Solis v. Williams
| Decision Date | 01 March 1910 |
| Citation | 205 Mass. 350,91 N.E. 148 |
| Parties | SOLIS et al. v. WILLIAMS et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
J. C. Ivy, for appellants.
R. D Swain and Hale & Grinnell, for appellee Jones.
The demurrer having been rightly overruled, as the bill on its face stated a case for equitable relief, the question for decision is whether upon the master's report, to which the plaintiffs have taken numerous exceptions, the decree dismissing the bill should be reversed. By his will, Sewell F. Barker devised to his son Charles H. Barker, a life estate with remainder to his other children, Mary E. Cary, Eliza J. Solis and Sewell F. Barker. The tenant for life having died, the plaintiffs Solis and Barker, in whom the remainder vested at the testator's death, and the plaintiff Cary, who claims title under a devise from his wife, Mary E. Cary, of her share, ask specifically that certain tax deeds under which the defendant Jones claims the fee, be canceled, with an accounting for rents and profits received while in possession. Inasmuch as the only interest the defendant Williams acquired was by purchase of the life estate, the money he received after it terminated belonged to the defendant Jones, by whose permission he collected the rents, and the bill as to him was properly dismissed. The cancellation or discharge of invalid conveyances of record, which if allowed to stand cast doubt or uncertainty upon a title otherwise good, is a well-recognized subject of equity jurisdiction. Rogers v. Nichols, 186 Mass. 440, 71 N.E. 950; Sawyer v. Cook, 188 Mass. 163, 170, 74 N.E. 356. The bill charges, in the third and fourth paragraphs, that one Bailey, from whom Jones, who hereinafter will be called the defendant, purchased, with knowledge of the fraudulent purpose, united with the life tenant and his wife in a scheme to permit the property to be sold for nonpayment of taxes, in order that Bailey should buy at the sale for the purpose of depriving the plaintiffs of their remainder in the land. But upon evidence not reported the master finds these allegations have not been proved, and having become unimportant they may be dismissed.
The exceptions to his findings as to the necessitous condition of the life tenant, and his family, which influenced Bailey to lend money to them from time to time for their support, and that to secure repayment of the loans he bid off the property at the first sale, are without merit, and must be overruled. Where fraud is charged, the relation of the parties, their conduct, and motives, are admissible to explain the nature of the transaction which it is sought to impeach, and set aside. In reference to the purchase by Bailey at the sale for the taxes of 1900, the master reports, that it was orally No conveyance by the life tenant or those claiming under him was ever made to Bailey; and it was not until after receiving the collector's deed that he entered into possession. The master having decided that before the time for redemption expired, either under this sale, or subsequent sales for nonpayment of taxes during his occupation, and where the grantees in the collector's deeds conveyed to him, the rents were more than sufficient to have repaid all the assessments, and charges, the plaintiffs contend, that the rents should have been applied in redemption, and as equity will treat that as done which ought to have been done, the tax titles never became absolute, but were discharged by payment. The master, however, found that the defendant bought for a valuable consideration, without notice of the arrangement. Undoubtedly it is the duty of the life tenant, and of those who may succeed to his estate by purchase, to pay the taxes assessed upon the property, nor can they by payment acquire any adverse rights against the remaindermen. Widersum v. Bender, 172 Mass. 436, 438, 52 N.E. 717; Varney v. Stevens, 22 Me. 331, 334; Garland v. Garland, 73 Me. 97; Murch v. Smith Mfg. Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 193, 20 A. 213; Ferguson v. Quinn, 97 Tenn. 46, 36 S.W. 576, 33 L. R. A. 688; Defreese v. Lake, 109 Mich. 429, 67 N.W. 505, 32 L. R. A. 744, 63 Am. St. Rep. 584; Reyburn v. Wallace, 93 Mo. 329, 3 S.W. 482; Stevens v. Melcher, 152 N.Y. 551, 46 N.E. 965; Pike v. Wassell, 94 U.S. 711, 24 L.Ed. 307.
But Bailey's title was not derived from the tenant. The taxes for the years 1900 and 1901 had been lawfully assessed, even if the tenant held an estate for the life of her husband, and the report states that the sales by the collector were valid. Bates v. Sharon, 175 Mass. 293, 56 N.E. 586. The conveyance to Bailey of the tax title held by the grantees, who purchased at the sale for a failure to pay the taxes assessed for the year 1901, also conveyed an independent title. The lien for that year's assessment was paramount to the previous liens under which he held the land. Keen v. Sheehan, 154 Mass. 208, 28 N.E. 150; Abbott v. Frost, 185 Mass. 398, 401, 70 N.E. 478. The tax lien attached to the entire estate, and the collector's deeds conveyed a fee by an independent title which under Bailey's conveyance to him vested in the defendant. Abbott v. Frost, 185 Mass. 398, 401, 70 N.E. 478; Weeks v. Grace, 194 Mass. 296, 300, 80 N.E. 220, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1092; Watkins v. Green, 101 Mich. 493, 60 N.W. 44. The assessment to Bailey of the taxes for 1904 under which the property was again sold by the collector to one Nickerson, who then conveyed to the defendant, was properly levied. Where an estate has been sold for taxes, and the deed to the purchaser recorded, the assessors may lawfully tax the property to the grantee. Roberts v. Welch, 192 Mass. 278, 78 N.E. 408; Rogers v. Lynn, 200 Mass. 354, 86 N.E. 889; Charland v. Home for Aged Women, 91 N.E. 146.
It follows, from the master's conclusions upon unreported evidence, that the defendant is an innocent purchaser for value. The plaintiffs not having shown that actual possession, and the legal title are united in them the bill cannot be maintained for a cancellation of the various tax deeds which they allege were invalid. First Baptist Church of Sharon v. Harper, 191 Mass. 196, 209, 77 N.E. 778. But as the purchaser at a tax sale, and those who claim under him, hold the title subject to the right of redemption, the plaintiffs under the prayer for general relief ask for leave to redeem. Wiggins v. Brand, 202 Mass. 141, 147, 88 N.E. 840; Bullock v. Adams, 20 N. J. Eq. 367. Both branches of the case were decided by the master, who, without further stating his reasons, reports that it would be inequitable under the circumstances to permit redemption.
It appears from the report that the plaintiffs were nonresidents, and there is no finding as to when they first knew of the sale or sales by the collector. The duty of paying the assessments did not devolve upon them, and while the remaindermen knew of the poverty of their brother, they are not shown to have been actually informed that the taxes were in arrears, or in possession of any information which should have put them upon inquiry. If there was no actual intent to defraud, neglect to pay the taxes by the life tenant or those who by purchase succeeded to his interest and their entering into an agreement whereby Bailey should acquire the property at a tax sale in payment of sums advanced to the life tenant, or to hold it as security until the loans were repaid and then to...
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