Spencer v. Myers

• Decision Date: 13 October 1896
• Citation: 44 N.E. 942,150 N.Y. 269
• Parties: SPENCER v. MYERS.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

150 N.Y. 269

44 N.E. 942

SPENCER

v.MYERS.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 13, 1896.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, Fourth department.

Action by Clara H. Spencer to recover the proceeds of a policy of insurance upon the life of her husband, which had been assigned to Peter B. Myers. There was a judgment for plaintiff, which was reversed by the general term (26 N. Y. Supp. 371), and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

S. M. Lindsley, for appellant.

William Kernan, for respondent.

O'BRIEN, J.

The plaintiff claimed to be entitled to the proceeds of a policy of insurance upon the life of her husband, and the learned trial judge sustained her claim. The general term reversed the judgment, having arrived at a different conclusion, upon what seems to us to be a very reasonable construction of a statute which is involved. On the 28th of October, 1880, the plaintiff's husband insured his life for her benefit in the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company. The policy was issued at Hartford, and sent by mail to one of the agents of the company in this state, to be delivered to the husband, who had made the written application upon which it was issued. The insured died in January, 1890, with the policy in force. The plaintiff claimed the money payable under the policy, amounting to $2,000, as widow of the insured, and the payee named therein. The defendant also claimed it under a written assignment from the plaintiff, to which her husband, the deceased, had consented in writing executed in due form. Both parties claiming the money, the company refused to pay either, and the plaintiff brought the action against it alone. Subsequently it paid the money into court, and the assignee was made a party. The controversy is, therefore, between the widow and her assignee, and turns upon the validity of the assignment. It is quite true, as urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, that prior to the statutes (Laws 1873, c. 821; Laws 1879, c. 248) a married woman was incapable of assigning a policy of insurance for her benefit upon the life of her husband. Miller v. Campbell, 140 N. Y. 457, 35 N. E. 651;Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N. Y. 574, 29 N. E. 826;Brick v. Campbell, 122 N. Y. 343, 25 N. E. 493;Eadie v. Slimmon, 26 N. Y. 9. But the obvious purpose of these statutes was to remove this disability, and it is not contended that the incapacity still exists in general, but only in particular cases. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has devoted a considerable part of his argument to establish the proposition that the policy was issued and delivered in the state of Connecticut, and not in this state, and therefore is a Connecticut contract. For the purposes of this case we will assume that he is correct in this contention. But we think that is not a material circumstance in the determination of the rights of the parties in a controversy between them with respect to the right to receive the money. Such a policy is assignable by the wife under the laws of Connecticut. Insurance Co. v. Palmer, 42 Conn. 66;Insurance Co. v. Westervelt, 52 Conn. 586;Barry v. Society, 59 N. Y. 587. The law of the place where the contract is made is sometimes important when questions concerning its validity or construction are involved. But in this case no such questions arise. The sole question is whether it was transferable, and whether the defendant, by the assignment, has acquired the right and title to the proceeds. Nor is there any question made with respect to the sufficiency of the instrument of assignment, in form and substance, to pass the beneficial interest, if, by the laws of this state, the policy could be transferred under any circumstances. In whatever state or jurisdiction the obligation had its legal origin, it was held within this state as property, and was subject, in all respects, to the laws of this state. The plaintiff's contention must rest entirely upon the proposition that by the laws of this state she was incapable of making a valid assignment, and this we understand to be the ground upon which she relies to sustain this appeal. The act of 1879 (chapter 248) is entitled ‘An act for the relief of policy holders in life insurance companies,’ and the first section reads as follows: ‘All policies of insurance heretofore or hereafter issued within the state of New York upon the lives of husbands for the benefit and use of their wives, in pursuance of the laws of the state, shall be, from and after the passage of this act, assignable by said wife with the written consent of her husband; or, in case of her death, by her legal representatives, with the written consent of her husband, to any person whomsoever, or be surrendered to the company issuing such policy, with the written consent of the husband.’ That this statute has removed the disabilities of married women to assign insurance policies upon the lives of their husbands, at least to some extent, is not, and of course cannot be, denied. But the learned counsel for the plaintiff insists that it applies only to policies ‘issued within the state of New York’; that is to say, that it extends no further than to enable them to assign policies issued by our domestic companies; and...