Associated Governments of Northwest Colorado v. Colorado Pub. Utilities Comm'n
| Decision Date | 14 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 11SA224,11SA225.,s. 11SA224 |
| Citation | 2012 CO 28,275 P.3d 646 |
| Parties | In re ASSOCIATED GOVERNMENTS OF NORTHWEST COLORADO, Petitioner v. COLORADO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION; Joshua Epel, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission; and James K. Tarpey and Matt Baker, in their official capacity as members of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission, Respondents. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, David A. Beckett, First Assistant Attorney General, Erin A. Overturf, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondents.
Paul M. Seby, Moye White LLP, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.
¶ 1 Respondent Colorado Public Utilities Commission challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court of Routt County to consider changing the venue in regard to a petition for judicial review, arguing that the petitioner failed to meet the requirements of section 40–6–115(1) and (5), C.R.S. (2011). Holding that section 40–6–115(5) pertained to venue, not jurisdiction, the Routt County District Court allowed a transfer of the case to the District Court for the City and County of Denver. We issued a rule to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. We agree with the district court, and hold that section 40–6–115(5) mandates venue and does not limit jurisdiction. Accordingly, we discharge the rule. On remand, the Routt County District Court may transfer this case to the Denver District Court.
¶ 2 The Associated Governments of Northwest Colorado (AGNC) timely petitioned the Routt County District Court, in two cases, for a writ of certiorari or judicial review pursuant to section 40–6–115, C.R.S. (2011). AGNC wished to challenge orders of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC). The orders adopted in part an emission reduction plan of the Public Service Company of Colorado. AGNC alleged that the plan (1) was untimely filed in violation of the Clean Air Clean Jobs Act, §§ 40–3.2–201 to –210, 40–6–123(1), C.R.S. (2011), and AGNC's due process rights; (2) relied unlawfully on a determination of the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment; (3) was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by evidence; (4) failed to adequately consider economic and environmental effects; and (5) depended on unreliable cost calculations. AGNC also alleged that two commissioners should have been disqualified from participating in the PUC decisions.
¶ 3 PUC and intervenors moved to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Section 40–6–115 requires that any suit brought to challenge a PUC order be “commenced and tried” in district court, either in the county the petitioner maintains its principal office or place of business or in Denver District Court. The district court found, and AGNC does not dispute, that its principal office or place of business is not in Routt County but in Garfield County.
¶ 4 Nevertheless, the district court did not dismiss the case. It concluded that the language in section 40–6–115(5) requiring a case to be “commenced and tried” in one of two district courts was a venue provision, not a jurisdictional limitation. As such, the court ordered AGNC to select one of the two fora, and indicated that it would order a transfer. As the court put it,
Routt County is not Petitioner's primary place of business; Garfield County is. Routt County District Court, therefore, has no authority to review the decision of the Public Utility Commission at issue. Routt County District Court does, however, have general jurisdiction over the class of cases before the court and may change venue to the proper forum. Petitioner will inform the court no later than August 12, 2011 as to whether it elects to have the venue changed to Garfield County District Court or to the District Court for the City and County of Denver.
AGNC selected the Denver District Court.
¶ 5 PUC initiated an original proceeding with this court pursuant to C.A.R. 21, arguing that the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it was not “commenced” in a proper forum. We issued a rule to show cause, and we now discharge the rule.
¶ 6 We hold that section 40–6–115(5) mandates venue and does not limit jurisdiction. On remand, the Routt County District Court may transfer this case to the Denver District Court.
¶ 7 In response to a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) challenge, the plaintiff has the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction. Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 452 (Colo.2001). The constitution grants district courts general subject matter jurisdiction. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9. The legislature may limit this jurisdiction, but only explicitly. State v. Borquez, 751 P.2d 639, 642 (Colo.1988).
¶ 8 Where a statute provides a right of review of an administrative decision, the statute is the exclusive means to secure review. Id. at 644. A petitioner's failure to comply strictly with the statutory procedure deprives the district court of jurisdiction. Id. (quoting Barber v. People, 127 Colo. 90, 95, 254 P.2d 431, 434 (1953)). If, however, the petitioner meets the jurisdictional requirements for review of an agency decision, the petitioner may cure nonsubstantive deficiencies in its complaint. Trans Shuttle, Inc. v. PUC, 58 P.3d 47, 50 (Colo.2002).
