Specialty Rest.S Corp. v. Nelson

• Citation: 231 P.3d 393
• Decision Date: 10 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09SC536.,09SC536.
• Parties: SPECIALTY RESTAURANTS CORP. and Colorado Insurance Guaranty Association c/o Western Guaranty Fund Services, Petitioners,v.Stephanie NELSON and Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Respondents.
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

231 P.3d 393

SPECIALTY RESTAURANTS CORP. and Colorado Insurance Guaranty Association c/o Western Guaranty Fund Services, Petitioners,v.Stephanie NELSON and Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Respondents.

No. 09SC536.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

May 10, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP, Kristin A. Caruso, Nancy A. Fitzgerald, Greenwood Village, CO, Attorneys for Petitioners.

The Law Office of Stephanie J. Stevenson, P.C., Stephanie J. Stevenson, Colorado Springs, CO, Attorney for Respondents.

Workers' Compensation Education Association, Susan D. Phillips, Denver, CO, Attorney for Amici Curiae Workers' Compensation Education Association.

Justice HOBBS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this workers' compensation case to determine whether an employee who was injured in 1990, awarded permanent and total disability (“PTD”) benefits in 2002, and received a lump sum payment in 2007 is entitled to an additional lump sum payment under a 2007 amendment to section 8-43-406, C.R.S. (2009), of the Colorado Workers' Compensation Act, which increased the maximum aggregate lump sum an employee may receive.¹ We find she is.

We hold that the lump sum provision of the Colorado Workers' Compensation Act is procedural in nature. An employee's election of a lump sum payment functions as an advance of an award of PTD benefits to which the employee already is entitled. Consequently, a lump sum payment does not create, eliminate, or modify the parties' existing rights or liabilities, which are determined as of the date of injury but vest only upon entry of an award of benefits. Instead, an employee's election of a lump sum payment simply alters the method of distribution of an existing award. Because the 2007 amendment is procedural in nature, it applies prospectively to requests for lump sum payments filed subsequent to the amendment's date of enactment, irrespective of the date of the employee's injury.

Because the court of appeals' opinion in Eight Thousand West Corp. v. Stewart, 37 Colo.App. 372, 546 P.2d 1281 (1976), does not constitute a prior judicial interpretation of particular language that has remained unchanged throughout subsequent amendments, we find it inapposite and overrule it to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

I.

On June 1, 1990, Stephanie Nelson suffered an admitted work-related injury while employed by Specialty Restaurants Corp. On December 5, 2006, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) determined that Nelson's injury left her permanently and totally disabled as of October 21, 2002, and ordered Specialty Restaurants Corp. and Colorado Insurance Guaranty Association (“CIGA”), on behalf of Western Guaranty Fund Services,² to pay Nelson PTD benefits. This opinion refers to petitioners Specialty Restaurants Corp. and CIGA c/o Western Guaranty Fund Services collectively as “CIGA.”

Pursuant to section 8-43-406 of the Colorado Workers' Compensation Act, Nelson requested and received a lump sum payment of $26,292 in February 2007. This amount was the statutory maximum aggregate lump sum available at the time of Nelson's injury. Ch. 62, sec. 1, § 8-43-406(2), 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 515.

In May 2007, the General Assembly amended section 8-43-406 to, inter alia, increase the maximum aggregate lump sum to $60,000. Ch. 341, sec. 9, § 8-43-406, 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws 1474-75. The General Assembly did not include an effective date in the 2007 amendment. The Colorado Division of Workers' Compensation (“the Division”) issued a non-binding advisory interpreting the 2007 amendment as “[a]pplicable to all claims without regard to date of injury” and “[e]ffective upon signature of the Governor,” which occurred on May 30, 2007.

On October 28, 2007, Nelson applied for an additional lump sum payment of $33,708, the difference between the newly-enacted $60,000 maximum aggregate lump sum and the $26,292 lump sum payment she received in February 2007. CIGA objected to Nelson's request for the additional lump sum payment, arguing that the court of appeals' decision in Eight Thousand West entitles an employee only to the maximum aggregate lump sum available at the time of injury.

In a December 19, 2007 order, the Director of the Division rejected CIGA's argument and directed it to pay the additional lump sum. The Director reasoned that the 2007 amendment affects only the procedural method of disbursing previously awarded benefits. Therefore, the Director found that the 2007 amendment applies to requests for lump sum payments filed after its enactment, irrespective of the date of injury. CIGA petitioned the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (“the ICAO”) for review of the Director's order.

