Smith v. Scio Tp.
| Decision Date | 13 January 1989 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 98014 |
| Citation | 173 Mich.App. 381,433 N.W.2d 855 |
| Parties | George SMITH, Jacob Grant, Edward Buszka, and F. William Petring, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SCIO TOWNSHIP, its Supervisor, Treasurer, Clerk, and Trustees, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Keusch & Flintoft, P.C. by Peter C. Flintoft, Chelsea, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Reading & Etter by John L. Etter, Ann Arbor, for defendants-appellees.
Before DANHOF, C.J., and SHEPHERD and BOSMAN, * JJ.
The primary question presented in this appeal is whether the Headlee Amendment, Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 31, limits a township board's taxing authority to its pre-incorporation level without a separate vote of the electors when the electors of a general law township vote to become a charter township pursuant to 1947 P.A. 359; M.C.L. Sec. 42.1 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 5.46(1) et seq. We hold that it does not.
Defendant Scio Township and members of the Scio Township Board sought to incorporate Scio Township as a charter township in an effort to prevent unwanted annexation by the City of Ann Arbor. The board therefore resolved to incorporate the township by board resolution, M.C.L. Sec. 42.3a; M.S.A. Sec. 5.46(3a). A petition of disagreement was timely filed by a number of the township citizens, including plaintiffs. M.C.L. Sec. 42.3a(2)(b); M.S.A. Sec. 5.46(3a)(2)(b).
Defendants submitted the question of incorporation to the electorate at the primary election of August 5, 1986. The ballot, prepared in accordance with M.C.L. Sec. 42.2; M.S.A. Sec. 5.46(2), set forth the proposition as follows:
Section 27 of the charter township act, M.C.L. Sec. 42.27; M.S.A. Sec. 5.46(27), permits a charter township board to levy taxes not to exceed " 1/2 of 1% of the assessed valuation of all real and personal property subject to taxation in the township" (five mills). Prior to incorporation, the taxing authority of defendant township, a general law township, was limited to 1.16 mills. The basis for plaintiffs' objection to charter incorporation was their belief that upon incorporation the defendant charter township board would acquire the authority to levy up to five mills. Defendant board shared plaintiffs' desire to limit the township's taxing authority to 1.16 mills; however, unlike plaintiffs, the board believed that operation of the Headlee Amendment would preclude an increase in the taxing authority in the absence of a vote expressly increasing the millage. In an attempt to resolve any ambiguity concerning the application of the Headlee Amendment, the board added a second proposal to the ballot:
The incorporation proposition passed by four votes, 695 voting in favor of incorporation while 691 voted against. The electorate overwhelmingly approved the millage limitation proposition, 1061 voting in favor and 272 voting against.
Following the election, plaintiffs filed this action quo warranto and for declaratory judgment seeking to: (1) enjoin certification of the results of the August 5, 1985, election; (2) declare that the results of the election were void; (3) order that the question of incorporation only be resubmitted to the electorate; and (4) declare that, if Scio Township becomes a charter township, the board is authorized to levy up to file mills tax on all assessed real and personal properties within Scio Township regardless of any vote of the electors to limit such taxation power.
The trial court found (1) the vote on the first proposition was effective to permit the general law Township of Scio to incorporate as the Charter Township of Scio, and (2) the Headlee Amendment applied so as to limit the taxing authority of Scio Township to 1.16 mills, unless and until the electors of Scio Township expressly vote to increase the millage.
In Waterford School Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed., 98 Mich.App. 658, 663, 296 N.W.2d 328 (1980), lv. den. 409 Mich. 934 (1980), this Court stated that the Headlee Amendment was designed to place specific limitations on state and local revenues and that the ultimate purpose was to place public spending under direct popular control. The trial court, using this statement of purpose, reasoned that one could not understand how a vote on a separate and distinct issue, i.e., charter township, implies an increase in taxes or taxing authority. Thus, the trial court interpreted Headlee to require a separate vote of the electorate before the charter township board is authorized to levy taxes above that rate authorized as a common law township.
On the interpretation of constitutional provisions, People v. Bd. of State Canvassers 23 Mich. 523, 529, 35 N.W.2d 669 (1949), citing with approval Attorney General v. State Bd. of Assessors, 143 Mich. 73, 106 N.W. 698 (1906), stated:
The operative language of the Headlee Amendment provides:
"Units of Local Government are hereby prohibited from levying any tax not authorized by law or charter when this section is ratified or from increasing the rate of an existing tax above that rate authorized by law or charter when this section is ratified, without the approval of a majority of the qualified electors of that unit of Local Government voting thereon." Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 31.
The plain language of Headlee prohibits a local government from levying a tax in excess of that permitted by law or charter and it prohibits increasing the authorized tax rate without approval of the electors. But nowhere does Headlee require a direct vote of the electors in order to permit a local unit of government to increase taxes if the local unit of government has the authority by law or charter to levy the increase. See Bailey v. Muskegon County Bd. of Comm'rs, 122 Mich.App. 808, 333 N.W.2d 144 (1983).
Here, the proposition which the electors of Scio Township approved not only submitted the question of whether they shall become a charter township but also specified the charter under which the township would be governed in the event the electors voted to become a charter township. Section 27 of the charter township act grants authority to the charter township board to levy taxes of up to five mills. As a general rule, it is not essential to print the full text of a proposed law on a ballot; it is sufficient if enough is printed to identify the matter and show its character and purpose. 26 Am.Jur.2d, Elections, Sec. 221, p. 51. Further, where a statute prescribes the form of the proposal, the statute should be strictly followed. Id. The proposal to incorporate in this case contained mandatory statutory language. There can be no doubt that the electors had ample notice that the effect of the proposal, if approved, would be to subject the township to all of the provisions of the charter township act. There is no claim the electors were not provided with an opportunity to become fully informed of the act's provision. To the contrary, a key issue in the election related to the township board's taxing authority. The statutory provision states, in pertinent part:
M.C.L. Sec. 42.27; M.S.A. Sec. 5.46(27).
Thus, by voting to incorporate, the electors also approved the adoption of a five-mill limitation on the township board's taxing authority. This does not clash with the Headlee Amendment, since its requirement that a majority of the qualified electors approve the authorized rate has been satisfied. The Headlee Amendment imposes specific limitations on the authority to impose additional taxes without voter approval. It does not require voter approval of increased tax levies where the authority to make the levy has already been approved. Bailey v. Muskegon County Bd. of Comm'rs, supra. The course of action available to a taxpayer under the charter township act to oppose a tax levy proposal up to five mills is to appear at the public hearing on the budget. M.C.L. Sec. 42.26; M.S.A. Sec. 5.46(26).
A second question was submitted to the trial court which it did not directly answer as...
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