St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. State

• Decision Date: 29 January 1912
• Parties: ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. STATE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

143 S.W. 913

102 Ark. 205

ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. STATE

Supreme Court of Arkansas

January 29, 1912

Appeal from Clark Circuit Court; George W. Hays, Judge on exchange reversed.

Judgment reversed, and case dismissed.

W. V Tompkins, E. B. Kinsworthy, and W. E. Hemingway, for appellants.

The court should have told the jury what a "division point" is. 63 Ark. 477; 99 P. 271; 9 Gill 331; 109 Ill.App. 560. The evidence does not sustain the verdict. 14 Ark. 286; 21 Ark. 370; 23 Ark. 101. The act is void for uncertainty and indefiniteness with respect to the places to which it applies 27 Fed. Cas. p. 1041; 19 F. 679; 52 F. 918; 35 F. 866; Pet. C. C. 122; 1 Paine 34; Bish. Stat. Crimes 41; Lieb. Herm. 156; 45 Ark. 159; 34 Ark. 224; 35 S.W. 129. To enforce it would be taking property without due process of law. 35 S.W. 129. It denies to the owners of railroads the equal protection of the laws. 183 U.S. 79; 194 U.S. 267; 184 U.S. 540; 75 Ark. 542; 86 Ark. 518.

Hal L Norwood, Attorney General, and W. H. Rector, Assistant, for appellee.

The act is not void for uncertainty. 86 Ark. 518; 25 Ark. 101; 31 Ark. 701; Broom's Leg. Max. 247, 248; 3 Bing. 193. Dwarris, Stat. Const. 692; 1 Kent, Com. 162; 15 N.Y. 532; 28 Ark. 200; 2 Pet. 627; 7 Wall. 482; 100 U.S. 239; 40 Ark. 431; 99 N.Y. 43; 20 Ala. 54; 45 Ark. 158. The enforcement of the act would not deny the defendant the equal protection of the laws. 86 Ark. 518; 194 U.S. 267; 94 U.S. 155; 165 U.S. 649; Id. 150; 174 U.S. 96; 32 L. R. A. 857; 33 Id. 319; 207 U.S. 88; 127 U.S. 205; 169 U.S. 385; 120 U.S. 71; 170 U.S. 294; 214 U.S. 91; 81 Ark. 304; 211 U.S. 539; 185 U.S. 203; 25 L. R. A. 759; 26 Id. 317; 175 U.S. 348; 203 U.S. 284; 217 U.S. 114; 219 U.S. 453.

FRAUENTHAL J. KIRBY, J., dissents.

OPINION

FRAUENTHAL, J.

This is an appeal from a conviction of the defendant, St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company, for the violation of the provisions of an act of the General Assembly approved May 1, 1905, entitled, "An act to provide for the protection of mechanics, laborers and other persons employed in the construction and repair of railroad equipment, and providing a punishment for violation thereof." The section of the act which defines the offense of which the defendant was convicted is as follows:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any railroad company or corporation, or other persons who own, control or operate any lines of railroad in the State of Arkansas, to build, construct or repair railroad equipment, without first erecting and maintaining at every division point a building or shed over the repair tracks, same to be provided with a floor, where such construction or repair [work] is permanently done, so as to provide that all men permanently employed in the construction and repair cars, trucks and other railroad equipment, shall be under shelter during snows, sleet, rain and other inclement weather." Acts 1905, p. 593.

The prosecution was instituted before a justice of the peace upon an information which in effect charged that the defendant had on June 15, 1910, repair tracks at Gurdon, which was alleged to be a division point on its line of railroad where repair work was permanently done and men permanently employed in the construction and repair of cars and other railroad equipment, and that it did not have a building or shed over the repair track so as to shelter such employees during snow, sleet, rain and other inclement weather. The trial resulted in a conviction, both before the justice of the peace and in the circuit court, to which an appeal was taken.

