Standiford Civic Club v. Com.
| Decision Date | 10 February 1956 |
| Citation | 289 S.W.2d 498 |
| Parties | STANDIFORD CIVIC CLUB et al., Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky et al., Appellees. Arthur GOODMAN et al., Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky et al., Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Henry B. Huff, Miller, Howard & Huff, Wm. P. Friedlander, Louisville, for appellants.
J. D. Buckman, Jr., Atty. Gen., C. J. Waddill, Hugh L. Hollingsworth, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellees.
STANLEY, Commissioner.
We have two class actions to enjoin the Commissioner of Highways of the Commonwealth and his agents from closing and obstructing certain streets of Louisville in the construction of the toll road between Louisville and Elizabethtown under authority of Chapter 177, Kentucky Revised Statutes. One action relates to what is called the Keller Avenue area and the other the Standiford area. The circuit court, with an expression of doubt, denied the injunctions upon the ground that under the exigencies and circumstances the parties should seek the remedy of damages.
The Keller Avenue area includes six streets or courts of which Keller Avenue is the main one since the others lead into it. That avenue intersects Preston Street or Preston Highway, which is a thoroughfare and the principal artery of traffic. This area is blocked in on the south and west by the Standiford airfield. It is bounded on the north by Phillips Lane, to which it appears there is at present no access, and on the east by Preston Highway. So, the only way of ingress and egrees is Preston Highway.
The Standiford area is bounded on the north and west by the Standiford airfield. The three outlets from this area to Preston Highway are Standiford Lane and Garden Row, which are city streets, and Standiford Avenue, which is not a public street but is dedicated by deed to the use and service of abutting property owners. The area is blocked in on three sides with Preston Highway the only way of access.
The new toll road will substantially parallel the Preston Highway and cut through both of these residential areas. This construction will cut off all means of ingress and egress to and from them. However, the plans of the toll road call for the construction of parallel service or local access streets. One will take the traffic of the Keller Avenue area to Phillips Lane on its north side and the other to Standiford Lane on its south side. It is not shown how Phillips Lane will get to the Preston Highway, but it is shown that an underpass will be built for Standiford Lane.
The closing of these streets and opening of new access ways paralleling the toll road will require everyone to travel circuitous routes from three to six to eight blocks longer in order to get to and from Preston Highway.
The appellants seriously contend that under the Constitution the Commonwealth has no power to build roads independently of the counties. Therefore, they challenge the constitutional validity of the Toll Road Act, which is now Chapter 177, KRS. The validity of the statute was declared in Guthrie v. Curlin, Ky., 263 S.W.2d 240. But the absence of the underlying constitutional authority now argued was not considered in that case. The present argument rests on the mandatory provision of Section 177 of the Constitution, which, among other things, declared that the Commonwealth should not 'construct a railroad or other highway.' The terms of the amendment of 1909, which became Section 157A of the Constitution, do not expressly or affirmatively empower the state to build public roads. Strictly construed it merely authorizes the extension of the state's credit and aid to the counties for public road purposes. However, in Mitchell v. Knox County Fiscal Court, 165 Ky. 543, 177 S.W. 279, decided in 1915, the court held that the purpose and effect of the amendment of the Constitution was to nullify the prohibition of Section 177 in relation to public roads, regarding the amendment to be awkwardly expressed in order to cancel out the terms of the original section. The court concluded that by reason of the nullification of Section 177 the previous unrestricted power of the Commonwealth in relation to public roads was restored. Subsequently enacted statutes have gradually put the Commonwealth more and more into the business of independently constructing and maintaining the highways of the state. Recognition of this power will be found in a number of cases, for example, in cases approving the acquisition or construction of toll bridges. See Bloxton v. State Highway Commission, 225 Ky. 324, 8 S.W.2d 392; Estes v. State Highway Commission, 235 Ky. 86, 29 S.W.2d 583; State Highway Commission v. King, 259 Ky. 414, 82 S.W.2d 443. Recognition will be found in other cases as well.
We have long recognized that ownership or occupancy of premises abutting on a street or highway and the right of access to or from a public way carries with it certain property rights in and to the use thereof. If the owners may suffer special injury, they cannot be deprived of the right without just compensation. It is the taking of property within the meaning of the constitutional provisions. Sections 13 and 242. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Ward, 237 Ky. 476, 35 S.W.2d 863; Brown v. Roberts, 246 Ky. 316, 55 S.W.2d 9; Cranley v. Boyd County, 266 Ky. 569, 99 S.W.2d 737; Wright v. Flood, 304 Ky. 122, 200 S.W.2d 117. But this property right, which generally is that of an easement, is, of course, subordinate to the rights of the public. The ground of authority for impairing or taking this property by closing or obstructing the street or highway is public convenience and necessity. Henderson v. City of Lexington, 132 Ky. 390, 111 S.W. 318, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 703, 22 L.R.A.,N.S., 20; Henderson Elevator Co. v. City of Henderson, 187 Ky. 453, 219 S.W. 809, 18 A.L.R. 983. The taking of such property right without due process of law cannot be countenanced. The statutes, KRS ...
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Com., Dept. of Highways v. Hess
...deprive him of his sole or principal means of ingress and egress. Wright v. Flood, 304 Ky. 122, 200 S.W.2d 117; Standiford Civic Club v. Commonwealth, Ky., 289 S.W.2d 498.' The holding here is that a property owner has no compensable property right in the road to be closed even though his p......
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...taking because the abutting owner has no property right in the continued maintenance or the particular highway. Standiford Civic Club v. Commonwealth, Ky., 289 S.W.2d 498, on the point for which the appellees cite it, was overruled by Department of Highways v. Jackson, Ky., 302 S.W.2d EFFEC......
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Department of Highways v. Jackson
...case departed from the established law of Kentucky, and should be overruled. They further argue that in Standiford Civic Club v. Commonwealth, Ky., 289 S.W.2d 498, it was held that a landowner has a property right in the continued maintenance of either a county road or a city street passing......
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Ex parte Com., Dept. of Highways
...deprive him of his sole or principal means of ingress and egress. Wright v. Flood, 304 Ky. 122, 200 S.W.2d 117; Standiford Civic Club v. Commonwealth, Ky., 289 S.W.2d 498. It may well be that where the closing will have such a result, the closing may not be effected until the damages have b......