South Ridge Baptist Church v. INDUS. COM'N OF OHIO

• Decision Date: 28 December 1987
• Docket Number: No. C-2-86-875.,C-2-86-875.
• Parties: SOUTH RIDGE BAPTIST CHURCH, Plaintiff, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

676 F. Supp. 799

SOUTH RIDGE BAPTIST CHURCH, Plaintiff, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, et al., Defendants.

No. C-2-86-875.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, E.D.

December 28, 1987.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Daniel J. Loomis, Gibbs & Craze Co., L.P.A., Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Merl H. Wayman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Worker's Compensation Section, Columbus, Ohio, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GRAHAM, District Judge.

Plaintiff, South Ridge Baptist Church of Conneaut, Ohio, has filed the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Industrial Commission of Ohio and the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation. Plaintiff is a non-profit religious organization. Defendants are agencies of the State of Ohio which administer the statutory workers' compensation program. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief in the form of a judgment declaring that the Ohio workers' compensation statutes and regulations are unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff requests that defendants be enjoined from enforcing the workers' compensation laws against plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that it possesses a sincerely-held religiously based objection to participating in or contributing to the Ohio Workers' Compensation System. Plaintiff contends that the statutory scheme constitutes a threat to plaintiff's right to free exercise of religion in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff's next claim is that the state program presents an impermissible risk of excessive government entanglement in the affairs of the church and interferes with church management prerogatives concerning the use of money and effort. Plaintiff further claims that the Ohio General Assembly in passing the workers' compensation laws did not intend to include religious organizations such as plaintiff within the scope of those laws, and that to include plaintiff within the coverage of those laws would violate the Ohio Constitution.

The present case was originally filed on May 27, 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Venue was found to be proper in the Southern District of Ohio, and the case was transferred to this court on July 11, 1986. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted on July 31, 1987. In light of the affidavits filed with the record, the court on October 1, 1987 elected to treat defendants' motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, and allowed the parties the opportunity to present additional argument and evidence.

Defendants' motion to dismiss includes three branches. Defendants first argue that plaintiff's suit is barred by the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel in light of the decision of the Lorain County Court of Appeals in Victory Baptist Temple v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 2 Ohio App.3d 418, 442 N.E.2d 819 (1982). In that case, the plaintiff church sought exemption from the payment of workers' compensation premiums on First Amendment religious grounds. The Court of Appeals held that the Ohio workers' compensation laws as applied to plaintiff did not violate the First Amendment.

In actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the preclusive effect of a prior state court judgment is to be determined by reference to the law of the state where the judgment was rendered. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980).

Under Ohio law, a final judgment on the merits is conclusive of rights, questions and facts in issue as to the parties and their privies, and is a complete bar to any subsequent action on the same claim or cause of action between the parties or those in privity with them. Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N.E.2d 67 (1943). Before res judicata can be applied, the parties to the subsequent action must be identical to those of the former action or be in privity with them. Cole v. Ottawa Home and Savings Ass'n, 18 Ohio St.2d 1, 246 N.E.2d 542 (1969). One is deemed to be in privity if he succeeds to the estate or interest of another. Whitehead v. General Telephone Co., 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 254 N.E. 2d 10 (1969). Privity is a succession of interest or relationship to the same thing. City of Columbus v. Union Cemetery Ass'n, 45 Ohio St.2d 47, 341 N.E.2d 298 (1976).

The court finds no indication in the record that plaintiff was involved in any way in the Victory Baptist Temple litigation, or that it is otherwise in privity with Victory Baptist. The mere fact that identical or similar issues are raised by plaintiff is not sufficient to make plaintiff a privy to Victory Baptist. Therefore, the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not present a bar to plaintiff's cause of action.

Defendants also urge this court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this case. Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1244, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). As the Supreme Court stated, Id:

The doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.

It was never a doctrine of equity that a federal court should exercise its judicial discretion to dismiss a suit merely because a State court could entertain it. Id. at 813-814, 96 S.Ct. at 1244. The Supreme Court in Colorado River Water Conservation District listed three circumstances in which the doctrine of abstention would be appropriately invoked: 1) where a federal constitutional question might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of state law; 2) when the case presents a difficult question of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import, and the exercise of federal jurisdiction would disrupt state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to those problems; and 3) where an injunction is sought to restrain the collection of taxes or criminal proceedings, and where no bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid statute is involved.

None of these factors is present in this case. One state court has already addressed the issue now before this court, and has interpreted relevant state statutes. Extensive interpretation of the state regulatory provisions is not required here; rather, the question presented is primarily whether the state program violates plaintiff's rights under the United States Constitution. The court concludes that abstention is not required in this case.

Defendants' remaining argument addresses the merits of plaintiff's complaint. The court has converted defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) into a motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.

The procedure for granting summary judgment is found in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), which provides:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The evidence must be viewed in a light favorable to the plaintiff. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, "that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, ___, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, summary judgment is appropriate if the opposing party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, ___-___, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The workers' compensation system is authorized by Article II, Section 35 of the Ohio Constitution. Section 35 authorizes the legislature to enact laws establishing a state fund maintained by compulsory employer contributions for the purpose of providing compensation to workers and their dependents for death, injury or occupational disease stemming from the workmen's employment.

Definitions of "employee" and "employer" are found in Section 4123.01, Ohio Revised Code. The definition of "employee" includes: "Every person in the service of any person, firm, or private corporation, including any public service corporation." On August 22, 1986, the statute was amended to exclude from the definition of employee "A duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister or assistant or associate minister of a church in the exercise of his ministry." Section 4123.01(A)(2)(a), Ohio Revised Code. Under Section 4123.01(A)(2), it is now within the discretion of the employer whether to elect workers' compensation coverage for ministers or assistant ministers.

Section 4123.01(B), Ohio Revised Code, defines "employer" as:

Every person, firm, and private corporation, including any public service corporation, that (a) has in service one or more workmen or operatives regularly in the same business or in or about the same establishment under any contract of hire, ...

Churches are included within the definition of "employer." Victory Baptist Temple v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, supra. The legislative...