Smith v. State, No. A04A1052
| Citation | 603 S.E.2d 445,269 Ga. App. 133 |
| Decision Date | 26 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. A04A1052, No. A04A1184. |
| Parties | SMITH v. The STATE. Simpson v. The State. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Michael Sheffield, Lawrenceville, for appellant (case no. A04A1052).
Thomas Lenzer, Robert Lenzer, Lenzer & Lenzer, Norcross, for appellant (case no. A04A1184).
Daniel Porter, District Attorney, Dawn Taylor, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
A jury found Geovania Smith guilty of the crimes of robbery by intimidation1 and false imprisonment.2 The same jury found her co-defendant, Terence Simpson, guilty of the crimes of armed robbery3 and kidnapping with bodily injury.4 Following the denial of their respective motions for new trial, each appeals. Smith maintains that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the statement she gave to the police. Simpson argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his statement to the police and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Because the charges arose from the same incident and the appellants were tried together, these separate appeals have been consolidated for review. As set forth below, we affirm in both cases.
1. Smith contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions.
The standard of review for the sufficiency of evidence, in reviewing either a motion for a directed verdict or a motion for new trial, is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and [defendants] no longer enjoy[] the presumption of innocence; moreover, an appellate court does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility but only determines whether the evidence is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia.5 Conflicts in the testimony of the witnesses are a matter of credibility for the jury to resolve. As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State's case, the jury's verdict will be upheld.
(Citations omitted.) Willingham v. State.6
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence shows that on May 13, 2001, the victim, Juan Hernandez, was approached by Smith at a gas station in Gwinnett County. Smith asked Hernandez, who was a taxi driver, about taxi service and said that she might need a taxi on another day; she wrote her name, address, and phone number in Hernandez's notebook. On May 16, 2001, Smith called Hernandez to request a taxi, and Hernandez drove to her apartment to pick her up.
Hernandez arrived at Smith's apartment within minutes, parked his taxi, and blew his horn. Smith failed to appear, and Hernandez telephoned her to confirm that he was at the right address; Smith told him he was at the right apartment complex. When Smith still did not come out, Hernandez walked to her apartment door and knocked. Smith opened the door and told Hernandez that she would be right out. At this point, Simpson came up from behind, pushed Hernandez into the apartment, and struck him in the back of the head.
Hernandez was forced to sit in a chair at a table facing Smith, who was standing in front of the table. Shoving a handgun into the back of Hernandez's head, Simpson forced him into the bathroom and robbed him, taking his money and driver's license. When Hernandez and Simpson came out of the bathroom, Smith was still standing in front of the table. Simpson grabbed Hernandez's cell phone from his pocket and sat him down in a chair at the table. Reminding Hernandez that he had his driver's license and knew where he lived, Simpson warned Hernandez that if he called the police, he would kill his family. Hernandez was then allowed to leave.
Bleeding from his head injury, Hernandez drove to a local store and reported the robbery to his employer. Police and emergency medical technicians, responding to a call, met Hernandez at the store shortly thereafter.
Hernandez told the first officer who arrived that a male and a female had assaulted and robbed him, and he gave the officer the address of the apartment; two other officers were sent to investigate.
The two officers went to Smith's apartment and knocked on the door, announcing that they were police officers and instructing any occupants to open the door; continued knocking over a period of time brought no response. While one officer watched the entrance to the apartment and the balcony, the other officer went to the leasing office to determine the identity of the tenant. The officer watching the apartment saw Simpson open the patio door, lean out, and then withdraw into the apartment. When Simpson stepped onto the patio a second time, the officer told him to open the front door and come out with his hands up. Simpson came to the door and was handcuffed. A short time later Smith also came out and was handcuffed. Hernandez was brought to the apartment and positively identified Simpson and Smith as the man and woman who had robbed him.
A warrant was obtained for a search of Smith's apartment. A crime scene technician found Hernandez's cell phone and driver's license, along with a business card with Hernandez's name and phone number on it, in a laundry bag in a bedroom closet. A purse containing $148 was found on the bed.
Blood stains were found on Simpson's boots. A DNA test established that the blood on the boots was Hernandez's. This evidence was sufficient to support Smith's convictions, as well as Simpson's.
Smith's contentions that she was merely present during the commission of the crime does not alter this result. Smith correctly states that presence at the scene of the crime is not sufficient to show that a defendant is a party to the crime under OCGA § 16-2-20. She argues that there is no evidence that she aided, abetted, caused, advised, encouraged, hired, counseled, or procured Simpson to commit the crime. "While mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient evidence to support a conviction for being a party to a crime, `presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are circumstances from which one's participation in the criminal intent may be inferred.'" Rust v. State.7 Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find Smith guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of being a party to the crimes.
2. Smith further contends that the police obtained her pretrial custodial statement by continuing to interrogate her after she asked for a lawyer, and that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the statement.
" The Fifth Amendment specifies that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself." Cook v. State.8 Under the rule in Edwards v. Arizona,9 once an accused being held in custody invokes the right to counsel, he should not be subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel is present, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Id. at 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880.
This rigid prophylactic rule embodies two distinct inquiries. First, courts must determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel. Second, if the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hall v. State.10
Smith asserts that she invoked her right to counsel during the following exchange:
(Ex. 5).
Our first inquiry is whether Smith actually invoked her right to counsel since law enforcement officers must cease questioning only when the accused has made a clear and unambiguous request to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. Jordan v. State.11
Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney. But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning. Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel. As we have observed, a statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not. A suspect must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.
(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id.
In this case, Smith's statements to the police officer did not communicate an unambiguous request for counsel or constitute a clear invocation of her right to counsel. When the officer asked Smith if she were willing to talk with him, she said, To this ambiguous response, the officer affirms that Smith can have a lawyer present if she...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
The State v. Brown.
...that “[w]hen you leave out of here and you tell us about it, you're going to feel a lot better,” was collateral); Smith v. State, 269 Ga.App. 133, 140(3), 603 S.E.2d 445 (2004) (holding that, after accused told detective that he “just wanted to go home,” detective's reply of “let's straight......
-
Pulley v. State, S12A0786.
...exclusion of that evidence. [Cits.]” Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 865, 869(2)(b), 725 S.E.2d 320 (2012). See also Smith v. State, 269 Ga.App. 133, 140(3), 603 S.E.2d 445 (2004); Patrick v. State, 169 Ga.App. 302(1), 312 S.E.2d 385 (1983). Therefore, the promise to talk to someone about placing A......
-
Hill v. State
...274 Ga. App. 366, 371-372(3)(a), 618 S.E.2d 72 (2005). 24. See Berry, supra at 372, 618 S.E.2d 72. 25. See Smith v. State, 269 Ga.App. 133, 142-143(4)(d), 603 S.E.2d 445 (2004). 26. See Braithwaite v. State, 275 Ga. 884, 888(8), 572 S.E.2d 612 (2002). 27. See Busch v. State, 271 Ga. 591, 52......
-
Slan v. State, A12A0130.
...Patterson v. State, 259 Ga.App. 630, 633(4), 577 S.E.2d 850 (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted).12 Smith v. State, 269 Ga.App. 133, 143(4)(d), 603 S.E.2d 445 (2004) (citation omitted).13 Hardy v. State, 301 Ga.App. 115, 116–117(3), 686 S.E.2d 789 (2009) (citation and punctuation omitt......