Solano v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
Docket Number | 3:20-cv-410-BJD-MCR |
Decision Date | 02 August 2023 |
Parties | HERMAN PAUL SOLANO, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Herman Paul Solano is proceeding pro se on a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Petition) (Doc. 1) challenging his St Johns County conviction for violation of pretrial release aggravated battery, false imprisonment, shooting into a building, and burglary with an assault or battery.[1] Respondents filed a Response to Order to Show Cause (Doc. 10) and an Appendix of Exhibits (Doc. 11). Petitioner filed an Amended Reply to Answer (Reply) (Doc. 20).[2]
The role of this Court is limited when reviewing a state prisoner's application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254; “[u]nder AEDPA, a court cannot grant relief unless the state court's decision on the merits was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,' Supreme Court precedent, or ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'” McKiver v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 991 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir.) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 441 (2021). Therefore, habeas relief is limited to those occasions where the state court's determinations are unreasonable, that is, if no fairminded jurist could agree with them. Id.
If there has been one reasoned state court judgment rejecting a federal claim followed by an unexplained order upholding that judgment, federal habeas courts employ a "look through" presumption: Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (Wilson).
Also, a state court's finding of fact, whether a state trial court or appellate court, is entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). “The state court's factual determinations are presumed correct, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Sealey v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 954 F.3d 1338, 1354 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 2469 (2021). This presumption of correctness, however, applies only to findings of fact, not mixed determinations of law and fact. Brannan v. GDCP Warden, 541 Fed.Appx. 901, 903-904 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (, )cert. denied, 573 U.S. 906 (2014).[3]Furthermore, the second prong of § 2254(d), requires this Court to “accord the state trial court [determination of the facts] substantial deference.” Dallas v. Warden, 964 F.3d 1285, 1302 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015)), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 124 (2021). As such, a federal district court may not supersede a state court's determination simply because reasonable minds may disagree about the finding. Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
Of import, “[i]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determination on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). Indeed, a habeas petition grounded on issues of state law provides no basis for federal habeas relief as a violation of state statute or rule of procedure does not constitute a violation of the federal constitution. Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). As such, a federal writ is only available in cases amounting to federal constitutional error. Jones v. Goodwin, 982 F.2d 464, 471 (11th Cir. 1993). This is so even if the claim is “couched” in terms of alleged constitutional violations, like due process. Branan, 861 F.2d at 1508.
The two-part Strickland standard governs claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.[4] Knight v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 958 F.3d 1035, 1038 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 2471 (2021). See Freeman v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 46 F.4th 1193, 1220 (11th Cir. 2022) (), cert. denied, 143 S.Ct. 1785 (2023). Pursuant to this standard, a defendant must show: (1) his counsel's performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A district court need not address both prongs if a petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one. Fifield v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 849 Fed.Appx. 829, 833 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (Strickland), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 788 (2022).
To prevail, a petitioner must successfully show his counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” as well as show “the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, depriving him of a ‘fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.'” Raheem v. GDCP Warden, 995 F.3d 895, 908 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1234 (2022). Additionally, combining the deferential standard for judging the performance of counsel with the extra layer of deference that § 2254 provides, the resulting double deference “is doubly difficult for a petitioner to overcome[.]” Johnson v. Sec'y, DOC, 643 F.3d 907, 911 (2011).
To determine whether Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief, this Court must ask (1) whether the [state court] decisions were ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined' in Strickland, or (2) whether the . . . decisions were ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.'” Whatley v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Ctr., 927 F.3d 1150, 1175 (11th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 1299 (2021). The AEDPA standard is quite difficult to meet as a state court's decision must be given deference and latitude.
A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is also governed by the Strickland standard. Philmore v. McNeil, 575 F.3d 1251, 1264 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1010 (2010). As in a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, failure to establish either prong of the Strickland standard is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Tuomi v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 980 F.3d 787, 795 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 1721 (2021).
In applying the two-pronged standard established in Strickland, the Court is mindful that appellate counsel may weed out weaker, although meritorious arguments, as there is no duty under the Sixth Amendment to raise every non-frivolous issue. Overstreet v. Warden, 811 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2016). Regarding the prejudice prong, “[a]ppellate] [c]ounsel's performance will be deemed prejudicial if we find that the neglected claim would have a reasonable probability of success on appeal.” Tuomi, 980 F.3d at 795 (quoting Philmore, 575 F.3d at 1265) (internal quotation omitted). “Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.” Overstreet, 811 F.3d at 1287 (quoting Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000) quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986)).
Petitioner raises eleven grounds in the Petition:
Although Petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing, Petition at 36 Reply at 39-41, the Court concludes no evidentiary...
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