Spyderco, Inc. v. Kevin, Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 16-cv-03061-CMA-NYW |
| Parties | SPYDERCO, INC., a Colorado corporation, Plaintiff, v. KEVIN, INC., a Maine corporation d/b/a Shawmut Distributors, d/b/a Kittery Trading Post, d/b/a KTP Gun Exchange, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Kevin, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue. (Doc. # 11.) For the reasons detailed herein, the Motion is granted.
Plaintiff Spyderco, Inc. is a knife manufacturer incorporated in Colorado with its principal place of business in Golden, Colorado. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 1, 11.) Plaintiff holds a number of federally registered and common law trademarks. (Doc. # 1 at 8-11.) Defendant Kevin, Inc. is a Maine corporation with its principal place of business in Kittery, Maine. (Doc. # 11 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant sold and continues to sell two variants of counterfeit Spyderco knives through a brick and mortar retail store located in Kittery, Maine. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 28.) Metallurgic testing confirmed that the knives are not authentic Spyderco products (Doc. # 1-11), yet both knives bear Plaintiff's trademarks. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 31.) Plaintiff initiated this suit on December 14, 2016, bringing claims for trademark infringement and counterfeiting under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117 & 1125, a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-101, and a number of common law causes of action. (Doc. # 1 at 17-21.)
On January 5, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. (Doc. # 11.) On January 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed its response (Doc. # 17), to which Defendant replied on February 10, 2017 (Doc. # 26). Defendant has not designed any products for Colorado, advertised within Colorado, or marketed the allegedly infringing products through a sales agent in Colorado. (Doc. # 11-1 at ¶¶ 10, 12, 14.) However, Plaintiff alleges that (i) Defendant's intentional trademark infringement and intentional and willful counterfeiting of Plaintiff's products and (ii) Defendant's long-standing relationship with Plaintiff constitute sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state for the purposes of personal jurisdiction.
A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Rambo v. American S. Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1417 (10th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). In responding to a Rule 12(b)(2) motion filed prior to an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction to defeat the motion. OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1091(10th Cir. 1998). The prima facie showing may be made by submitting affidavits or other written materials with facts that would support jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. A defendant can counter that showing by demonstrating "that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." Id. (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)).
Allegations made in the complaint must be taken as true so long as they remain undisputed by the defendant's affidavits. Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995). Conflicting facts in the parties' affidavits "must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor, and the plaintiff's prima facie showing is sufficient notwithstanding the contrary presentation by the moving party." Wenz, 55 F.3d at 1505 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, Plaintiff has "the duty to support jurisdictional allegations in a complaint by competent proof of the supporting facts if the jurisdictional allegations are challenged by an appropriate pleading." Pytlik v. Prof'l Res., Ltd., 887 F.2d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1989).
An analysis of personal jurisdiction begins with a two-step inquiry. First, a court must determine "whether any applicable statute authorizes the service of process on [the] Defendant. Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Second, a court must "examine whether the exercise of such statutory jurisdiction comports with constitutional due process demands." Id.
With respect to the first question, the federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117 & 1125, does not provide for nationwide service of process. CrossFit, Inc. v. Jenkins, 69 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1094 (D. Colo. 2014). Consequently, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) requires that this Court apply Colorado law. Colorado's long-arm statute, in turn, confers the maximum jurisdiction permissible consistent with the Due Process Clause. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187, 1193 (Colo. 2005). Thus, in this case, the first, statutory inquiry effectively collapses into the second, constitutional analysis.
The Supreme Court has held that, to exercise jurisdiction in harmony with due process, defendants must have "minimum contacts" with the forum state, such that having to defend a lawsuit there would not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). Jurisdiction over corporations may be either general or specific. Rambo, 839 F.2d at 1418. Jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum state is "specific jurisdiction." Id. In contrast, when the suit does not arise from or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum and jurisdiction is based on the defendant's presence or accumulated contacts with the forum, the court exercises "general jurisdiction." Id. In this case, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled that Defendant has the continuous or systematic contacts with Colorado that would permit an exercise of general jurisdiction. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 n. 15; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn. 8 & 9 (1984). Accordingly, this Court will review Defendant'scontacts with the forum to determine whether the exercise of "specific" personal jurisdiction would offend due process. See OMI, 149 F.3d at 1091.
Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction, the out-of-state defendant must have (i) purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum, and (ii) the litigation must result from alleged injuries that "arise out of or relate to" those activities. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472. The aim of the "purposeful direction" doctrine is to ensure that an out-of-state defendant is not bound to appear to account for merely having 'random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts' with the forum state. Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475). The Supreme Court has developed a tripartite inquiry to determine whether a defendant purposefully directed its activities at a forum state: the presence of (a) an intentional act that was (b) aimed expressly at the forum state with (c) knowledge that the brunt of the injury would be felt in the forum state. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984). The Tenth Circuit has interpreted the "express aim" element to signify that "the forum state itself must be the 'focal point'" of the tort. Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1075 & n.9 (quoting Far W. Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1080 (10th Cir. 1995)); see also Impact Prods., Inc. v. Impact Prods., LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1191 (D. Colo. 2004).
The allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint regarding the Lanham Act are considered torts for the purposes of Colorado's long-arm statute. Floyd's 99 Holdings, LLC v. Jude's Barbershop, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1208 (D. Colo. 2012). The simple fact that an out-of-state defendant has committed a tort that caused economic injury to a forum resident does not necessarily establish the requisite minimum contacts with theforum state. Far W. Capital, 46 F.3d at 1077-80. The Tenth Circuit has cautioned that Id. at 1078; see also Impact Prods., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d at 1191 ().
By alleging that Defendant intentionally infringed on its trademarks and intentionally and willfully sold counterfeit products, Plaintiff has adequately pled that Defendant engaged in intentional tortious acts with the knowledge that the brunt of the injury would be felt in Colorado. See Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1071; (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 9, 31, 33, 35; Doc. # 17 at 3-7.) Plaintiff has not, however, met its burden to support its Complaint with "competent proof of the supporting [jurisdictional] facts," Pytlik, 887 F.2d at 1376, because there are no facts suggesting that Defendant's allegedly tortious actions were - as is required under Calder - "expressly aimed" at Colorado, see Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1071. See generally (Doc. # 17 at 1-5.)
Notwithstanding that Defendant knew that its tortious actions would cause economic injury in Colorado, a commission of a tort that occurs in another state does not, by itself, satisfy...
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