¶ 9 Venue requirements limit where an action may be “commenced,” “brought,” or “tried.” See Spencer v. Sytsma, 67 P.3d 1, 3 (Colo.2003); Borquez, 751 P.2d at 641. A specific statutory provision on venue prevails over a conflicting provision in C.R.C.P. 98, the catch-all venue provision. See U.M. v. Dist. Court, 631 P.2d 165, 168 (Colo.1981). Venue requirements are imposed for the convenience of the parties, and are a procedural, not a substantive issue. Spencer, 67 P.3d at 3. When a party brings an action in an improper venue, it is not a jurisdictional or fatal defect. Cf. Fletcher v. Stowell, 17 Colo. 94, 96, 28 P. 326 (1891). The remedy for improper venue is a transfer to the proper venue. See Spencer, 67 P.3d at 7; People v. Dist. Court, 78 Colo. 526, 530, 242 P. 997 (1925).
¶ 10 However, not all place-based forum requirements are venue provisions; some are jurisdictional in nature. When a party violates a jurisdictional requirement in petitioning a district court to review an administrative decision, the court has no power to hear the case, or even to order a transfer. Instead, the court must dismiss the case. See Borquez, 751 P.2d at 643–45.
¶ 11 Therefore, the pivotal question in this case is whether section 40–6–115(5) contains a jurisdictional or a venue requirement. As with all matters of statutory interpretation, we proceed de novo with the goal of effectuating the intent of the General Assembly. S. Ute Indian Tribe v. King Consol. Ditch Co., 250 P.3d 1226, 1232–33 (Colo.2011). We apply the plain meaning of the statutory language, give consistent effect to all parts of a statute, and construe each provision in harmony with the overall statutory design. Id. If the statutory language is ambiguous, we use other tools of statutory interpretation to determine the General Assembly's intent, including legislative history, the language of laws on the same or similar subjects, and the placement of a provision within the statutory framework. Id. at 1233; Hernandez v. People, 176 P.3d 746, 753 (Colo.2008) (legislative history); id. at 752–53 (); Town of Erie v. Eason, 18 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Colo.2001) (); People v. Hickman, 988 P.2d 628, 645 (Colo.1999) (); see § 2–4–203, C.R.S. (2011).
¶ 12 The two subsections of section 40–6–115 relevant to this case are (1) and (5). They provide:
(1) Within thirty days after a final decision by the commission in any proceeding, any party to the proceeding before the commission may apply to the district court for a writ of certiorari or review for the purpose of having the lawfulness of the final decision inquired into and determined....
(5) All actions for review shall be commenced and tried in the district court in and for the county in which the petitioner resides, or if a corporation or partnership in the county in which it maintains its principal office or place of business, or in the district court of the city and county of Denver, at the option of the petitioner....
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 13 Subsection (1) is clearly jurisdictional. It provides a strict process and notes the court of jurisdiction. We must determine whether subsection (5), in specifying the counties where an action may be commenced and tried, supplements the jurisdictional requirements of subsection (1) or acts as a freestanding venue requirement.
¶ 14 An initial question is the meaning of “the district court” in subsection (1). This is an unusual formulation. “In district court” is a typical colloquialism, as the district court below pointed out. But “the district court” is also susceptible to a second meaning, “the district court which as defined in subsection (5) may hear the action.” As the two possible meanings raise an ambiguity, we look to legislative history to determine legislative intent. The forerunner of the current statute, an act of 1913, originally provided that, to challenge a PUC decision, “the applicant may apply to the supreme court of this State for a writ of review.” Ch. 127, sec. 52, 1913 Colo. Sess. Laws 497 (emphasis added). An amendment of 1945 simply replaced “the supreme court” with “the district court.” Ch. 195, sec. 8, 1945 Colo. Sess. Laws 531. This indicates that “the district court” in the current statute is so phrased as to contrast with other types of courts. It does not suggest a cross-reference to the...
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