Spalding, In re

Decision Date13 February 1975
Docket NumberNo. 59,59
Citation273 Md. 690,332 A.2d 246
PartiesIn the Matter of Cindy Ann SPALDING.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Gerard Meola, Baltimore (Richard J. Habiger, St. Louis, Mo., on the brief), for appellant.

Bernard A. Raum, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Clarence W. Sharp and James I. Keane, Asst. Attys. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

LEVINE, Judge.

In the landmark decision of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), the Supreme Court held, for the first time, that various of the federal constitutional guarantees accompanying ordinary criminal proceedings are applicable, in certain instances, to state juvenile delinquency cases. Those safeguards, all embraced within fundamental procedural due process, are: Notice of charges; the right to counsel; confrontation and cross-examination; and the privilege against self-incrimination. Appellant seeks to extend that holding-with specific reference to self-incrimination-to another area of juvenile court jurisdiction in Maryland, known as 'Children in Need of Supervision' (CINS). 1

The Court of Special Appeals in Matter of Carter and Spalding, 20 Md.App. 633, 318 A.2d 269 (1974), upheld the decision of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County sitting as a Juvenile Court rejecting appellant's claim. We granted certiorari to consider whether statements made to the police by appellant-then 13 years of age-should have been suppressed; whether she was denied her constitutional right to refuse to testify; and whether she should have been permitted to cross-examine a police officer with regard to both voluntariness of the statements made to him and the warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966).

In the early morning hours of January 31, 1973, Officer Joseph W. Price, a member of the Baltimore County Police Department assigned to the Dundalk station, responded on instructions from his headquarters to a call from City Hospital to investigate a possible rape and overdose of narcotics. There, he was met by a Mr. Carter, who advised him that his daughter, age 11, had taken a white tablet which had impaired her speech, had caused a loss of equilibrium and had dilated her pupils. She had also admitted to her parents that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with an adult male on January 29 in an apartment immediately below that occupied by her family. She contrived this visit by climbing down from her bedroom window. When questioned by the police officer, the child acknowledged the episode of the 29th, and added that on the same occasion she had engaged in sexual acts with others who were present including two women. The Carters had brought their daughter to the hospital because they wanted her examined for possible sexual intercourse and treated for the drug.

Later that morning, at approximately 6:30 A.M., Officer Price again met with the Carter family at the Dundalk police station. Also there is response to a phone call from the officer were appellant and her mother. The minister of the church attended by both families was also present. Officer Price and one of his superiors then proceeded to interrogate both girls under somewhat disorganized conditions. Much of this appears to have resulted from interference by both the minister, who exercised considerable influence over the girls, and the parents. Ultimately, with permission of the latter, Officer Price obtained written statements from both girls. The officer later testified that the parents had '. . . insisted on the girls giving the information. They were at sometime, they were (sic) some yelling at the girls and the girls being upset, crying, they were trying to calm them down. They were trying to help and assist getting all the information they could.'

In her oral and written statements to the police that morning, as in her statements subsequently given to Juvenile Bureau detectives, appellant admitted her participation in the same events of the 29th as had been described by the Carter youngster. In doing so, she supplied the names of all those who had been in attendance on that occasion. She also recounted additional episodes of similar sexual activity in the basement of her home with male boarders residing there; and at a number of other 'parties' in the apartment below that occupied by the Carters. She was able to attend these early-morning functions amounting to nothing less than orgies at which adults and juveniles were in heavy attendance, by placing a sleeping pill in her mother's coffee. She was furnished the pills, and was driven to those bizarre parties by one Sheldon B. Coon, who apparently was the impresario of the 'sex ring.' He gave a pill to the girls on each occasion immediately before they departed from their residences, and again before they engaged in sexual intercourse. This seems to have had a narcotic-like influence on them.

After the police had struggled through their various interrogation procedures on the 31st, they took the girls to the Parkville police station, with the approval of the Department of Juvenile Services, where they were detained overnight. This step was taken because the statements furnished by the girls disclosed assaults upon them by Coon, who threatened to kill them if they ever revealed information to anyone concerning the parties. The official report filed by the police specified 'protective custody' as the reason for the detention. Once the police had completed the interviews, they immediately sought arrest warrants for the large number of adults identified by the girls. The men in this group were charged with 'statutory rape' and the women with 'unnatural and perverted sexual practices.' In both instances, the two girls were listed as victims.

