Soderstrom v. Curry & Whyte, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 June 1919
• Docket Number: No. 21235.,21235.
• Citation: 173 N.W. 649,143 Minn. 154
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: SODERSTROM v. CURRY & WHYTE, Inc.

143 Minn. 154

173 N.W. 649

SODERSTROM

v.CURRY & WHYTE, Inc.

No. 21235.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 27, 1919.

Appeal from District Court, St. Louis County; Wm. A. Cant, Judge.

Action by Victor Soderstrom against Curry & Whyte, Incorporated. From an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

One employed by a shipper of pulpwood to load it on a vessel while moored on navigable waters at a dock in a port in this state, to be transported to a port in another state, is engaged in work of a maritime nature, and, if injured while so employed, does not come within the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Law of this state (Gen. St. 1913, §§ 8195-8230).

One thus employed, if injured by reason of the actionable negligence of his employer, is not limited to the relief to which seamen are entitled under the rules of admiralty, but may recover the full damages to which he would be entitled at common law.

The amendment to the federal Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, §§ 24, cl. 3, 256, cl. 3, 36 Stat. 1091, 1161) of October 6, 1917 (Act Oct. 6, 1917, c. 97, 40 Stat. 395 [U. S. Comp. St. §§ 991(3), 1233]), which extends the rights and remedies afforded by the Workmen's Compensation Laws of the several states to persons injured while employed in work of a maritime nature, will not be given a retroactive effect. Washburn, Bailey & Mitchell, of Duluth, for appellant.

Andrew Nelson and John G. Cedergren, both of Duluth, for respondent.

LEES, C.

Appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint. The demurrer was based on two grounds; the first, that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the action, and the second, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The court certified that the questions presented were important and doubtful. A condensed statement of the facts alleged follows:

Defendant is a Minnesota corporation dealing in and shipping pulpwood. It owns a dock at Two Harbors, in this state, on the navigable waters of that port, from which pulpwood is loaded into the holds of vessels plying on the Great Lakes. On July 2, 1917, plaintiff was a common laborer employed by defendant to convey pulpwood from the dock and stow it in the hold of the steamer Orion, to be transported to another state. Fourteen men were engaged in this work, plaintiff's station being in the hold of the steamer. The pulpwood was carried in dump cars to spouts extending from the dock to hatches in the deck of the steamer and was damped from the cars through the spouts into the hold. The men in the hold could not see the cars dumped, nor could the men dumping them see those working below, and there were no means of communication between them. It was the custom to dump the cars in regular order, beginning with the hatch nearest the bow and running back to the stern. The work was in charge of a foreman stationed on the deck. While plaintiff was working under one of the hatches, the contents of a car were dumped out of the customary order and he was caught under the pulpwood and seriously injured. In support of the demurrer, defendant contends: (1) That plaintiff's sole remedy is under the Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Act. (2) That, even though it should be held that he was employed under a maritime contract, the complaint fails to state a cause of action based on a maritime right. (3) That the amendment to the federal Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, §§ 24, cl. 3, 256, cl. 3, 36 Stat. 1091, 1161) of October 6, 1917 (Act Oct. 6, 1917, c. 97, 40 Stat. 395 [U. S. Comp. St. §§ 991(3), 1233]), definitely relegates him to relief under the Compensation Act.

Consideration of the arguments upon which the case was submitted and examination of the authorities cited in the memorandum, which the learned trial court made part of the order overruling the demurrer, together with those cited in the briefs, have led us to the conclusion that the questions were correctly decided in the court below. We will briefly indicate our views upon them.

1. Lindstrom v. Mutual Steamship Co., 132 Minn. 328, 156 N. W. 669, L. R. A. 1916D, 935, would be conclusive authority for defendant, but for the fact that a year after that case was decided the Supreme Court of the United States, in So. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900, held that a state's Workmen's Compensation Law cannot be extended to work of a maritime nature, because Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law of the land, and injuries sustained by one engaged in maritime work are within the admiralty jurisdiction. Since then the states have uniformly held, so far as we are aware, that the compensation laws do not apply to workmen injured while engaged in maritime work. Doey v. Howland, 224 N. Y. 30, 120 N. E. 53;Duart v. Simmons, 231 Mass. 313, 121 N. E. 10;Georgia Casualty Co. v. Am. Milling Co. (Wis.) 172 N. W. 148;Veasey v. Peters, 142 La. 1012,77 South. 948.

[2] 2. In The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 23 Sup. Ct. 483, 47 L. Ed. 760, rules were formulated applicable to all maritime contracts of employment. One of them was thus stated:

‘That the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence of the master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and cure, whether the injuries were received by negligence or accident.’

Counsel have referred to this as the ‘limited liability’ rule and it is earnestly contended that this case falls within its scope, and that plaintiff was limited in admiralty to a claim for maintenance and cure. If this is true, the complaint states no cause of action, because it is framed on an entirely different theory of legal liability. We are of the opinion that the contention cannot be sustained. Plaintiff was not a seaman and was not in the service of a ship. Read v. Canfield, 1 Sumn. 195,11 Fed. Cas. No. 11,641; The John B. Lyon (D. C.) 33 Fed. 184; The J. P. Schuh (D. C.) 223 Fed. 455; The Chicago (D. C.) 235 Fed. 538; The Buena Ventura (D. C.) 243 Fed. 797. We are unable to see why the question is not disposed of contrary to defendant's contention in Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 34 Sup. Ct. 733, 58 L. Ed. 1208,51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1157. In that case the man injured was a stevedore engaged in loading a ship and sought to recover from the owner of the ship and from the stevedore company by whom he was employed. The libel was dismissed as to the shipowner and a recovery of general damages allowed against the employer. The right to such recovery was affirmed on appeal. If Imbrovek had been a seaman, or in the service of the ship, he could have recovered only under the limited liability rule stated in the Osceola Case.

Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 38 Sup. Ct. 501, 62 L. Ed. 1171, does not change the effect of the decision in the Imbrovek Case, for the reason that the injury involved was sustained by a fireman on board a ship while at sea, and obviously the rule stated in the Osceola Case was applicable.

The reasons for the limited liability rule are clearly set forth in the noted opinion of Judge Story in Harden v. Gordon, 2 Mason, 541, Fed. Cas. No. 6,047. Men employed on shipboard are peculiarly...