Souza v. Lauppe

• Decision Date: 02 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. C022484,C022484
• Citation: 59 Cal.App.4th 865,69 Cal.Rptr.2d 494
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9066, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,573 Martin SOUZA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Burton LAUPPE et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 494

69 Cal.Rptr.2d 494

59 Cal.App.4th 865, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9066,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,573

Martin SOUZA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Burton LAUPPE et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. C022484.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Dec. 2, 1997.

Certified for Partial Publication. ^*

Review Denied Feb. 18, 1998.

Haycock & Pomykala, D. Jack Haycock, Sacramento, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Caulfield, Davies & Donahue, Richard Hyland Caulfield, David N. Tedesco and Diane E. Lockareff, Sacramento, for Defendants and Respondents.

Donahue, Wood, Loving, Myers & Vogel, Mark A. Bates, Sacramento, for Defendants and Respondents.

Lea & Arruti, Mark Arruti, Sacramento, for Defendants and Respondents.

Porter, Scott, Weiberg & Delehant, Anthony S. Warburg, Sacramento, for Defendants and Respondents.

SCOTLAND, Associate Justice.

In this suit between farmers of neighboring parcels, brought after plaintiffs switched from rice to row crops, plaintiffs allege that defendants' rice farming has caused water to seep under and onto plaintiffs' property, resulting in damage to the property and lost profits from plaintiff's farming operations.

Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment on the ground plaintiffs' action On appeal, plaintiffs claim section 3482.5 does not apply because the statute "was never intended to bar [an action] by one farmer against another farmer"; rather, its purpose is to preclude suburban dwellers from seeking to enjoin neighboring agricultural practices. In plaintiffs' words, the statute "was only intended to bar claims by non-agricultural uses 'coming to the nuisance' " as a result of "urban crawl." Defendants retort the plain language of section 3482.5 precludes any lawsuit that attempts to enjoin a lawful, commercial agricultural activity that meets the requisites of the statute.

is precluded by Civil Code section 3482.5, which provides that a commercial agricultural activity conducted for more than three years consistent with accepted standards in the locality shall not become a nuisance due to any changed condition in the locality if the activity did not constitute a nuisance when it began. (Further section references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise specified.)

We agree with defendants' construction of section 3482.5. As we will explain, the plain meaning of the section's unambiguous language does not limit its preclusive effect to nuisance actions commenced by non-agricultural plaintiffs. The statute applies broadly to bar a nuisance action, such as this, brought by one commercial agricultural entity against another commercial agricultural entity. We also reject plaintiffs' claim that their switch from rice to row crops does not constitute a changed condition within the meaning of section 3482.5.

In the unpublished portion of our opinion, we reject plaintiffs' remaining contentions. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Mary DeMatos is the owner of real property (the DeMatos parcel) near the Sacramento International Airport. DeMatos and her husband farmed the property since 1945. Prior to the 1970s, they planted row crops; thereafter, and until 1988, they planted rice.

DeMatos's husband died in 1988. Since then, her daughter, plaintiff Janet Souza, and son-in-law, plaintiff Martin Souza, have managed the DeMatos parcel. In 1988, the Souzas hired plaintiffs Joe Perry, Joaquin Perry and John Perry to farm row crops on the DeMatos parcel.

Defendants are owners and lessees of real property which borders the DeMatos parcel to the north and east. They began farming rice on their property as early as 1983. At that time, the DeMatos parcel also was being used for rice farming.

Sometime after plaintiffs shifted to planting row crops on the DeMatos parcel in 1988, they begin to notice that, when defendants' neighboring rice fields were flooded, the portion of the DeMatos parcel closest to defendants' land became so wet it could not be farmed properly in row crops. Plaintiffs also noticed that the timing of defendants' flooding and subsequent drainage coincided with water intrusion under and onto the DeMatos parcel. They attributed the reduced yields from their sugar beets and safflower crops to excessive seepage of water from defendants' rice growing activities.

