St. Clair v. State

Decision Date12 July 2000
Docket NumberNo. 10-99-074-CR,10-99-074-CR
Citation26 S.W.3d 89
Parties(Tex.App.-Waco 2000) JAMES LAWSON ST. CLAIR, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Before Chief Justice Davis Justice Vance and Justice Gray

O P I N I O N

REX D. DAVIS, Chief Justice.

The trial court convicted James Lawson St. Clair in a bench trial of aggravated assault on a public servant, failure to stop and render aid, and intoxication assault. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2) (Vernon 1994); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 550.021(a)(3), (c) (Vernon 1999); Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, sec. 49.07(a), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3697 (amended 1999) (current version at Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 49.07(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2000)). The court found that St. Clair used a deadly weapon, namely an automobile, during the commission of the aggravated assault and intoxication assault offenses. The court sentenced St. Clair to sixteen years' imprisonment for the aggravated assault and five years' imprisonment for each of the remaining offenses and decreed that his sentences run concurrently.

St. Clair presents nine points of error in which he claims:

the court erred by overruling his motion to quash the indictment because it failed to provide adequate notice (two points);

the evidence is legally insufficient to support the verdict on any of the three offenses (three points); and

the court erred by admitting in evidence his blood test results because they were obtained in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights and in violation of statutory requirements (four points).

BACKGROUND

St. Clair was driving his girlfriend's Pontiac Sunbird convertible erratically on County Road 174 in Burleson during rush hour. Susan Anderson was attempting to exit the parking lot of a business alongside C.R. 174 in her Toyota Camry. St. Clair drifted off the road and collided with the driver's side of Anderson's Camry. The force of the collision spun the Camry around and killed the Sunbird's engine. St. Clair sustained a head injury and momentarily slumped over the wheel of the Sunbird.

Anderson's four-year-old son Austin was sleeping in the backseat of the Camry at the time of the collision. Anderson was about eight weeks' pregnant. Anderson noted only "bumps and bruises" on herself immediately following the collision. Her attention was focused primarily on Austin. An ambulance promptly responded to the scene and transported Anderson and Austin to Cook Children's Medical Center in Fort Worth where Austin was treated and released.

Moments after the collision, St. Clair restarted the Sunbird and left the scene. He parked the car behind a grocery store about a block away. Two men who had witnessed the accident followed St. Clair in their pickup. Burleson Police Officer Robert Sherman deemed suspicious the manner in which the two vehicles were driving, activated his overhead lights and siren, and drove to the rear of the grocery store. Sherman pulled alongside the pickup and instructed the men not to leave. He then parked his patrol car behind the Sunbird and approached the driver's side of the car. Upon observing St. Clair's condition, Sherman radioed his dispatcher for medical assistance. He learned from the dispatcher that a collision had occurred nearby just moments earlier. He told the dispatcher that he had stopped someone who was probably involved in the collision.

When St. Clair overheard Sherman's conversation with the dispatcher, he started the Sunbird. Sherman tried unsuccessfully to reach in and turn off the car. He then pulled his service revolver and ordered St. Clair to turn off the car. St. Clair ignored him and drove away, circling through a grassy area and a drainage ditch before returning to the pavement. At this point, St. Clair turned the Sunbird in Sherman's direction and accelerated. Sherman attempted to shield himself with a wooden utility pole located just off the pavement as St. Clair drove directly toward him while continuing to accelerate. St. Clair stopped the Sunbird a few feet away from the utility pole and then stood up inside the convertible.

Sherman returned his revolver to its holster and pulled out a container of pepper spray. He directed St. Clair to get out of the car. When St. Clair failed to do so, Sherman sprayed him with the pepper spray. Because the wind was blowing from St. Clair's direction, the spray incapacitated both of them. Another officer subdued St. Clair and handcuffed him as Sherman cleared his eyes. St. Clair fought with emergency medical technicians ("EMT's") and tried to bite them as they attempted to place him on a gurney and put him in the ambulance. At the emergency room, St. Clair continued to fight with medical personnel. A blood specimen obtained at the hospital revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.188, and a urine specimen indicated the presence of cannabinoids.

