Soltero v. Wimer, 77548-6.
| Decision Date | 18 January 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 77548-6.,77548-6. |
| Citation | 150 P.3d 552,159 Wn.2d 428 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Patricia A. SOLTERO, Respondent, v. Kenneth L. WIMER, Petitioner. |
Allen Morris Gauper, Salina Sanger and Gauper, Spokane, WA, for Petitioner.
Robert R. Cossey, Robert R. Cossey & Associates PS, Spokane, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 Washington courts have long recognized that community-like1 property jointly owned by partners in a meretricious relationship is subject to a just and equitable distribution when the relationship ends. This distribution resembles in many ways the distribution of community property at the termination of a marriage.
¶ 2 Unlike the distribution in a divorce, however, the separate property of the parties in a dissolving meretricious relationship is not subject to distribution. In this case, after a full trial, the judge below identified no community-like property. Nonetheless, he awarded one of the parties $135,000 to be paid by the other. Because an equitable distribution of community-like property requires community-like property to distribute, we reverse.
¶ 3 Kenneth Wimer and Patricia Soltero began dating in a nonexclusive relationship in 1983. In 1992 they moved in together. They stayed together through 2001, and the trial judge found that their relationship was monogamous and exclusive during that time.
¶ 4 Wimer owned Westside Honda in Spokane, Washington, and several associated motorcycle-all terrain vehicles-snowmobile businesses and properties. A few years into their relationship Soltero left a job with the Cheney Federal Credit Union to work for Wimer's motorcycle dealership. Soltero was paid $18,000 a year. Wimer's salary during that time was approximately $42,000 a year though he was compensated in other ways as well, and he retained capital in the business itself.
¶ 5 During this time, Soltero moved into Wimer's house. Wimer did not charge Soltero rent. Every month Wimer deposited $400 into Soltero's personal checking account to cover household expenses, which were minimal because most were paid for by Wimer's businesses. Wimer purchased another home and business in Priest Lake, Idaho. Soltero decorated the homes, worked in the gardens, and cooked for the couple and their guests. The trial court found that Soltero did not contribute financially to the relationship but undertook "all of the marital-like duties and obligations of the household." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 5.
¶ 6 Although Soltero and Wimer lived together and held themselves out to be a couple, they never purchased any personal or real property jointly nor did they commingle any money. Instead, they maintained their finances separate in separate bank accounts Soltero did add Wimer to her checking account, but Wimer never drew money from it. During their nine-year relationship Wimer's net worth increased from $1.5 million to more than $4.5 million, while Soltero's net worth does not appear to have materially grown.
¶ 7 In 2001, Wimer terminated the relationship via letter. Not long afterward he remarried his former wife. Meanwhile, Soltero brought this suit asserting that a meretricious relationship existed between them and seeking a distribution of their assets.
¶ 8 The trial court found that Soltero and Wimer had a meretricious relationship. The trial court also found Wimer had maintained his property and businesses as separate property and all rents, incomes, and profit from those businesses were also separate. The trial judge concluded:
The vast majority, if not the entire amount, of the earnings and increased value ... during the ... relationship can be traced to the growth of the business, property value increase, rental income and Mr. Wimer's benefit from early efforts and continued efforts to make the businesses and business holdings grow.
CP at 7, and:
The evidence was clear that all of the real property and business property was, remained, and is today the separate property of Mr. Wimer. Additionally, it is clear that all the rents, income and earnings, other than salary or wage income, from separate property remained separate property.
CP at 9. However, the trial court also ruled that:
Mathematical calculations, analysis and juxtaposition of numbers considering the parties' salaries, IRA contributions and other economic and financial realities leave me with the conclusion that the equitable distribution of property boils down to simply this: What is Ms. Soltero's rightful claim, if any, to an equitable distribution of the non-separate property earnings of the parties during those nine years? My analysis is as follows:
An equitable split is Mr. Wimer 70%, Ms. Soltero 30%, therefore, their individual earnings is a push.2
The value of Ms. Soltero's other services provided as a cohabitating, committed, long-term companion, including the obligations of running the household and business/social matters, net (meaning after consideration for board and room), is:
$15,000 a year × nine years or $135,000.00
CP at 9-10. Thus, the trial court ordered Wimer to pay Soltero $135,000. Wimer appealed, arguing that no meretricious relationship existed and, in the alternative, "services" performed are not compensable. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed in part. Soltero v. Wimer, 128 Wash. App. 364, 115 P.3d 393 (2005). Acting Chief Judge Dennis J. Sweeney dissented. He found no reason to disturb the trial court's exercise of discretion but also opined that domestic services in a meretricious relationship are not compensable. Id. at 375-76, 115 P.3d 393 (Sweeney, A.C.J., dissenting) ().
¶ 9 Property distribution at the end of a meretricious relationship is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Koher v. Morgan, 93 Wash.App. 398, 401, 968 P.2d 920 (1998) (citing In re Meretricious Relationship of Sutton, 85 Wash.App. 487, 491, 933 P.2d 1069 (1997)). Among other things, discretion is abused when it is exercised on untenable grounds. State v. Downing, 151 Wash.2d 265, 272-73, 87 P.3d 1169 (2004). While we review conclusions of law de novo, findings of fact merely need to be supported by substantial evidence. E.g., Nordstrom Credit, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 120 Wash.2d 935, 942, 845 P.2d 1331 (1993).
¶ 10 "A meretricious relationship is a stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not exist." Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash.2d 339, 346, 898 P.2d 831 (1995) (citing In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash.2d 299, 304, 678 P.2d 328 (1984)). Washington has "a three-prong analysis for disposing of property when a meretricious relationship terminates." In re Pennington, 142 Wash.2d 592, 602, 14 P.3d 764 (2000) (citing Connell, 127 Wash.2d at 349, 898 P.2d 831). First, the court decides whether a meretricious relationship existed. Second, Id.
¶ 11 Wimer conceded for the purposes of review that he and Soltero had a meretricious relationship. We turn now to the second prong, the property characterization. In Connell we clearly held that only property that would be considered community property in a marriage would be subject to a just and equitable distribution upon dissolution of a meretricious relationship. Connell, 127 Wash.2d at 351-52, 898 P.2d 831.3 Property acquired during the meretricious relationship is presumed to be community-like, but the presumption is rebuttable. Id. Unlike a property distribution in a divorce, the separate property of the parties is not subject to distribution. Id. at 350, 898 P.2d 831. If there is no community-like property, then there is nothing to justly and equitably distribute.
¶ 12 Wimer argues that the trial court erred by treating the "domestic services" provided by Soltero as community-like property. We read the trial court's letter opinion differently. It appears to us that the trial court found that Soltero's domestic services provided a basis for an equitable distribution. The Court of Appeals affirmed, opining that "the growth in [Wimer's] separate estate between 1992 and 2001 could be considered by the court in determining a proper equitable distribution of property." Soltero, 128 Wash.App. at 372, 115 P.3d 393. The Court of Appeals is correct that the trial court could have found that some portion of the increase in value was community-like property, rather than due to the "natural enhancement" of the separate...
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