On the following morning, February 1, 1973, both girls were brought before Juvenile Master Kahl pursuant to petitions of the Department of Juvenile Services, which charged each with being a 'delinquent child' and 'in need of supervision, 2 within the meaning and intent of Section 70-2 of Article 26 of the Annotated Code of Maryland.' 3 The Master found both girls to be in need of care and treatment, but, significantly, did not find them to be 'delinquent.' 4 His memorandum, dated February 1, 1973, is quoted here:

Art. 26 was repealed effective January 1, 1974, and juvenile causes are now covered by Maryland Code (1974) § 3-801 et seq., Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

'Police investigation indicates that these young girls have been victimized by a group of adults in the Dundalk area and elsewhere, for purposes of sexual abuse and drug experimentation. It is not known at this point just how much damage has already been done, physically situation is one of the most serious that situation is one of the most serious that I have encountered in my four years with the Juvenile Court.

'Both girls are in need of medical treatment immediately, and notwithstanding whatever wishes the parents of the girls may have at this time, I find them to be Children In Need Of Supervision and am committing them to the Department of Juvenile Services for placement, with the intention that they shall be immediately admitted to the University Hospital for medical evaluation and treatment.

'On February 7, 1973, they are to be transported to the Maryland Children's Center for evaluation and return to Court one month thereafter.' (emphasis added).

During the ensuing month, extensive psychiatric and family studies were conducted at the Maryland Children's Center.

On March 7, 1973, immediately upon their return from the Children's Center, the girls attended a hearing before Juvenile Master Peach. Armed with the thorough reports and comprehensive recommendation of the Children's Center, he adjudicated each girl to be 'a child in need of supervision' and 'in need of care and treatment.' He therefore 'committed both of them to the Department of Juvenile Services for placement and planning so that they can receive some therapy to help them cope with the problems which I am sure lie ahead for both of them.' Exceptions to the findings and recommendations of the Master were duly noted on behalf of each juvenile, accompanied by a request for a de novo hearing before the court.

Pursuant to the exceptions and requests, the cases came on for trial on May 3, 1973, before the Circuit Court for Baltimore County sitting as a Juvenile Court (Jenifer, J.), where extensive testimony and argument ensued in accordance with Maryland Rule 908. Shortly before the trial commenced, a written motion was filed on behalf of appellant aimed at suppressing the statements made by her to the police, to the Juvenile Service workers and to the staff of the Children's Center. At the outset of the trial, the court announced that it would reserve its ruling on that motion.

During the course of the trial, objections to the admissibility of those statements were renewed on the grounds that the fourfold Miranda warnings had not been given by any of the interrogating officers prior to or during any questioning. 5 Officer Price, however, had announced to all those assembled at the police station that 'anything they said could be used against them in a court of law if they were charged.' This colloquy also appears in the testimony:

'MR. MEOLA: Your Honor, I would like to question the officer about what warning he did give these children.

'THE COURT: I don't think he has to give any warning. They were not in custody for the commission of a crime or for a delinquency petition at this time. They were volunteered statements given with the consent at the insistence of the parents. The Miranda warning doesn't apply to these statements, gentlemen.' (emphasis added).

It is this refusal that laid the groundwork for one of the three questions framed by the Writ of...

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11 cases
  • Johnson v. Solomon
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • 17 Agosto 1979
    ...of the natural family environment." Matter of Carter and Spaulding, 20 Md.App. 633, 653, 318 A.2d 269, 281 (1974), aff'd, 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975). Pointing to other states whose Juvenile Acts have language similar to section 3-802, plaintiffs cite a series of cases where federal co......
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    ...`magic words' are not essential.... Courts and administrative agencies are expected to look at the substance"); Matter of Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 703, 332 A.2d 246, 253 (1975) ("[I]t is clear that labels are not controlling in determining the applicability of" a constitutional provision); Ko......
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2 books & journal articles
  • "decision Rules" and Kids: Clarifying the Vagueness Problems With Status Offense Statutes and School Disciplinary Rules
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    • University of Nebraska - Lincoln Nebraska Law Review No. 89, 2021
    • Invalid date
    ...cases for purposes of determining whether or not the Gault protections apply in status offense adjudications. See, e.g., In re Spaulding, 332 A.2d 246 (Md. 1975) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination requirement of Gault in delinquency adjudications is not required in child......
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    • Seattle University School of Law Seattle University Law Review No. 2-01, September 1978
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