Anderson and her son arrived home from the hospital at 10:00 or 10:30 that night. At home, she noticed that her undergarments "were pretty much soaked in blood." She called the emergency number for her obstetrician and was instructed to come in the next morning. After an examination the next morning, it was determined that she had suffered a miscarriage.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT

St. Clair contends in his first point that the court erred by overruling his motion to quash the aggravated assault count of the indictment because it failed to give him adequate notice of the manner or means by which he threatened Sherman.

The aggravated assault count reads in pertinent part that St. Clair did:

intentionally or knowingly threaten imminent bodily injury to R. Sherman, a public servant, to-wit: a police officer for the City of Burleson, Texas, while R. Sherman was lawfully discharging an official duty and the defendant knew that R. Sherman was a public servant, and the defendant did use or exhibit a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault, to-wit: a motor vehicle, that in the manner of its use or intended use was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

The State responds that the indictment is proper because it tracks the language of the statute and because "the only sensible meaning" of the indictment, when read as a whole, "is that the motor vehicle was intentionally or knowingly driven in an assaultive manner, threatening imminent bodily injury or death to Officer Sherman."

The Texas Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure require that an indictment provide an accused with adequate notice. See State v. Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Tex. Const. art. I., § 10; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.05 (Vernon 1977). An indictment must allege the commission of an offense with enough certainty that the defendant can "plead the judgment that may be given upon it in bar of any prosecution for the same offense." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.04 (Vernon 1989).

Article 21.11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part:

An indictment shall be deemed sufficient which charges the commission of the offense in ordinary and concise language in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is meant, and with that degree of certainty that will give the defendant notice of the particular offense with which he is charged . . . .

Id. art. 21.11 (Vernon 1989). When we review an indictment under article 21.11, the indictment is "read as a whole and viewed in light of common understanding." Hare v. State. 713 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1986, pet. ref'd).

An indictment need not set forth facts which are "merely evidentiary in nature." Mays, 967 S.W.2d at 406. Generally, an indictment which tracks the statutory language will provide adequate notice. Id. In the face of a motion to quash however, an indictment must provide more specific allegations "if the prohibited conduct is statutorily defined to include more than one manner or means of commission." Saathoff v. State, 891 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (per curiam). Additionally, "[a] statute which uses an undefined term of indeterminate or variable meaning requires more specific pleading in order to notify the defendant of the nature of the charges against him." Mays, 967 S.W.2d at 407.

The Court of Criminal Appeals applied the latter principle in Doyle v. State, a case in which the appellant had been charged with retaliation by threatening a public servant. 661 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (per curiam). The indictment in that case alleged that Doyle did:

intentionally and knowingly threaten to harm another person, namely: Dan Gibbs, by an unlawful act in retaliation for and on account of the service of the said Dan Gibbs as a public servant, in that the said defendant threatened to kill the said Dan Gibbs on account of the services of the said Dan Gibbs as a judge in a prior lawsuit in which the defendant was a party.

Id. at 729. The Court observed that, although the indictment alleged the nature of the threat, it failed to specify the manner and means by which Doyle committed the offense. Id. at 730. The Court noted that the alleged threat "could have been conveyed in a number of ways, including: face to face in person, over the phone directly, through a third party, or through the mail." Id. The Court concluded that the trial court had erred in overruling the motion to quash because the indictment did not allege "facts sufficient to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense" or "to give [Doyle] precise notice of the offense with which he was charged." Id. at 731.

The State places primary reliance on Hare, which involved an indictment substantially similar to St. Clair's.1 See Hare, 713 S.W.2d at 398. The El Paso Court found the indictment in that case sufficient because:

the...

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