South Coast Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Oceanside

• Decision Date: 24 September 1984
• Citation: 206 Cal.Rptr. 527,160 Cal.App.3d 261
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: SOUTH COAST NEWSPAPERS, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF OCEANSIDE, et al., Defendants and Respondents. D000706. Civ. 28604.

Page 527

206 Cal.Rptr. 527

160 Cal.App.3d 261

SOUTH COAST NEWSPAPERS, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF OCEANSIDE, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

D000706.

Civ. 28604.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Sept. 24, 1984.

Hearing Denied Dec. 13, 1984.

Swirsky & Sauer and W.N. Sauer, Jr., Carlsbad, for plaintiff and appellant.

Robert G. Steiner, Gregory D. Roper, Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, Musick, Peeler & Garrett, San Diego, Stephen G. Contopulos and Anthony Russo, Los Angeles, amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.

Charles R. Revlett, City Atty., Oceanside, and Warren B. Diven, Asst. City Atty., for defendants and respondents.

STANIFORTH, Acting Presiding Justice.

This appeal questions denial of South Coast Newspapers, Inc.'s (South Coast) (the public's) right to inspect or receive a copy of the police report of an investigation undertaken by an Oceanside police officer in response to oral complaints from Oceanside residents a high school principal had failed to report an incident of child abuse. The trial court declared the report was statutorily protected from disclosure no matter its contents. The court also refused to inspect the report in camera. We hold South Coast (the public) is entitled, pursuant to the California Public Records Act (CPRA), Government Code section 6250 et seq., ¹ and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Deukmejian, 32 Cal.3d 440, 186 Cal.Rptr. 235, 651 P.2d 822, to receive a copy of the report upon request and after the following trial court determinations: (1) no confidential sources will be revealed as a result of the report's release; (2) disclosure will not interfere with enforcement proceedings; (3) no person will be deprived of a fair trial; (4) release of the report will not constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (5) secret police investigative techniques or procedures will not be revealed; or (6) the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel will not be endangered. We reverse and remand for a forthwith in camera inspection and disclosure of the report or parts thereof, or an accurate edited summary, unless the court finds disclosure will result in an invasion of statutorily

protected areas of information. (Gov.Code, § 6254, subd. (f).) ²

FACTS

South Coast owns and operates the Blade Tribune, an Oceanside, California, newspaper. In early 1982, South Coast learned the City of Oceanside Police Department had prepared a report during the course of its investigation of the principal of Oceanside High School for his alleged failure to report an incident of child abuse. South Coast requested the City of Oceanside (the City) provide it with a copy of the report.

The history of the report is: The City's police department had received a complaint from a minor concerning alleged illegal sexual activity by the local high school band director with female students. During the course of his investigation into the allegations against the band director, Sergeant C.C. Sanders, the supervising investigating officer, became aware of information provided by other investigating officers which led him to believe Joseph Graybeal, the high school principal, may have had prior knowledge of the band director's activities but failed to report the activities to the police department.

Sanders informed his superiors of the information he had received about Graybeal. Upon instructions from the chief of police, Sanders prepared an investigative report regarding the principal's alleged failure to report an incident of child abuse. The report was submitted to the district attorney's office for review. The district attorney declined to prosecute Graybeal for violation of Penal Code section 11172 (failure to report an instance of child abuse which the person knows or reasonably should know to exist).

The City refused to release a copy of the report or to allow South Coast to review it on the ground section 6254, subdivision (f), exempts the report from disclosure. On September 24, 1982, South Coast filed an Upon hearing before the trial court, South Coast requested the City disclose, at a minimum, all information in the report which section 6254, subdivision (f)(2), directs must be disclosed. South Coast, however, did not abandon its argument it was also entitled to a copy of the report. The court then continued the case in order to give the City an opportunity to respond to South Coast's request. Nine days later (Nov. 12, 1982) the City complied with South Coast's request for information delineated in section 6254, subdivision (f)(2). South Coast then filed an amended petition for declaratory relief. South Coast still sought a declaration it was entitled to inspect or receive a copy of the report, and alternatively requested a determination the City had failed to satisfy the disclosure requirements of section 6254, subdivision (f)(2).

action for declaratory relief in the superior court of San Diego County. South Coast sought a judicial declaration it was entitled to inspect or receive a copy of the police report.

