Spine Specialists of Mich., PC v. Member Select Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 17 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 358296 |
| Parties | SPINE SPECIALISTS OF MICHIGAN, PC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MEMBER SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION February 2, 2023
Macomb Circuit Court LC No. 2020-003355-NF
Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and BOONSTRA and GADOLA, JJ.
Plaintiff Spine Specialists of Michigan, PC, appeals as of right the trial court's order granting in part and denying in part defendant, MemberSelect Insurance Company, summary disposition of plaintiff's complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10). We affirm.
This case is a provider suit brought under Michigan's no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. The facts of this case essentially are undisputed. On January 21, 2017, Jeremy Woods was injured in an automobile accident. Woods was the insured of defendant under a policy of no-fault insurance at the time of the accident. Plaintiff provided medical care to Woods, and Woods assigned to plaintiff his right to payment from defendant. Pursuant to the assignments, plaintiff sought payment from defendant for the medical care it provided to Woods. Defendant refused to pay plaintiff, and plaintiff initiated this action on September 21, 2020, seeking payment under the assignments.
Defendant moved for summary disposition of plaintiff's complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10) on the basis that all or most of the amounts sought by plaintiff were barred by the one-year back rule, MCL 500.3145, and/or by a release signed by Woods in connection with the settlement of litigation between Woods and defendant. The trial court granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion for summary disposition. Specifically, the trial court granted defendant summary disposition of plaintiff's claims for benefits for services provided to Woods before June 11, 2019, the effective date of the amendment to MCL 500.3145, and denied defendant's motion for summary disposition for plaintiff's claims for services from June 11, 2019 through August 12, 2020. The parties resolved the claims arising from June 11, 2019 through August 12, 2020, and stipulated to dismissal of those claims. Plaintiff filed this appeal, challenging the trial court's order granting defendant summary disposition of plaintiff's claims for medical care it provided Woods from February 2, 2019 to June 11, 2019.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by granting in part defendant's motion for summary disposition of plaintiff's complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10) on the basis that the pre-amendment version of MCL 500.3145 barred plaintiff's claims. We disagree.
We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition. Meemic Ins Co v Fortson, 506 Mich. 287, 296; 954 N.W.2d 115 (2020). We also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Le Gassick v Univ of Mich. Regents, 330 Mich.App. 487, 495; 948 N.W.2d 452 (2019). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) should be granted when the claim is barred by a statute of limitations,[1] or other basis stated in that court rule. MCR 2.116(C)(7). When considering a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), we accept the allegations of the complaint as true unless contradicted by documentation submitted by the moving party, and consider any affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence submitted. Estate of Miller v Angels' Place, Inc, 334 Mich.App. 325, 330; 964 N.W.2d 839 (2020). When there is no factual dispute, whether a plaintiff's claim is barred under a basis set forth in MCR 2.116(C)(7) is a question of law. Id.
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich. 152, 160; 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is warranted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. When reviewing a motion for summary disposition granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider the documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, id., and will find that a genuine issue of material fact exists if "the record leave[s] open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." Johnson v Vanderkooi, 502 Mich. 751, 761; 918 N.W.2d 785 (2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
MCL 500.3145, known as the one-year-back rule, "is designed to limit the amount of benefits recoverable under the no-fault act to those losses occurring no more than one year before an action is brought." Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 491 Mich. 200, 203; 815 N.W.2d 412 (2012). Before its amendment, effective June 11, 2019, MCL 500.3145(1), provided, in relevant part:
An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under this chapter for accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident causing the injury unless written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits for the injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, work loss or survivor's loss has been incurred. However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced....
MCL 500.3145 was amended by 2019 PA 21, effective June 11, 2019, and now provides, in relevant part:
In this case, the claims in question relate to medical care plaintiff provided to Woods in April and May 2019. Plaintiff filed its complaint on September 21, 2020, seeking payment for those services. Because the claims are for "loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced," under the pre-amendment version of the statute the claim is barred as untimely. The amended version of MCL 500.3145 also contains a one-year-back provision, stating that "the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced." MCL 500.3145(2). However, the amended version of the statute includes a tolling provision, stating that the one-year-back rule "is tolled from the date of a specific claim for payment of the benefits until the date the insurer formally denies the claim." MCL 500.3145(3).
The trial court in this case determined that the pre-amendment version of the statute applied because the amended statute does not provide for retroactive application. "Statutes and amendments to statutes are presumed to operate prospectively." Andary v USAA Casualty Ins Co, ___ Mich. App___, ___; ___ N.W.2d___ (2022) (Docket No. 356487); slip op at 2. This presumption is overcome only when the Legislature clearly manifests an intent for retroactive application. Buhl v City of Oak Park, 507 Mich. 236, 244; 968 N.W.2d 348 (2021). In this Court's recent decision in Andary, although not addressing MCL 500.3145 specifically, this Court held that the legislative amendments to the no-fault act in 2019 PA 21 and 2019 PA 22 do not apply retroactively because "the Legislature did not clearly demonstrate an intent for the amendments to apply retroactively to persons injured in pre-amendment accidents." See Andary, ___Mich App at___; slip op at 1. This Court observed that "[i]ndeed, 2019 PA 21 provided an effective date of June 11, 2019, and it contains no language referring to retroactive application." Id. at ___; slip op at 2. In the absence of any Legislative statement of retroactive application, and in light of the presumption against retroactive application of a statutory amendment, the trial court in this case correctly determined that the amendment to MCL 500.3145 does not apply retroactively. See Brewer v A D Transport Express, Inc, 486 Mich. 50, 56; 782 N.W.2d 475 (2010) ()
Plaintiff argues, however, that the amended statute applies because, at the time the amended statute became effective on June 11 2019, the April-May 2019 claims were still viable claims not yet denied by defendant. Plaintiff argues that because the pre-amendment version of the statute does not have a tolling provision, applying the amended version of the statute preserves plaintiff's claims while applying the pre-amendment statute takes away claims that were viable on June 11, 2019. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, the relevant inquiry is not which version of the statute preserves plaintiff's claims. Generally, whether a statute applies depends upon the date on which the cause of action arose. Hill v Gen Motors...
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