SOUTH CAROLINA DEPT. v. Cochran
Citation | 589 S.E.2d 753,356 S.C. 413 |
Decision Date | 24 November 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 25753.,25753. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
Parties | SOUTH CAROLINA DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondent, v. Kimberly Cochran and Bobby COCHRAN, Defendants, of Whom Kimberly Cochran is the Appellant. In The Interest of Tyler Dane Cochran, DOB: 830-93 Minor child under the age of 18 years. |
Kimberley Elizabeth Campbell, of Patrick Chandler & Campbell, of Surfside Beach, for appellant.
Celeste Moore, of the Department of Social Services, of Columbia, for respondent.
Melissa Meyers Frazier, of Law Offices of Walter J. Wylie, of N. Myrtle Beach, for Guardian Ad Litem. Chief Justice TOAL:
Kimberly Cochran ("mother") appeals the family court's decision to terminate her parental rights of her child, Tyler Dane Cochran ("child").
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Department of Social Services ("DSS") temporarily removed child from the home of mother and Bobby Cochran ("father") in August 1997 after discovering that father had physically abused the child.1 Child was returned to mother (mother and father were separated at this time) subject to conditions that the family court judge set forth at a merits hearing. Both mother and father had to submit to drug testing, mother had to seek drug treatment, and they had to complete a parenting skills program and a marriage counseling program. If mother failed a drug test, child would immediately be removed from her custody. Mother tested positive for cocaine shortly thereafter, and DSS regained custody of child in November 1997.
A permanency planning hearing took place on July 30, 1998, and the judge concluded that DSS should retain custody of the child and that DSS could proceed to terminate mother and father's parental rights to the child. The following is a list of some of the events that transpired between the initial merits hearing and the termination of parental rights hearing, which was heard on July 20 and August 21, 2000 respectively:
The trial court determined that mother and father's parental rights should be terminated based on the following grounds: 1) that pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(2) (Supp.2000), mother and father failed to remedy or rehabilitate the situation which caused the initial removal of child; 2) that pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(6) (Supp.2000), mother had a diagnosed drug addiction, which prevented her from providing minimally acceptable care for the child; 3) that pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(8) (Supp.2000), the child had been in foster care for 15 of the previous 22 months; and 4) that termination was in the best interest of the child.
Mother appeals the family court determination and raises the following issues on appeal:
LAW/ANALYSIS
The family court will terminate parental rights and free a child up for adoption if it finds that one of the nine statutory grounds for termination has been met and that "termination is in the best interest of the child." S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1578 (Supp.2000). The family court judge terminated mother's parental rights pursuant to three statutory grounds. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 20-7-1572(2), (6), and (8). DSS must prove these grounds by clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); Richland County v. Earles, 330 S.C. 24, 496 S.E.2d 864 (1998). When reviewing the family court decision, this Court may make its own conclusion as to whether DSS proved by clear and convincing evidence that parental rights should be terminated. South Carolina DSS v. Brown, 317 S.C. 332, 454 S.E.2d 335 (Ct.App.1995).
I. Chain of Custody
Mother argues that the family court erred in concluding that DSS had established a proper chain of custody for mother's blood samples that were used for drug testing in May and June of 2000. We agree.
Although mother raises various issues on appeal,2 in our opinion, the central issue in this case is whether mother's drug addiction is so enduring that she cannot parent her child.3 We find that the full picture of mother's drug addiction is unclear because DSS did not establish a proper chain of custody for key evidence that supported its allegation that mother failed two recent drug tests.
Mother presented evidence to support her contention that she was trying to overcome her drug addiction and improve her parenting skills. The merits hearing judge ordered mother to submit to drug testing, take marriage and family counseling courses, and seek drug treatment. Mother participated in all of these activities. She failed to finish the marriage counseling regimen with Dr. Heidt, but she and her husband later returned to continue the counseling with Dr. Heidt. However, the fact that she may have tested positive for drugs in May and June of 2000 would seem to suggest that despite her good intentions to become a better mother, she could not rid herself of her drug addiction. Therefore, mother's blood samples that were taken for the May and June 2000 drug tests become highly important in determining the progression of her drug addiction, and DSS must have established a proper chain of custody for those samples in order to utilize the results to request termination of mother's rights.
DSS has the burden to establish a chain of custody for the blood samples "as far as practicable." State v. Williams, 297 S.C. 290, 376 S.E.2d 773 (1989). This Court has held:
[T]he party offering such specimen is required to establish, at least as far as practicable, a complete chain of evidence, tracing possession from the time the specimen is taken from the human body to the final custodian by whom it is analyzed. Where the substance analyzed has passed through several hands the evidence must not leave it to conjecture as to who had it and what was done with it between the taking and the analysis.
Benton v. Pellum, 232 S.C. 26, 33-34, 100 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1957) (cited in Raino v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 309 S.C. 255, 258, 422 S.E.2d 98, 99-100 (1992)).
In this case, DSS took a telephonic deposition of Steven Ivey ("Ivey"), an employee of LabCorp, which is the laboratory that tested the blood samples.4 Ivey testified generally as to who would have handled the samples and how the testing of the samples would have occurred. However, he also testified that he did not handle the samples, nor did he know which employee handled the samples. While the chain of custody that DSS is required to establish does not have to be perfect, Ivey presented no direct evidence as to how those specific blood samples were processed. We find that Ivey's...
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