Sparks v. Robertson, 9631.
| Decision Date | 28 May 1947 |
| Docket Number | No. 9631.,9631. |
| Parties | SPARKS v. ROBERTSON et al. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Bell County; Wesley Dice, Judge.
Action by Turner Sparks against Chester Robertson and others to partition residence property. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed in part and in part reversed and rendered.
W. C. Haley, of Waco, for appellant.
Cox, Brown & Daniel and John B. Daniel, Jr., all of Temple, for appellees.
This suit was brought by Turner (Turner Sparks) against Chester (Chester Robertson) to partition residence property, in which each owned a one-half undivided interest. The property was not susceptible of partition in kind, and was therefore sold by a receiver and the proceeds ordered divided between Turner and Chester. The only questions the appeal presents are:
1. Whether Turner's interest is chargeable with $300, being one-half the amount by which the value of the property was enhanced as of the date of the partition judgment, by reason of permanent improvements made thereon during the marriage of Chester and his deceased wife, Elizabeth, and paid for from their community funds, at which time Elizabeth had a homestead estate in the entire property and a one-half interest therein in fee.
2. Whether Turner's portion is entitled to a credit of $76.50, being one-half the amount collected by Chester for rentals of the property subsequently to the death of Elizabeth.
The salient facts, which are undisputed, are these:
The property was the community homestead of Isaac and Elizabeth Sparks, husband and wife. They had no children. Isaac died February 1, 1931, and his half interest, burdened with a small purchase money obligation (not here involved) and with a homestead estate in favor of Elizabeth, was inherited by Turner, Isaac's son by a former marriage. Elizabeth continued to occupy the property as her homestead until her death February 6, 1946. Meantime (July 31, 1931) she married Chester, during which marriage the permanent improvements here involved were made from their community funds. Upon Elizabeth's death her half interest passed to her heirs at law (including a 1/3 life estate to Chester), burdened with a homestead estate therein in Chester, who, after her death, purchased the interests of Elizabeth's other heirs and collected rentals from the property in the amount of $153. The permanent improvements in issue were found to have been voluntarily made and to have enhanced the value of the property in the sum of $600, as of the date of the partition judgment. In the distribution of the proceeds of the sale Turner was denied any allowance on account of rentals collected by Chester after the death of Elizabeth, and his share of the proceeds was charged with $300, one-half the enhancement in value by reason of the stated permanent improvements.
The first question involves the proper application of certain elementary principles, which it will only be necessary to state in general terms. They are:
In this State, homestead interest of each spouse or the surviving spouse in the homestead property constitutes an estate therein, and is treated as a life estate, so long as the property retains its homestead character. This is true, whether the fee title to the homestead property belongs to the separate estate of either or both spouses, or to their community estate.
An essential element of cotenancy is the present right of possession. Consequently the relationship of cotenancy does not exist among remaindermen, nor between them and the life tenant. And this is true where the life tenant owns additionally an undivided interest in the fee.
A cotenant can not impose any burden upon the estate of his cotenants by voluntarily placing upon the common property improvements of a permanent character. However, in a partition in kind, such cotentant may have set aside to him the portion of the common property upon which such improvements have been placed, if this can be done without detriment to the rights of his cotenants. Likewise, where partition in kind can not be made, such cotenant may be awarded appropriate compensation for such improvements out of the proceeds of the sale of the property.
A life tenant, who owns no greater estate in the property, can not impose any burden upon the estate of remaindermen by voluntarily making permanent improvements on the property.
It may be noted that although as stated the relationship of cotenancy does not exist among the remaindermen, it is held in some jurisdictions under certain circumstances, that principles applied to cotenancy are applied to coremaindermen, in fact they are sometimes designated cotenants in remainder. The following is from 33 Am.Jur., p. 643, § 176: "Remaindermen in their relations with each other concerning their respective interests in the property given to them together are governed by the principles of law governing the respective rights, duties and liabilities of cotenants generally." We do not find that the citations support this unqualified statement of the text. In 98 A.L.R. 859 (1935) is an extensive annotation entitled "Contribution or allowance as between cotenants in remainder as affected by fact that one or more of them owns, or did own, the life estate or an interest therein." (Emphasis added.) Upon the specific question of allowance for permanent improvements it will be observed that the annotated cases are in conflict.
It would serve no useful purpose here to discuss these decisions, or the bases upon which their respective conclusions were rested for the reason that we regard the first question foreclosed against the right of Chester to charge Turner's interest with the $300 (1/2 enhancement by reason of permanent improvement) by the decision in Sargeant v. Sargeant, 118 Tex. 343, 15 S.W.2d 589, 592. In so far as the instant question is concerned the factual situations in the two cases are identical. In the Sargeant case the property was the community business homestead of the surviving husband and his deceased wife, and the partition was made by sale and division of the proceeds. It was sought to charge the proceeds with the cost of permanent improvements made by the survivor, and paid for with his individual funds. The holding upon this issue was In neither of the cases cited in this quotation (except as noted below) did the life tenant own other than a life estate. In the Clift case the property was...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Williams v. Williams
...been held to be one in the nature of a legal life estate or life estate created by operation of law. See Sparks v. Robertson, 203 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.Civ.App. Austin 1947, writ ref'd); White v. Blackman, 168 S.W.2d 531 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1942, writ ref'd w. o. m.); Petrus v. Cage Bros., 12......
-
U.S. v. Rogers
...475 (1888); W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Blackwell, 48 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1932, writ dism'd); Sparks v. Robertson, 203 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tex.Civ.App. Austin 1947, writ ref'd); Crews v. General Crude Oil Co., 287 S.W.2d 243 (Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont 1955, no writ); Norman v. First Bank &......
-
Laster v. First Huntsville Properties Co.
...character. Fiew v. Qualtrough, 624 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sparks v. Robertson, 203 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1947, writ ref'd). Although the homestead estate is not identical to a life estate because one's homestead rights can be lost......
-
Sanchez v. Telles
...129, citing Fiew v. Qualtrough, 624 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sparks v. Robertson, 203 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1947, writ ref'd). Although the homestead estate is not identical to a life estate because one's homestead rights can be los......