting the application thereof to a particular area of the State such as would exclude the land here involved, and a decree was then rendered dismissing said pleadings when the complainants declined to plead further.

From the foregoing statement of the case it will be seen that there was presented to the court below the question of whether or not the sixteenth section of land here involved is subject to lease at all under the present state of our legislative enactments on the subject or under the authority of a decree of the chancery court. Section 6773, Code of 1930, provides that "The chancery courts have jurisdiction to determine, on bill or petition, what lands are, or may be, subject to lease under provisions of this article; but all sixteenth sections, or lands taken in lieu thereof, are presumed to be so subject, unless the contrary be shown clearly." Hence, it follows that said court was confronted with the necessity of deciding whether or not the right previously conferred upon board of supervisors to make such a lease with the approval of the Governor and the Attorney General under Section 6762 of said Code had been effectually withdrawn, and this question was to be determined (1) upon the construction and application given to the amendatory act, Chapter 150, Laws of 1942, supra, that is to say, whether the authority to make leases thereunder was limited to a particular area of the State which in a true historical sense might exclude the right to do so in Pearl River County, and (2), if so, whether said Act of 1942 is unconstitutional as a special or local law in alleged violation of Section 90, subsection (p) of the State Constitution, as contended by the board of supervisors. On the second proposition above stated, it is the contention of the appellants that said amendatory act should be so construed and applied as to exclude said county from its operation, and that the same should, nevertheless, be held constitutional, thereby leaving the chancery court vested with full authority under its equity powers to lease lands for mineral purposes in the excluded area, and with the result that we would have a situation where the sixteenth sections of land reserved for school purposes, and lands held in lieu thereof, would be leased for mineral purposes in a large area of the State by the boards of supervisors upon the approval of the county superintendent of education, that is to say, pursuant to legislative fiat as contemplated by Section 211 of the State Constitution that all of such lands should be, if leased at all, and the remainder of them leased by decree of court alone; and this condition of divided authority would likewise prevail to such an extent that even in the same county the board of supervisors and the county superintendent of education would lease a part of the lands and the chancery court the other, that is to say, in Lowndes, Clay, Monroe, Amite, Franklin, Forrest and Perry which are located partly within and partly without the so-called restricted area.

In further reference to the alleged jurisdiction of the chancery court in the premises, we have already noted that the proposed lease, made an exhibit to the bill of complaint, is unexecuted. Therefore, equity jurisdiction cannot be sustained under Section 6775, Code of 1930, conferring...