The ICAO issued an order on May 2, 2008, reversing the Director's order. The ICAO did not engage in an interpretation of the 2007 amendment. Instead, it simply concluded that the court of appeals' decision in Eight Thousand West controls and that the Director's determination was contrary to the holding in that case. Nelson appealed.

The court of appeals reversed the ICAO's order. It determined that the 2007 amendment is procedural in nature and operates prospectively on requests for lump sum payments filed after its date of enactment. The court of appeals specifically declined to follow Eight Thousand West, reasoning that the opinion “provided little analysis and premised its conclusion on consideration of the effect retroactive application of the statute would have on insurers [, which is] a policy consideration within the province of the General Assembly and not this court.” Nelson v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 219 P.3d 416, 420 (Colo.App.2009). We granted CIGA's petition for certiorari to determine whether Nelson is entitled to the additional lump sum payment under the 2007 amendment. We find she is.

II.

We hold that the lump sum provision of the Colorado Workers' Compensation Act is procedural in nature. An employee's election of a lump sum payment functions as an advance of an award of PTD benefits to which the employee already is entitled. Consequently, a lump sum payment does not create, eliminate, or modify the parties' existing rights or liabilities, which are determined as of the date of injury but vest only upon entry of an award of benefits. Instead, an employee's election of a lump sum payment simply alters the method of distribution of an existing award. Because the 2007 amendment is procedural in nature, it applies prospectively to requests for lump sum payments filed subsequent to the amendment's date of enactment, irrespective of the date of the employee's injury.

A. Standard of Review & Statutory Construction

Statutory construction is a question of law we review de novo. Williams v. Kunau, 147 P.3d 33, 36 (Colo.2006). Our primary objective in construing a statute is to effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. Davison v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 84 P.3d 1023, 1029 (Colo.2004). If the statutory language is clear, we interpret the statute according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. If the statute is reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations, we may look to other aids in construction. Williams, 147 P.3d at 36. In addition, we will not construe a statute in a manner that assumes the General Assembly made an omission; rather, the General Assembly's failure to include particular language is a statement of legislative intent. Romer v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 956 P.2d 566, 576 (Colo.1998).

We also review an administrative agency's conclusions of law de novo. Dep't of Labor & Employment v. Esser, 30 P.3d 189, 193 (Colo.2001). We give considerable weight to an agency's reasonable interpretation of its own enabling statute, but we are not bound by its legal interpretations. Anderson v. Longmont Toyota, Inc., 102 P.3d 323, 326 (Colo.2004). Further, we traditionally give deference to the interpretation of a statute adopted by the officer or agency charged with its administration. Indus. Claim Appeals Office v. Orth, 965 P.2d 1246, 1254 (Colo.1998). The Division is the agency charged with administration of the Colorado Workers' Compensation Act, § 8-1-103, C.R.S. (2009), including the calculation of lump sum payments, § 8-43-406(1).

The General Assembly explicitly stated its intent that the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to provide an effective remedy for employees injured at work:

It is the intent of the general assembly that the “Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado” be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to employers, without the necessity of any litigation, recognizing that the workers' compensation system in Colorado is based on a mutual renunciation of common law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike.

§ 8-40-102(1), C.R.S. (2009). To effectuate its remedial and beneficent purposes, we must liberally construe the Act in favor of the injured employee. Williams, 147 P.3d at 36, 39; Davison, 84 P.3d at 1029; Univ. of Denver v. Indus. Comm'n of Colo., 138 Colo. 505, 509, 335 P.2d 292, 294 (1959).

B. Lump Sum Payment of PTD Benefits

Under the Act, an employee is permanently and totally disabled when she is “unable to earn any wages in the same or other employment.” § 8-40-201(16.5)(a), C.R.S. (2009). The Division awards a permanently and totally disabled employee a fixed percentage of her average weekly wage, to continue until her death, irrespective of the employee's life expectancy. § 8-42-111(1), C.R.S. (2009). Accordingly, PTD benefits provide wage loss protection for the life of an injured employee who is unable to return to the work force. Culver v. Ace Elec., 971 P.2d 641, 652 (Colo.1999). While the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties to a workers' compensation case are determined as of the date of the employee's...