Spencer v. Towson Moving and Storage, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 May 1996
• Citation: 922 S.W.2d 508
• Parties: Valencia SPENCER, as Natural Parent and Legal Guardian of Natasha Spencer, A Minor, and Teresa Plummer, as Natural Parent and Legal Guardian of Cornay Cordale Plummer, A Minor, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. TOWSON MOVING AND STORAGE, INC., Defendant/Appellant.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 508

922 S.W.2d 508

Valencia SPENCER, as Natural Parent and Legal Guardian of Natasha Spencer, A Minor, and Teresa Plummer, as Natural Parent and Legal Guardian of Cornay Cordale Plummer, A Minor, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. TOWSON MOVING AND STORAGE, INC., Defendant/Appellant.

Supreme Court of Tennessee at Knoxville.

May 13, 1996.

O. Michael Carter, Terry L. McGhehey, Chattanooga, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Charles W. Dooley, Sean Antone Hunt, Chattanooga, for Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION

BIRCH, Justice.

In this workers' compensation appeal, we consider the trial court's interpretation of the death benefit provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act ¹ in calculating benefits and determine whether the trial court erred in ordering a partial commutation of attorneys' fees. The standard of review by this Court in workers' compensation cases is de novo upon the record, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the factual findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e) (Supp.1995); Fink v. Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952, 958 (Tenn.1993). This case, however, involves questions of law. Thus, we are not bound by the preponderance of the evidence standard, and we review questions of law de novo without limitation. Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Tenn.1996); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn.1993).

The stipulated facts, in pertinent part, are:

1. Darryl Davis was acting within the course and scope of his employment when he was killed on February 12, 1993, and his death is compensable under Tennessee workers' compensation law.

2. The deceased had two wholly dependent minor children: Natasha Spencer and Cornay Plummer.

3. Darryl Davis' workers' compensation weekly rate is $115.77.

Based upon these facts, the trial court awarded $127,296 to the plaintiffs. The trial court awarded attorneys' fees of $25,459.20 (twenty percent of the judgment). However, after crediting the defendant for payments already made to the plaintiffs' attorneys, the court commuted seventy-five percent of the outstanding balance of attorneys' fees to a lump sum and ordered that the remaining twenty-five percent be paid directly to the attorneys out of the dependents' every-other-week benefit payment.

The first issue concerns the application of Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 50-6-209(b) and -210(e). These two statutes provide for compensation arising out of the death of a covered employee, and they are to be construed together. Haynes v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 178 Tenn. 648, 162 S.W.2d 383 (1942). Under the two statutes, in cases in which the deceased employee leaves two or more dependent "orphans," ² compensation shall be paid in the amount of sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the "average weekly wages" of the deceased, not to exceed the "maximum total benefit." Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 50-6-209(b)(3) and -210(e)(5).

"Maximum total benefit" is defined in Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-102(a)(6) to mean "the sum of all weekly benefits to which a worker may be entitled." For injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1992, it is four hundred (400) weeks times the maximum weekly benefit. Thus, under this definition, the "maximum total benefit" is determined by multiplying the "maximum weekly benefit" by four hundred.

"Maximum weekly benefit" is defined in § 50-6-102(a)(7)(A) as "the maximum compensation payable to the worker per week." For injuries occurring on or after August 1, 1992, through June 30, 1993, the maximum weekly benefits are sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the employee's average weekly wage up to seventy-eight percent of the state's average weekly wage as determined by the department of employment security.

The trial court found that in the context of the other definitions, the definition of "maximum weekly benefit" is ambiguous; it then construed the statute to require that the amount of death benefits be calculated based upon seventy-eight percent of the state's average weekly wage and not upon the employee's actual average weekly wages. Accordingly, the trial court calculated the maximum total benefit by multiplying $318.24 ³ by four hundred weeks, for a total of $127,296.

The starting point for statutory construction was stated in Kendrick v. Kendrick, 902 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tenn.App.1994):

Our search for legislative purpose begins with the language of the statute itself. Neff v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 704 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn.1986). If the General Assembly has spoken directly to the issue, and if the statute is clear, our examination need proceed no further because the courts must give effect to unambiguous statutes. Roddy Mfg. Co. v. Olsen, 661 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tenn.1983); Anderson v. Outland, 210 Tenn. 526, 532, 360 S.W.2d 44, 47 (1962).

In the case under review, §§ 50-6-209(b) and -210(e) provide that the compensation to be paid to the deceased employee's dependents shall be in the amount of sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the deceased's average weekly wages, subject to the "maximum total benefit." Under Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-102(a)(6), the "maximum total benefit" is four hundred weeks times the "maximum weekly benefit." The "maximum weekly benefit" is, for the purposes of this case, "sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of the employee's average weekly wage up to seventy-eight percent (78%) of the state's average weekly wage as determined by the department of employment security." Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-102(a)(7)(A)(iii). We find that this definition is clear and unambiguous: the maximum weekly benefit is to be determined based upon the employee's average weekly wage; not until sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the employee's average weekly wages equals or exceeds seventy-eight percent of the state's average weekly wage does the court use the figure "seventy-eight percent (78%) of the state's average weekly wage" to determine the amount of the compensation payable to the dependents. Under §§ 50-6-209(b) and -210(e), as well as the statutory definitions quoted above, we conclude that the deceased employee's dependents are entitled to maximum total benefits in the amount of $46,312, ⁴ not the $127,296 awarded by the trial court.

In reaching this conclusion, we recognize, as the trial court did, that the amount of the benefits payable to these two dependents is substantially less than the benefits which would have been paid had their father died on or before July 31, 1992. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-102(7)(A)(ii) provides that for the period July 1, 1991, through August 1, 1992, "the maximum weekly benefit shall be two hundred ninety-four dollars ($294) per week." Therefore, the maximum total benefit for dependents of an employee who had died during this period would have been four hundred weeks times $294, for a total of $117,600. Even though one might question the disparity between the benefits that are due to the plaintiffs in this case and those benefits that would have been payable to dependents whose mother or fa...