St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Coolidge

• Decision Date: 19 November 1904
• Citation: 83 S.W. 333
• Parties: ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. v. COOLIDGE.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

83 S.W. 333

ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. v. COOLIDGE.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

November 19, 1904.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Phillips County; Hance N. Hutton, Judge.

Action by Henry E. Coolidge against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Dodge & Johnson, for appellant. E. C. Hornor and Rose, Hemingway & Rose, for appellee.

HILL, C. J.

The evidence fairly establishes these facts: On the evening of June 10, 1896, Coolidge delivered at Lexa, Ark., a car of potatoes, in good order, to appellant railroad, for shipment over its line to St. Louis, and thence by connecting carriers to the consignee in Chicago. The time which should have been consumed in the trip was 2 days, of which 8 hours should be allowed the Chicago & Alton Railway, the connecting carrier at St. Louis, to deliver in Chicago. The time actually consumed was about 65 hours, instead of 40, from Lexa to St. Louis, and about 15, instead of 8, from St. Louis to Chicago, and then about a day lost in Chicago in delivery after arrival. The car while in appellant's control took a side trip from Wynne to Memphis and return, which the evidence shows contributed to the delay, although contended otherwise by the appellant. The potatoes were heated and rotten when delivered to the consignee, who lost a sale at 75 cents per bushel on account of this condition. That price was the fair market price at Chicago at the time they should have arrived. The consignee put men into the car, and saved what he could from the lot, and peddled out the salable potatoes, realizing $97 for the car load. This suit is for what they would have brought, had it not been for this damage to them. They cost at Lexa 30 cents per bushel, and were then properly packed into the car. There was no evidence of the condition of the potatoes from the time they left Lexa in good order till they reached the consignee rotten and heated. There is evidence that delay in transportation of potatoes at that season of the year causes them to heat and rot, and that the weather was very warm, and that the time consumed in the unnecessary trip from Wynne to Memphis and return would increase the likelihood of damage to the potatoes.

1. In the absence of evidence locating the damage to goods in transit over several connecting lines, a prima facie presumption arises that the last carrier is the negligent one. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Birdwell (Ark.) 82 S. W. 835; Moore v. Ry. (Mass.) 53 N. E. 816, 73 Am. St. Rep. 298; Cote v. Ry. (Mass.) 65 N. E. 400; Faison v. Ry., 69 Miss. 569, 13 South. 37, 30 Am. St. Rep. 577; Ry. v. Harris, 26 Fla. 148, 7 South. 544, 23 Am. St. Rep. 551; Ry. v. Brown (Tex. Civ. App.) 37 S. W. 785; Ry. v. Edloff (Tex. Sup.) 34 S. W. 414; Laughlin v. Ry., 28 Wis. 204, 9 Am. Rep. 493; Smith v. Ry., 43 Barb. 225. When the initial carrier receives the goods in good order, the law presumes each successive carrier intermediate between the initial and last carrier receives them in good order; and this presumption working through to the last carrier, who delivers them in bad order, leaves the responsibility upon him, unless he can show as evidence that the damage occurred prior to his receiving them. Ry. v. Jones, 100 Ala. 263, 14 South. 114; Ry. v. Harris, 26 Fla. 148, 7 South. 544, 23 Am. St. Rep. 551; Hutchinson on Carriers, § 761; 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. (2d Ed.) p. 752. All of these authorities declare this presumption only arises in the absence of evidence, and its purpose is to cast the burden of proof upon the party having the knowledge or means of knowledge to ascertain the truth. The appellant invokes the presumption as a defense here. If the evidence is sufficient to show negligence in the appellant, as the initial carrier, which caused the injury, then the presumption is overcome. The difficulty in this case is in determining whether the injury was caused by the delay of the initial or the last carrier, or both. The Georgia court announced this rule in regard to perishable goods: "Unreasonable delay in forwarding fruit would be negligence, because prolonging the time within which, by the operation of natural laws, decay will be produced, and therefore such negligence would contribute to causing the damage." Forrester v. Ry., 92 Ga. 699, 19 S. E. 811. In a Massachusetts case where a carrier contracted to deliver apples to a connecting carrier by a fixed time, and negligently delayed delivering them, and they froze in the possession of the connecting carrier, the court said: "If the freezing had occurred on defendant's line, it cannot be doubted that the law would regard the delay as the proximate cause of the damage. It is none the less so because it happened on a connecting line. The damage was not caused by any extraordinary event subsequently occurring, but was caused by the event which was, according to common experience, naturally and reasonably to be expected—a change of temperature." Fox v. Ry., 148 Mass. 220, 19 N. E. 222, 1 L. R. A. 702. In the absence of a contract fixing the time for delivery to the connecting carrier, the law fixes a reasonable time;...