Plaintiffs sued. Their complaint states three untitled "causes of action." The first alleges negligence against each defendant "for allowing excessive amount[s] of water to seep under and onto plaintiffs' land," resulting in property damages and lost profits from plaintiffs' farming operations. The second seeks to enjoin defendants' conduct alleged in the first cause of action. The third asserts that defendants' failures to refrain from the actions alleged in the first cause of action constitute unlawful business practices and unfair competition in violation of California Business and Professions Code sections 17200 through 17208.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs' complaint constitutes a nuisance action and, as such, is precluded by section 3482.5, subdivision (a)(1), which provides in pertinent part: "No agricultural activity ... conducted or maintained for commercial purposes, and in a manner consistent with proper and accepted customs and standards, as established and followed by similar agricultural operations in It is undisputed that plaintiffs did not notice any water intrusion onto their property due to defendants' rice farming until after plaintiffs switched from growing rice to growing row crops in 1988. Defendants also submitted as undisputed the following facts: their rice farming is an agricultural activity conducted for commercial purposes in a manner consistent with proper and accepted customs and standards as established and followed by similar agricultural operations in the same locality, has been ongoing for more than three years, and was not a nuisance at the time it began in 1983.

the same locality, shall be or become a nuisance, private or public, due to any changed condition in or about the locality, after it has been in operation for more than three years if it was not a nuisance at the time it began."

Plaintiffs' papers disputed the last material fact. In their response to defendants' statements of undisputed facts, plaintiffs stated they "do not dispute the manner of [defendants'] rice farming, only that [the] rice farming causes water intrusion onto plaintiff[s'] property and has done so since its inception; [Defendants'] [r]ice farming did constitute a nuisance at the time rice farming began but not [sic] damage occurred until later." Plaintiffs attached the declaration of a civil engineer, stating his opinion that water has intruded from defendants' property onto the DeMatos parcel since defendants first flooded their fields for rice farming, but that plaintiffs and their predecessors "may not have been aware of the severity of the water intrusion due to the fact that Mr. DeMatos, Mary DeMatos's husband, for several years farmed the subject property to rice and therefore the water intrusion would not have been noticeable."

In addition to asserting that defendants failed to satisfy the requisites of section 3482.5 because their rice farming was a nuisance when it started, plaintiffs argued the statute does not bar this action because (1) legislative history indicates the section was intended only to provide a "coming to the nuisance" defense to actions brought as a result of "urban crawl," and (2) plaintiffs' change from rice to row crops is not a "changed condition in or about the locality" within the meaning of the statute. Thus, plaintiffs argued, the seepage of water onto plaintiffs' property gives rise to tort liability under a variety of theories.

The trial court found that, regardless of how they are denominated, plaintiffs' claims for relief are "in fact based on a theory of nuisance" because they allege the violation of a single primary right, i.e., plaintiffs' right to the unimpaired ownership and undisturbed enjoyment of their premises. Concluding that section 3482.5 "clearly applies to this factual scenario," the court held the statute bars plaintiffs' action because the undisputed facts establish the following: defendants had been growing rice for more than three years prior to 1989; they did so for a commercial purpose and in a manner consistent with proper and accepted customs and standards in the locality; during the same time period, plaintiffs' predecessor had grown rice exclusively; and "plaintiffs changed their use of the land in 1989" by commencing to grow crops other than rice. Accordingly, the court granted defendants' respective motions for summary judgment on the ground they had met their burden of showing plaintiffs' complaint has no merit because there is a complete defense to the action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subds. (c) & (o)(2).)

DISCUSSION

I

We first address plaintiffs' contention that section 3482.5 does not preclude this action because the statute "was never intended to bar claims of water intrusion from one farmer against another farmer" but "was only intended to bar claims by non-agricultural uses 'coming to the nuisance'...." As the applicability of a statute to a given situation is a question of law, we are not bound by the trial court's determination. (Southern California Edison Co. v. State Board of Equalization (1972) 7 Cal.3d 652, 659, fn. 8, 102 Cal.Rptr. 766, 498 P.2d 1014.)

After reciting the history of urban expansion following World War II and asserting that, when suburban areas expanded into agricultural areas, residents "suddenly For reasons which follow, we shall deny plaintiffs' request for judicial notice and reject their interpretation of section 3482.5.

discovered the disadvantages of adjacent agricultural enterprises," plaintiffs claim the "imagined threat" of lawsuits against agricultural enterprises...