Smither v. Director of Revenue

Citation136 S.W.3d 797
Decision Date22 June 2004
Docket NumberNo. SC 85565.,SC 85565.
PartiesKenneth S. SMITHER, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Cheryl Caponegro Nield, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Appellant.

Jeffrey S. Eastman, Gladstone, for Respondent.

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR., Judge.

The Director of Revenue revoked respondent Kenneth Smither's driving privileges for refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test, pursuant to section 577.041, RSMo 2000. After hearing, the Circuit Court of Platte County reinstated Smither's driving privileges. The director then appealed to the Court of Appeals, and after opinion, this Court granted transfer. MO. CONST. art. V, sec. 10. The judgment is reversed.

On December 23, 2001, Trooper Steve Salfrank of the Missouri State Highway Patrol was dispatched to an accident site in the area of I-29 and Highway 152 in Platte County. Upon arrival, he saw an overturned vehicle resting against a concrete barrier on the left side of the interstate. Trooper Salfrank determined that the vehicle had driven off the ramp exiting Highway 152 onto northbound I-29, hit an embankment, rolled over, and then skidded across three lanes of I-29 before hitting a concrete barrier.

Trooper Salfrank determined that Smither, who was lying on the ground behind the overturned vehicle, was the driver. Smither was injured, but conscious, and stated that he could not remember what had happened. Trooper Salfrank remained with Smither until paramedics arrived and placed Smither into an ambulance. During that time, Trooper Salfrank smelled alcohol on Smither's breath and noticed that his eyes were bloodshot.

Trooper Salfrank followed Smither to the hospital and interviewed him on his bed in the emergency room. In response to Trooper Salfrank's questions, Smither admitted that he had been drinking that night. Trooper Salfrank also administered a field sobriety test called the "gaze nystagmus test," which indicated intoxication, but he did not administer other tests due to Smither's incapacitating injuries. He then determined on the basis of all the evidence that Smither was intoxicated and told Smither that he was under arrest for driving while intoxicated. At this point, Trooper Salfrank read Smither the Miranda warnings and the implied consent law warning, which includes a request to submit to a blood alcohol test. In response, Smither asked to contact his attorney.

Trooper Salfrank waited while Smither's parents attempted to contact an attorney. After 40 minutes, Trooper Salfrank again requested that Smither submit to a blood alcohol test, but Smither again refused and then invoked his right to remain silent. Trooper Salfrank then issued Smither a written notice of revocation of driving privileges for failing to submit to the blood alcohol test, a summons for driving while intoxicated, and a summons for careless and imprudent driving. After issuing the notice and summonses, Trooper Salfrank left the hospital.

As noted, pursuant to section 577.041, the director revoked Smither's driving privileges for one year, and Smither sought review in the circuit court. Trooper Salfrank testified on behalf of the director, and Smither offered no evidence. The trial court held that the director had failed to make a prima facie case for revocation, specifically finding that Smither had not been arrested. The trial court then ordered the reinstatement of Smither's driving privileges.

The director contends that a prima facie case for revocation...

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7 cases
  • Young v. Commonwealth of Va..
    • United States
    • Virginia Court of Appeals
    • March 1, 2011
    ...case is redundant at best; at worst, it may interfere with medical treatment or aggravate the suspect's injuries.” Smither v. Dir. of Revenue, 136 S.W.3d 797, 799 (Mo.2004) (citation omitted); State v. Setter, 721 S.W.2d 11, 17 (Mo.Ct.App.1986) (“The facts reveal that the officer placed res......
  • State v. Ajak
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • April 3, 2018
    ...resisting arrest or escape from custody. For example, this Court relied on section 544.180 ’s definition of arrest in Smither v. Director of Revenue, 136 S.W.3d 797, 798-99 (Mo. banc 2004) , in determining the defendant was under arrest even though not physically restrained by the officer, ......
  • Haffner v. Dir. of Revenue
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • May 19, 2020
    ...at the time she submitted to the blood alcohol test. Appellant argues Respondent was arrested pursuant to Section 544.180 and Smither v. Director of Revenue, in that Respondent was injured in a serious crash, was told she was under arrest while hospitalized, agreed to provide a blood sample......
  • Edwards v. Director of Revenue, State
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • November 3, 2009
    ...and later specifically informed Driver that he "was releasing him from my custody for medical treatment." Driver also notes Smither v. Dir. of Revenue, 136 S.W.3d 797 (Mo. banc 2004), a case that seems to aid the Director more than Driver. There, an officer was dispatched to the site of a o......
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