Speaker v. Lawler
| Decision Date | 04 February 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 7211,7211 |
| Citation | 463 S.W.2d 741 |
| Parties | Phillip SPEAKER, et al., Appellants, v. Mamye LAWLER, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
R. E. Renfer, Jr., Dumas, R. A. Neathery, Dallas, for appellants.
Louis Dubuque, Dumas, for appellees.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted plaintiffs in an action for a declaratory judgment, brought under the authority of Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. Article 2524--1 to interpret a judgment which had been entered by the same trial court in which this suit was filed. The plaintiffs in the suit now pending before us were defendants in the original suit, and the defendants were plaintiffs. For convenience, the first suit will be designated as the 'original suit' and this suit will be designated as the 'present suit.'
Martha Ann Speaker was either the mother or grandmother to all of the parties to this suit. Before her death, she executed a deed to the defendants in the original suit conveying the property in controversy.
The original suit was brought to set aside that deed on the grounds of lack of mental capacity or duress. Defendants in the original suit answered and filed a cross-action in trespass to try title and specially pleaded the three and five year statutes of limitation. Plaintiffs in the original suit filed a formal pleading of 'not guilty.' Trial of the original suit was by jury and, after both sides had rested, plaintiffs in the original suit filed a motion and request for the trial court to sever defendants' cross-action in trespass to try title and enter a take-nothing judgment against defendants because they had introduced no proof in support of their pleading, which motion was granted.
The case was then submitted to the jury, which found that the execution of the deed had been secured through duress. The trial court then entered judgment upon the verdict cancelling the deed and quieting the title of the plaintiffs in the land described, without stating the amount of interest the plaintiffs had. This judgment was affirmed upon appeal, Lawler v. Speaker, 446 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.Civ .App.,--Amarillo, 1969, error ref. n.r.e.).
Plaintiffs alleged in this suit that the defendants were claiming all of the ownership of the property in question by reason of the judgment or judgments entered in the original suit, and that the court should declare the effect of such judgment to be that the plaintiffs and defendants each owned an undivided one-half interest in the property. Both plaintiffs and defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The judgment entered in this present suit merely states in substance that on the 8th day of May, 1970, came on to be heard this controversy as to the interpretation of the judgment in the original suit, and the court found the plaintiffs to be owners of an undivided one-half interest in the property, and the defendants the owners of an undivided one-half interest. There is no recitation in that judgment that a motion for summary judgment was granted, or that evidence was heard. There is no statement of facts in this record.
Appellants (plaintiffs in the original suit and defendants in the present suit) have four points of error. First, that the judgment in the original suit was res judicata as to the present suit. Second, the trial court in the present suit incorrectly interpreted the judgment that defendants take nothing in the original suit. Third, the present suit is a collateral attack upon the original judgment. Fourth, the trial court erred in rendering this present judgment without a trial on the merits.
Article 2524--1 does not expressly provide for construction of a judgment, and we decline to extend its provisions by implication. Section 2 of this Act mentions specifically 'a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract' and also 'Statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise.' We have not been cited, nor have we found, a single case in Texas brought under this Act for the purpose of interpreting a judgment.
We are aware that this Act has been used in other states for this purpose. The division of authority as to this matter is discussed in 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 43, at pages 126--127 and in 154 A.L.R. 745 and 749.
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State ex rel. Edmisten v. Tucker
...47 (Mo.App.1981); Crofts v. Crofts, 21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701 (1968); Mills v. Mills, 512 P.2d 143 (Okla.1973); Speaker v. Lawler, 463 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.Civ.App.1971); Glassford v. Glassford, 76 Ariz. 220, 262 P.2d 382 (1953). The reasons for this long-standing rule are two-fold. First, if......
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Courter v. City of Portland
...of a prior judgment or order is normally an appropriate subject for a declaratory judgment action."), with Speaker v. Lawler , 463 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (noting the divide in authority, but "declin[ing] to extend" the provisions of the act to allow for the construction of a ......
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