St. Germain v. Husqvarna Corp.

• Decision Date: 29 July 1988
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,881 Jeannette J. ST. GERMAIN v. HUSQVARNA CORPORATION.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1283

544 A.2d 1283

57 USLW 2132, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,881

Jeannette J. ST. GERMAIN v. HUSQVARNA CORPORATION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued March 17, 1988.

Decided July 29, 1988.

Jonathan W. Sprague, Stevens, Engels, Bishop & Sprague, Presque Isle, Rudolph T. Pelletier (orally), Madawaska, for plaintiff.

E. Allen Hunter (orally), Solman, Page & Hunter, P.A., Caribou, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, ^* WATHEN, GLASSMAN, SCOLNIK and CLIFFORD, JJ.

SCOLNIK, Justice.

In this products liability case, Jeannette St. Germain appeals from a judgment entered for the defendant, Husqvarna Corporation, by the Superior Court (Aroostook County), following a jury trial. St. Germain contends that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of the defendant on the issue of strict liability. We agree, but finding the error harmless, we affirm the judgment.

On August 1, 1979, Ronald St. Germain, the plaintiff's deceased husband, drove his skidder on a logging trail near Eagle Lake to an area where he was cutting pulp wood. On the way, he encountered a tree blocking the trail and attempted to push it out of the way with the skidder. When this was unsuccessful he jumped down from the skidder and started to cut the tree with his Husqvarna Model 65 chain saw. The tree was under tension and when the cut was almost complete, either the chain saw kicked back or the tree sprang back causing the chain saw to hit the decedent. The saw blade cut through the decedent's chest, striking his heart, and he died within approximately ten minutes.

The plaintiff filed this wrongful death action against the defendant manufacturer of the chain saw on March 11, 1981. The complaint alleged that the defendant was liable on theories of negligence, strict liability and breach of warranty. The plaintiff abandoned the breach of warranty claim and does not address it on appeal. Her negligence and strict liability claims essentially follow the same argument: that the chain saw used by the decedent was designed and manufactured without a "chain brake," which would have prevented the decedent's accident from being fatal. ¹

At the close of the evidence, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on both the negligence and strict liability counts. The presiding justice denied defendant's motion as to negligence, but granted it as to strict liability on the ground that there was no evidence to establish that the chain saw was defective and unreasonably dangerous. A unanimous jury returned a verdict in defendant's favor and judgment was entered accordingly. The plaintiff appeals, claiming that the Superior Court erred in granting a directed verdict on the strict liability count.

"In reviewing a directed verdict, we consider the evidence, including every justifiable inference therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is directed. If by any reasonable view of this evidence a jury verdict for the plaintiff could be sustained, the granting of a directed verdict is improper." Baker v. Mid Maine Medical Center, 499 A.2d 464, 466 (Me.1985) (citations omitted). Although we find from the evidence presented at trial that the Superior Court erred in granting a directed verdict on the strict liability issue, we conclude the error was harmless.

Strict liability in Maine is governed by 14 M.R.S.A. § 221 (1980), which reads in its entirety as follows:

One who sells any goods or products in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to a person whom the manufacturer, seller or supplier might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods, or his property, if the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product and it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without significant change in the condition in which it is sold. This section applies although the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product and the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.

The presiding justice directed the verdict on the strict liability issue on the ground that insufficient evidence existed for the jury to find that the chain saw was defective and unreasonably dangerous. ² Whether the court's decision was correct turns on the applicable definition of "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." 14 M.R.S.A. § 221.

The terms "design defect" and "unreasonably dangerous" have been given widely varying meanings in different jurisdictions. See W. Prosser and W. Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 99 at 698 (5th ed. 1984); Frumer and M. Friedman, 2 Products Liability, § 303 [f][iv] at 3-598 (1987); R. Hursh and H. Bailey, 1 American Law of Products Liability, § 4:12 at 670 (2d ed. 1974). These different definitions generally fall within two approaches that have been utilized in evaluating design defect cases: (1) the "danger utility test," which weighs the utility of the product against the danger it presents, and (2) the "consumer contemplation test," under which a product is defectively dangerous if it is dangerous to an extent beyond the contemplation of the ordinary consumer. Prosser, supra, § 99 at 698-700. In Stanley v. Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc., 462 A.2d 1144 (Me.1983), we indicated that Maine follows a "danger utility test." We stated:

In actions based upon defects in design, negligence and strict liability theories overlap in that under both theories the plaintiff must prove that the product was defectively designed thereby exposing the user to an unreasonable risk of harm. Such proof will involve an examination of the utility of its design, the risk of the design and the feasibility of safer alternatives.

Stanley, 462 A.2d at 1148 (citations omitted).

In the present case, sufficient evidence was presented to establish that the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user. The jury heard testimony that chain saws designed with chain brakes have a utility in protecting the user from potential injury. On the other hand, testimony was presented that saws without chain brakes may also implicate a utility interest because the brake can interfere with the function of the saw, can present maintenance problems, and can sometimes react too slowly to protect the operator. The jury further heard that chain saws designed without chain brakes present a risk of not protecting the user against avoidable injury, and that the risk could have been reduced in the instant case by the defendant's design and manufacture of a saw that incorporated a chain brake. Finally, there was testimony that chain brake technology was available at the time the decedent's chain saw was manufactured, that the cost of a chain brake would run from $7.50 to $30.00, and that the safety feature would minimally impair the use of the saw. In light of this evidence, the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant, since a jury could have concluded, under the "danger utility test," that the Husqvarna Model 65 chain saw was defective and unreasonably dangerous because its utility without a chain brake did not outweigh the risk of harm it posed for its users. See Stanley, 462 A.2d at 1148.

Even though the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict for the defendant, the error was harmless. ³ In its instructions to the jury, the court set forth the exact same "danger utility test" for negligence that it would have laid out for a strict liability count. At no time did the plaintiff challenge the correctness of this instruction. In response to the court's instructions, the jury returned a special verdict finding that the defendant was not negligent in its design or manufacture of the chain saw in question. Accordingly, right or wrong, the instruction furnishes the answer that the jury would have arrived at with a similar instruction on a strict liability count. In these circumstances, we conclude that the submission of the strict liability count to the jury would not have resulted in a different verdict and it is therefore "highly probable" that the court's error in directing a verdict on the strict liability count did not affect the judgment. See State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 467 (Me.1981).

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

McKUSICK, C.J., and WATHEN, J. concurring.

GLASSMAN, Justice, with whom CLIFFORD, Justice, joins, dissenting.

I must respectfully dissent. Because fault in the sense of negligence by the defendant in the design of the chain saw is not a prerequisite to the plaintiff's recovery under 14 M.R.S.A. § 221, I would vacate the judgment and remand this case to the Superior Court for a new trial on the strict liability count of the plaintiff's complaint. See Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280, 282, 285 (Me.1984).

Here, the court recognizes that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish that the product was in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to the user because the utility of the chain saw without a brake did not outweigh the risk of harm to its users. The court nonetheless holds that because of the jury's finding that ...