St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. v. Olson

• Decision Date: 11 July 1902
• Citation: 91 N.W. 294,87 Minn. 117
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: ST. PAUL, M. & M. RY. CO. v. OLSON.

87 Minn. 117

91 N.W. 294

ST. PAUL, M. & M. RY. CO.

v.OLSON.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 11, 1902.

Appeal from district court, Otter Tail county; L. L. Baxter, Judge.

Action by the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company against Clement Olson. Verdict for defendant. From an order granting a new trial, he appeals. Affirmed.

Brown, J., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Whenever a person is prevented from exercising his legal remedy by some paramount authority, the time during which he is thus prevented is not to be counted against him in determining whether the statute of limitations has barred his right.

2. The law, in the absence of some specific provision to the contrary, commits, in the first instance, all matters affecting the disposition of public lands of the United States, and the adjustment of all private claims thereto, and grants therefor under congressional legislation, to the general land office, under the supervision of the secretary of the interior; and while such matters are pending and undetermined in such department the courts have no jurisdiction thereof.

3. The plaintiff claimed title to the land here in controversy by virtue of its land grant. The defendant went into possession thereof, and made application to enter it as a homestead, which was denied, and by successive appeals he kept the matter in litigation in the land department for 11 years, when the contest was decided in favor of the plaintiff. Held, that the time during which the contest was thus pending is not to be counted against the plaintiff in determining whether the statute of limitations has barred its right to the land, and that the defendant has not established title thereto by adverse possession. John Lind and A. Ueland, for appellant.

Thomas R. Benton, for respondent.

START, C. J.

The plaintiff, on May 16, 1901, brought this action in the district court of the county of Otter Tail to recover from the defendant the possession of the E. 1/2 of the N. E. 1/4 of section 17, township 131 N., range 43 W. The answer put in issue the plaintiff's alleged title, and set up title in the defendant by adverse possession. On the trial in the district court at the close of the evidence both parties asked for a directed verdict, and the court directed a verdict for the defendant. On the motion of the plaintiff for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, the court made its order granting a new trial, from which the defendant appealed. The evidence and admissions given and made on the trial established these facts: The land here in question was embraced in the patent issued to the state of Minnesota by the United States on the 19th day of February, 1901, under the acts of congress granting land to the state to aid in the construction of the St. Vincent Extension of the St. Paul & Pacific Railway Company, and was embraced in the deed issued to the plaintiff by the governor of the state on behalf of the state on the 8th day of April, 1901. A map in due and proper form, and duly approved by the secretary of the interior, fixing the definite and permanent location of the railroad from East St. Cloud to St. Vincent, known as the St. Vincent Extension of the St. Paul & Pacific Railroad, was filed in the office of the commissioner of the general land office at Washington, D. C., on December 19, 1871, by the governor of the state of Minnesota. The land is within the primary or 10-mile limit of the grant made by the congress of the United States in aid of the construction of the railroad, as shown by the map fixing the definite location of the route of the railway. The entire extension was completed and equipped prior to January 1, 1880, and on January 9, 1880, the governor of the state of Minnesota certified to the secretary of the interior that the whole of the extension was completed and equipped as required by the several acts of congress and of the legislature of the state relating thereto, which certification the secretary of the interior accepted as satisfactory evidence of the construction and completion of the line of railway in accordance with the terms and requirements of the several acts of congress and of the legislature of the state. The defendant took actual possession of the land in 1880, and has ever since been in the open, exclusive, and continuous possession thereof. He took and held such possession believing and claiming that it was public land, subject to entry under the land laws, and that he had the right to be in possession, and had the right to acquire title from the United States. He was assessed and paid taxes on the improvements as ‘improvements on United States lands' every year after 1881. In September, 1887, he applied to the local United States land office to enter the land under the homestead act, but the application was rejected, and from this decision he appealed to the commissioner of the general land office. From the commissioner's decision, dated March 6, 1889, affirming the decision of the local land office, he appealed to the secretary of the interior, who affirmed the commissioner's decision on May 10, 1898. The cost of surveying the lands so granted to the plaintiff was not paid by it until December 26, 1900, and the cost of conveying them was not paid until February 15, 1901. The defendant here claims that, although the patent for the land was not issued until February 19, 1901, yet the plaintiff became the owner in fee thereof with the right of possession, so that it could have maintained ejectment therefor, when the map fixing the definite location of the railway was filed December 19, 1871, or, at all events, when the certificate of the completion thereof was filed, January 9, 1880, hence he now has title by adverse possession. On the other hand, the plaintiff's contention is to the effect that the defendant's possession of the land was not adverse, and the statute has not run, because: (1) The legal title remained in the United States until the patent was issued to the state, and, further, if this be not so, the legal title was in the state until April 8, 1901, when it executed a deed of the land to the plaintiff; (2) the United States retained the legal title to secure the cost of surveying and conveying the lands; (3) the defendant took possession of the land in subordination to the admitted title of the United States, which he sought to...