At the hearing on the amended petition (Dec. 3, 1982), the trial court ruled South Coast had already received more information regarding the Graybeal investigation than it was entitled; the court reasoned the section 6254, subdivision (f)(2), information disclosure directive is triggered only when a formal, written complaint is filed with a police department. The court also ruled section 6254, subdivision (f), "clearly exempts from the Public Record Act records of complaints to or investigations conducted by any state or local police agency." Finally, the court refused to conduct an in camera inspection of the Graybeal report pursuant to section 6259, ³ on the ground such inspection was "not necessary."

DISCUSSION

I

Section 6254, subdivision (f), contains a general exemption from disclosure of "[r]ecords of complaints to or investigations conducted by ... any state or local police agency...." The trial court ruled this exemption absolute, suggested a public agency is never obligated to produce investigatory reports. In so doing, the trial court failed to consider the history of the CPRA in general or the investigatory records exemption of section 6254, subdivision (f), in particular.

The CPRA was modeled on the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), enacted in 1967. As the appeal court noted in San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, 143 Cal.App.3d 762, 772, 192 Cal.Rptr. 415:

"The [CPRA] ... can draw on its federal counterpart [the FOIA] for judicial construction and legislative history. [Citations.] This resource becomes a useful tool, in view of the lack of California cases construing the Act. Moreover, the [CPRA], like the FOIA, reflects a general policy of disclosure that can only be accomplished by narrow construction of the statutory exemptions. [Citations.]" (Fn. omitted.)

On its enactment in 1967, the FOIA contained a disclosure exemption for "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes." (Former 5 U.S.C., § 552(b)(7).) The CPRA, on its 1968 passage, contained a similar exemption for:

"records of complaints to or investigations conducted by, or records of intelligence information or security procedures of ... any state or local police agency, or any such investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or local agency for correctional, law enforcement or licensing purposes ...." (Stats.1968, c. 1473, § 39, p. 2947; former § 6254, subd. (f).)

After a series of restrictive federal court decisions held all documents in a law enforcement investigatory file were exempt from FOIA disclosure requirements, Congress amended the FOIA so that investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes were exempt, but only to the extent production of the records would:

"(A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel ...." (5 U.S.C., § 552(b)(7).)

These FOIA amendments simply "reinstat[ed] the scope of the [investigatory file] exemption as intended in the original act (see Climax Molybdenum Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra, 539 F.2d 63, 64) ...." (American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, supra, 32 Cal.3d 440, 449, 186 Cal.Rptr. 235, 651 P.2d 822.)

In discussing the CPRA, the Supreme Court in American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Deukmejian, supra, noted the CPRA was modeled on the FOIA and ruled the FOIA and its amendments should thus be used to construe the CPRA. (32 Cal.3d 440, 447, 186 Cal.Rptr. 235, 651 P.2d 822.) In light of the FOIA and its amendments, the Supreme Court concluded despite section 6254, subdivision (f)'s, plain language, its investigatory records exemption is not an absolute exemption:

"Such a broad exemption would in essence resurrect the federal judicial doctrine which Congress repudiated in 1974, and which was never part of California law. It would undercut the California decisions which in some circumstances limit the exemption of subdivision (f) to cases involving concrete and definite enforcement prospects. And most important, it would effectively exclude the law enforcement function of state and local governments from any public scrutiny under the California Act, a result inconsistent with its fundamental purpose.

"....

"... We recognize, of course, that California has not enacted any amendments to the Act comparable to the 1974 federal amendments ...