It is contended by counsel for defendant that the act is invalid because the term "division point," used therein for the purpose of specifying the place where the building or shed should be erected and maintained, has no well-understood meaning, rendering the act indefinite and uncertain. In this connection, it is urged that the lower court erred in failing to declare to the jury what a division point was and in leaving it for them to decide its meaning by instructing them in effect that they should take into consideration everything in connection with the transaction in order to determine whether or not Gurdon was a division point as contemplated by said act. The interpretation of the language used by the Legislature in its enactments is a matter exclusively for the court, and not for the jury. It is the duty of the court to construe and expound the law, and to instruct the jury definitely as to the interpretation of the statute, for the law must be certain and applied alike to all persons and by all juries. The sole province of the jury is to determine the facts in each particular case, and therefrom to decide whether the law, as announced to them by the court, has been violated. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. Ry. Co. v Becker, 63 Ark. 477. It therefore became the duty of the trial court in this case to definitely declare what a division point is as used in this statute. But the failure to so instruct the jury was not prejudicial if, under the undisputed evidence, Gurdon was such a division point. We are of the opinion that this term "division point," as used in this statute, has a certain and definite meaning. In determining what the meaning of these words is, we must look to see what is the usual and ordinary interpretation given to them by those using them, and also to consider them in reference to the subject-matter in the mind of the Legislature, as shown by this statute. "The true sense in which words are used in a statute is to be ascertained generally by taking them in their ordinary and popular signification, or, if they be terms of art, in their technical meaning. But it is also a cardinal rule of exposition that the intention is to be deduced from the whole, and every part of the statute, taken and compared together--from the words and context, and such construction adopted as will effectuate the intention of the lawmakers." Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650; Potter's Dwarris on Stat. 197, 201. The court is presumed to know whether or not these words have a definite signification and what is their exact meaning. It may seek every source for information as to such meaning, and is not confined to the testimony of any witness who may have given testimony as to his knowledge relative thereto. For the purpose of considering and advising itself as to the true interpretation of this term, the court may call to its assistance persons who may have information relative thereto, or may apply to any other available source to obtain this information, But the testimony of any person called to its aid is simply for the purpose of advising the court, and not to give evidence before the jury. Such testimony or information is solely for the court in aiding it in declaring what the term means and thus to announce what the law is. Thus in the case of Louisiana & Ark. Ry. Co. v. State, 85 Ark. 12, 106 S.W. 960, it became necessary to determine whether or not a statute requiring a station to be erected at a particular place along the line of railroad was reasonable. It was there held that the question of the reasonableness of such statute was one of law for the court to determine. It was determined in that case that the court was not bound by the facts presented or agreed upon by the parties relative to the reasonableness of having such station erected, but should possess itself of all information obtainable upon the subject, and, for that purpose, might apply to any source which it deemed proper. And so in the case at bar the court must determine whether the term "division point" has a certain and definite meaning, and what that meaning is. In order to possess itself of information, it may seek all such available means and sources as it deems proper and, from the information thus acquired, declare what is really within common knowledge. Proceeding in this manner, we know that railroad corporations have departments, officials and employees for the management of their affairs and properties. A railroad corporation has organized departments to which are intrusted certain duties; amongst these is the duty to provide and keep in proper repair and to operate the equipment which its passenger and freight traffic may require. In order to effectively conduct and operate its trains, its line of railroad is separated into divisions. The division is the longest undivided part of its line, and within such division the operation of its trains is managed and supervised by separate and distinct officials, who are known as division officers, with different titles, according to their varied duties. Within such division, there is a place or point where these officials are located, and such place is known as division headquarters. This is the place where the division officials who manage, control and superintend the operation and repair of trains and equipments which are employed within such division are located. Such a place is a division point. But, in considering the use of this term relative to the subject-matter of this statute, we think that it has an additional meaning. Each division has its beginning and end fixed upon the line of railroad. At these limits of the divisions, trains are made up and employees operating such trains take charge thereof to make their runs from one end of the division to the other. At these places, upon the end or beginning of a division, the trains end their runs. Here engines and cars are inspected and repaired, or taken out of the train altogether, and the train is in effect made up again and either returned upon its trip on the same division or sent on to another division in the course of its run. Here the employees or crews operating the trains leave them and take...