Solomon v. Harman
Decision Date | 30 September 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 10333,10333 |
Citation | 107 Ariz. 426,489 P.2d 236 |
Parties | Elmer C. SOLOMON, in his individual capacity, et al., Appellants, v. Ronald William HARMAN et al., Appellees. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Gorey & Ely by Stephen L. Weiss, and Jeffrey D. Bonn, Phoenix, for appellants.
O'Connor, Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears by Ralph E. Hunsaker, Phoenix, for appellees.
This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court in a wrongful death action dismissing as parties plaintiff the surviving brothers and sisters and the foster parents of the deceased, Paul Conrad Cargo, a minor.
In this appeal we are concerned with the right to be a plaintiff in a wrongful death action (i.e. the right for an action to be brought 'by and in the name of'); the right to be a beneficiary in a wrongful death action (i.e. the right to be entitled to recover); and the constitutionality of the wrongful death statute in its operation as to the foster parents.
The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. The deceased, Paul Conrad Cargo, age 17, was killed as the result of an automobile accident in which the defendant, Ronald William Harman, was the allegedly negligent driver. Decedent resided with his foster parents, Elmer C. Solomon and Betty Solomon, husband and wife, as did Virgil Cargo and Lois Cargo, brother and sister of the deceased. Decedent's mother, Rebecca Cargo, was alive but mentally incompetent, and institutionalized in Pennsylvania. For reasons not apparent from the record, the natural father is not mentioned and not a party to this action. We will not, therefore, consider any rights he might have.
The defendant moved to dismiss as to the foster parents and the brothers and sisters. The order granting the motion read in part as follows:
'IT IS ORDERED that the amended complaint be dismissed as to all parties-plaintiff, except as to Irene Smith, guardian of Rebecca Cargo, (and/or except as to Elmer C. Solomon, Administrator of the Estate of Paul Conrad Cargo, on behalf of Irene Smith, guardian of Rebecca Cargo), and except as to Elmer C. Solomon, Administrator of the Estate of Paul Conrad Cargo on behalf of the Estate, but in this latter instance only for the purpose of the Administrator claiming funeral and burial expenses. * * *'
Notice of appeal was filed by all those dismissed.
The right of action for wrongful death is purely statutory and the action must be brought in the names of the persons to whom the right is given by statute. Barragan v. Superior Court, Pima County, 12 Ariz.App. 200, 469 P.2d 92 (1970). Accordingly, the statute provides as follows:
Arizona's wrongful death statutes clearly differentiate between the right to be a plaintiff in the action (i.e. 'by and in the name of') and the right to be a beneficiary of that action (i.e. 'for and on behalf of').
The following are proper parties plaintiff:
1. The surviving husband or wife (§ 12--612A), or
2. the personal representative (§ 12--612A), or
3. the parent (in preferential order) (§ 12--612B), or
4. The guardian (§ 12--612B).
The proper parties plaintiff in the case of a deceased unmarried minor are either the personal representative, parent, or guardian. § 12--612, subsecs. A and B.
This court has previously stated in affirming the action of the trial court in denying a motion to amend the complaint in a wrongful death action to include as parties plaintiff the dependent parents of the deceased where there was a surviving wife and minor children:
* * *.' Lueck v. Superior Court, County of Cochise, 105 Ariz. 583, 585, 469 P.2d 68, 70 (1970).
In the instant case, there being a surviving mother, the trial court properly dismissed all other parties as plaintiffs other than the mother and the administrator for purposes of funeral and burial expenses. § 14--682 A.R.S.
The determination of proper parties plaintiff does not, however, dispose of the right to recover:
25A C.J.S. Death § 32, p. 642.
The pertinent part of § 12--612 subsec. A A.R.S., as amended in 1956, provides as follows:
'An action for wrongful death shall be brought * * * For and on behalf of the surviving husband or wife, children or parents, Or if none of these survive, on behalf of the decedent's estate.' (Emphasis added)
The statutory language of the 1956 amendment is an evolutionary product. That evolution began in 1887 with the adoption of our original wrongful death act. §§ 2145, et seq., R.S.A.1887. This court has previously noted that the 1887 act 'followed Lord Campbell's act in all essential respects', and:
Southern Pacific Co. v. Wilson, 10 Ariz. 162, 165, 85 P. 401, 402 (1906). (Emphasis added)
The recovery under the 1887 act was 'divided among the persons entitled to the benefit of the action * * * in such shares as the jury shall find by their verdict.' § 2155 R.S.A.1887.
In 1901, however, the substance of the action was changed. § 2765 R.S.A. of 1901. The 1887 act was repealed. The new section provided for the action to be brought 'by and in the name of the personal representative', 'preferred' parent, or guardian, to be 'distributed to the parties and in the proportions provided by law for distribution of personal estate left by persons dying intestate.' Southern Pacific Co. v. Wilson, supra at 169, 85 P. at 403. Of this change this court noted:
Southern Pacific Co. v. Wilson, supra at 169, 85 P. at 403.
To summarize, under the 1887 act, which was a codification of Lord Campbell's Act, it was necessary to show the existence of the beneficiaries named in the statute. The measure of damage was the loss to designated beneficiaries and the proceeds of the action went to the said beneficiaries. In the 1901 statute, it was not necessary to show the existence of any beneficiaries but only to show a wrongful death and the measure of damages was to the estate . The proceeds went to the estate to be distributed according to intestate succession.
The 1956 amendment fused these two theories providing:
§ 12--612, subsec. A, A.R.S.
What then was the net effect of this fusing? Did it authorize the court in effect to read back into the statute a provision that the action was for the benefit of the beneficiaries? Quite obviously it did, but only if there were surviving beneficiaries as named in § 12--612, subsec. A. The amendment provided for a cause of action for and on behalf of certain designated members of the family 'or if none of these survive, on behalf of the decedent's estate.' § 12--612, subsec. A. It would appear then that if the beneficiaries as designated in § 12--612, subsec. A survive, the court may proceed, as in Lord Campbell's Act and the 1887 statute, for and on behalf of the designated beneficiaries. If none of these designated beneficiaries survive, then the action may be brought on behalf of the estate as provided in the 1901 statute.
The estate, then, is a beneficiary only if none of those named beneficiaries survive. The result of the 1956 amendment was to provide alternative benefits to either the named beneficiaries or the estate. As we previously stated:
In Re Estate of Milliman, 101 Ariz. 54, 59, 415 P.2d 877, 882 (1966).
Therefore, an action for wrongful death may be brought by a proper party for and on behalf of the following only:
4. or if none of the above survive the estate of the decedent.
This brings us to the...
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